De Litteris by Jordan, Robert W et al.
Connecticut College 
Digital Commons @ Connecticut College 
Connecticut College Books Linda Lear Center for Special Collections & Archives 
1973 
De Litteris 
Robert W. Jordan 
Eugene P. Cognon 
Gordon P. Wiles 
Susan M. Woody 
James R. Baird 
See next page for additional authors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/ccbooks 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Linda Lear Center for Special Collections & Archives at 
Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Connecticut College Books by an 
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. For more information, please contact 
bpancier@conncoll.edu. 
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author. 
Authors 







©Connecticut College Library 1978 
Publication made possible, in part, by a grant from 
The Mellon Foundation 
D E  L I T T E R I S  
Occasional Papers in the Humanities 
Edited by 
Marijan Despalatovic 
Connecticut College Library 
New London 
And they want to know what we talked about? 
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Both of ancient times and our own, in short the usual subjects 
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Since 1973 the annual series of faculty lectures known as De Litteris 
has been an important contribution to cross-disciplinary endeavor at 
Connecticut College. The creativity and scholarly rigor of the papers 
have rewarded the careful listener with insights into varied aspects of 
the human condition. It is appropriate that the Library should spon­
sor the publication of this selection from De Litteris for the Library 
may be seen as a symbol of the diversity — and ultimate unity — of 
knowledge. Its collections record not only man's achievement, but the 
vast commentary upon that achievement and they provide a fund of 
resource material without which teaching and learning could not oc­
cur. In publishing these seven papers the Library is performing a 
variation of its traditional responsibility to make ideas and informa­




By Way of an Introduction 
The circumstances surrounding De Litteris are minor; the whole an­
nual series of lectures in the humanities, now in its seventh year, is a 
minor event in the profusion of such events visited upon the par­
ticipants in the nebulous rites of higher education. The concerns of the 
contributors to this slim volume, however, constitute a significant cir­
cumstance. It alone, I think, may explain why the essays taken as a 
whole convey a hazy shape of a methodology; just as one of Conrad's 
misty halos sometimes made visible by "the spectral illumination of 
the moonshine" makes it possible to infer the central presence, a core. 
I dare say everybody has had a dream in which a visitor from 
another world gravely and with intimidating simplicity wishes to ob­
tain an answer to a perfectly ordinary question regarding some essen­
tial cause of the sleeper's vocation or profession. The sleeper in­
variably stumbles through several progressively less coherent begin­
nings and wrenching the right word from the blackness wakes up just 
as the word is about to pass over his lips. The word slips away. 
Unspoken? Unheard? Unremembered? The sleeper, now thoroughly 
awake, is saturated with the certainty that he has given the visitor a 
comprehensive, substantive answer, but the answer is enveloped by 
the dream, irretrievable yet horribly urgent. 
Fanciful? Yes. For nowadays, if we are at all honest, we know that 
if we cannot give an answer we are not going to wake up. And the 
visitor is not from another world, but our kinsman. And he wishes to 
know why learning is important. And dogmatic answers will not 
satisfy him for long. Nor will he find much comfort in the observation 
that each culture is a Bastille unto itself, that it storms itself 
periodically to proclaim its old newness. He wants an answer. 
The purpose of learning is simple enough: it is "to recover what has 
been lost and found and lost again and again," as Eliot says in East 
Coker. And the task is always undertaken with imperfect tools, 
against a ceaselessly shifting mindscape. Thus the disciplined doing 
often appears to be the only stable, recognizable property of learning. 
When that is the case, the doing becomes an insidious and irresistible 
threat to learning. It is, therefore, imperative that what we do be sub­
jected to regular and systematic theoretical scrutiny, lest our thought 
becomes opaque to itself and we become unable to think that our 
thought may be wrong. 
De Litteris is a brief record of what happens when guardians try to 
guard themselves. 
M.D. 
Some Philosophical Remarks About Poetry 
Robert W. Jordan 
Several years ago, in The Sewanee Review, I tried to defend the 
thesis that poetry and philosophy are two modes of revelation and that 
while they must, of course, be distinguished, they must not be 
separated. To separate them, as I thought then and as I think now, is 
to diminish our chances for a comprehensive vision of the human con­
dition and, therefore, to insure that we shall fall far short of the best 
that we might become. The thesis still has much to recommend it. In­
deed, I now feel its significance with a much greater sense of urgency. 
It entails a number of unresolved fundamental questions concerning 
truth, sensibility and the nature of the interior life, the nature of 
education and the goals which a liberal arts education should pursue, 
and, above all, the question of non-conceptual knowledge which, I 
think, is the most important issue in contemporary philosophy. At any 
rate, it ought to be. I wish that I had something stunningly original 
and crushingly true to say about even one of these questions. As it is, I 
can only suggest why they are momentous and indicate the direction 
one must take in seeking answers to them. 
Consider the question of poetic truth. I do not mean "poetic 
truth", nor the trivial matter of whether poetry sometimes contains 
assertions which could be regarded as true. We do not usually think of 
individual poems as bearers of truth although it would not be difficult 
to find examples which do just that, among the many other things that 
they do. But such poems are rightly understood only within the con-
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text of the whole body of work by a single poet, or within the context 
o writings by a group of poets who share a common vision such as, 
or example, the English romantic poets. The questions, then, might 
be put in the following way: does such a body of work reveal to us 
aspects of the truth concerning Nature, Man and God, or does it mere-
y,rePresent a spontaneity of impulse which finds some echo in us or 
which, at least, sweetens our emotional life, thus yielding the illusion 
of joy where no joy is? Whatever the answer to this question may be it 
must be understood as having to do with poetic truth straight out, 
W1n quptation marks, double or single. I shall assume that what is 
called poetic or artistic truth tells us something about the way things 
are which we could not learn in any other way. 
uch a forthright affirmation is difficult to accept. Poetry is, of 
course, to e taken seriously, but literary fundamentalism is no more 
attractive than the Biblical variety and we all know how absurd that is. 
ere ore, qualifications are in order and are quickly forthcoming. In 
b^r\°n lf\r 1 
Santayana says> "Art is action which transcending the 
body makes the world a more congenial stimulus to the soul. All art is 
J"e ore ,use J1 anc* Practical, and the notable aesthetic value which 
f t)f„WOr S °. art Ppssess> for reasons flowing for the most part out 
nffVrc'f SI® Icance, is itself one of the satisfactions which art 
otters to human nature as a whole." 
a thin8 can be practical and useful, like Ptolemaic astronomy, 
rr ug t™e. Santayana is an extremely seductive philosopher 
cent h! 7f° f hlS temperament and are therefore disposed to ac-
tavlna the K frequently escaPes their notice that in San-
in the eoM TFalJlfe 18 8ubtly transformed into the aesthetic life. And 
has been rhmT T tWn ° .morning there comes the realization that one 
his DO11 I HAVE admired Santayana, and I still do, as I admire 
fhesrfientlemen thPart WallaCC StCVens' ~ excessively, i would pay 
calling them H suPreme compliment [as Plato did to Homer] of 
t?mraVd in thifj'0?- 1 t3ke them Very> seriously. But at this 
fellow-poets say Se'Tom'^ QUeStion: is what they and thdr 
outrageous as J™, I T e pomt of view the question is 
concerned with th. OVe.r ° P°etry would protest, but I am not here 
n^Ts a PW osoDhieParmt °f ^ The QUestion 1 want to consider 
literary criticism qUestlon intimately related to questions of 
ArlstotlVto A?prLemeethatntt a^°ng philosophers' from Plato and 
that we enter the area of the / ia a Property of propositions, and 
the level of propositions W h*C falsC °nly when we speak at 
that they are or S thev A T S3y that thin*s are true. We say e, or that they exist. A dog is not true or false; a dog simply 
exists. We may say that the dog before us now is a 'true' New­
foundland or a 'true' Miniature Schnauzer, meaning that the dog has 
the points required by the standards set for judging a genuine instance 
of a given breed of dog. And that is all that we usually mean when we 
use the word "true" in this way. Whether we could mean something 
more than that I shall put aside for the moment. I shall also put aside 
the question of whether the word "true" could appropriately be used 
of the works of art other than poetry, such as painting, sculpture, 
music, and so on. If we cannot make sense of "truth" as applied to 
poetry, which uses words, it is not likely that we shall succeed with 
painting or sculpture, and music presents enormous problems of a 
special kind. To mention but one: is there a grammar or language of 
music which corresponds in any way to the language of poetry? Let us 
suppose that the answer to that question is Yes. In that case, would it 
make any sense at all to speak of a musical composition as true? (If 
one has a season of speculation). The non-verbal arts present special 
difficulties, but I hope that if we can make a case for poetic truth it 
might be possible to consider other arts in a similar way. 
Statements made in propositional form can be true or false and we 
distinguish them from non-propositional utterances such as exclama­
tions, orders, questions, and so on. Poetry contains many proposi­
tional statements, but when we look for useful examples we find that 
they do not seem to fit our ordinary conception of a proposition, the 
most obvious difference being that the poetic utterance does not raise 
questions about truth or falsehood at all. On the contrary. Therefore, 
to treat a poem as if it were a logical argument shows a want of sen­
sitivity and discernment. 
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting 
The Soul that rises with us, on life's Star 
Had elsewhere its setting 
And cometh from afar 
Not in entire forgetfulness 
And not in utter nakedness 
But trailing clouds of glory do we come 
From God, who is our home: 
Heaven lies about us in our infancy. 
True or false? If we choose to play the game I would be inclined to 
accept these assertions. I might not express them in the same way and, 
of course, not as well. But I would not call them false. Yet, that leaves 
only "true", unless one chooses to say that these words are merely 
saturated with emotion, that they are expressive of Wordswort s 
mood at the time of composition and dependent for their effect on 
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one's mood at the time of reading. In that case the question of truth or 
a sehood does not arise, but such a position hardly does justice to 
Wordsworth's affirmation, which surely goes beyond the expression 
of a mood. 
And yet, to say "true" does not seem quite right either. Many 
would probably hold that Wordsworth is talking romantic nonsense. 
would adow us to admire the passage as an apt expression of a 
specific human feeling, but they would urge us not to spoil the 
false V3'Ue t'1C Passa®e by worrying about whether it is true or 
But why not? Here it will be helpful to take a long look backwards 
to the classical philosophers of ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle 
passed on to us not only their specific views about the nature of 
things; they also taught us what it means to think. The Greek under­
standing of thinking was one of the greatest achievements in Western 
civilization, and I intend no disparagement of it when I say that it still 
has us in thrall, even in bondage. It established the standards for what 
it means to think and, of course, we cannot do without it. But what we 
learn from it is that thinking is conceptual. It moves through concepts 
w,lc are ® bearers of meaning, and meanings are universals. Any 
o er orm of thinking is either an illusion or an emotional substitute 
for responsible thought. 
To return to Wordsworth's lines. We can see that they are quite 
nnHp8 / °HWfV,r as tbe'r meaning is concerned. Anyone can 
following linesV181 ^ ^ Said in them" What about the 
Life, like a many-coloured glass, 
Stains the white radiance of eternity. 
buHfT °F fa!f? My resP°nse t0 th«se lines is quick and positive, 
a critic o^srhnT Z ^ ZUSt what they mean 1 sha11 have to appeal to 
the common readen CSS * iS t0 ilUerpret difficult P°etry f°r 
Now consider two stanzas of one of Housman's poems: 
Shot? So quick an ending? 
Oh, that was right, lad, that was brave-
Yours was not an ill for mending, 
Twas best to take it to the grave. 
Oh you had forethought, you could reason, 
A  ̂ S,aw your road and where it led 
And early wise and brave in season 
"ut the pistol to your head 
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True or false? Surely, false. I think that Houseman at his best will be 
read as long as English poetry is read; but this is Housman at his 
worst. It is sloppily sentimental and altogether meretricious. It is 
phoney. I cannot deny that someone who relishes the suicidal mood 
and has a taste for self-pity might think that this particular poem is 
one of the best things that he has ever read. But I think that if he 
resists self-destruction long enough he could be persuaded to change 
his mind. 
At any rate, in answer to the question True or False? we have in the 
first case "True", in the second "Who knows?", and in the third ex­
ample, "False". The fact that these are my personal judgments 
presents no problem. The answers I have given are possible answers 
and they are not meaningless. I claim that the above poetic assertions 
and others like them belong in the realm of the true and the false. The 
examples also show that such claims can be made even when passages 
are taken out of context, that is, in isolation from the work of which 
they are parts. My claim is ambitious and I am now in trouble. But let 
us consider the trouble I am in. 
I have said that when philosophers talk about truth being proposi-
tional they are talking about conceptual knowledge and discursive 
thought. Concepts are universals — such as man, justice, beauty, and 
so on. The accounts of how universals are formed differ greatly, but I 
think that there would be general agreement that propositions are 
formed by the assertion of an agreement or disagreement between 
concepts, or between singulars and concepts. The agreement can be a 
priori, or it can be empirical. That is, some propositions are true by 
virtue of the meanings which the concepts have.Tamiliar examples are 
"All bachelors are unmarried," or "A square is not a circle. Other 
propositions are empirical such as "The cat is on the mat, or ere 
is a gazelle in the courtyard." If a proposition is to be regarded as 
true, it must be verifiable. This is a crucial point. A priori propositions 
require no verification because what is said in the subject is identica 
with what is said in the predicate. On the other hand, empirica pro 
positions must be capable of verification, where verification means 
that the statement in question is open to empirical observation y 
anyone with the normal faculties of sense perception. 1JV11V *» 1L11 lliv 11VZ1 111U1 l «v w » 10 rpl 
what ,irr\niH it r»ninrp tn verifv anv of my three examples. The 
vai^guiy liiiauuic 13 utmg, 
discourse is being used in another universe of discourse w ere 1 
rightful place and no accepted meaning. Thus mis-use e 1 ^ 
verification is not only unhelpful: it stands in the way o un er 
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ding poetry. Second — and this is far more important — it will be said 
at poetic utterances cannot be verified anyway, that they exist out­
side ot the realm of verifiable statements. Unfortunately, we live 
under a scientific imperialism as powerful as the philosophical im-
peria ism o t e ancient Greeks or the theological imperialism of the 
mediaeval scholasUc philosophers. Everyone 'knows' that verification 
. n er , e con*ro1 experimental science in the sense that science 
tells us what verification means. But to define verification is, in effect, 
tLt ,ln a ance for what is to be called true or false. I realize 
hest ^neFif wZ3tl°jS akout Sc^ence a°d its methods are hazardous at 
ffa ! uponwhich philosopher of science one reads and 
u . j U , ^ that it is safe to say that the whole question of 
nlanalSf f f 1S u generalIy understood as finding an ex-
p an^tion for somethmg by deducing it from a universal law or princi-
and historical Understanding.1'dCd ^ C°VCr ^ hiSt°riCal kn°W'edge 
whkh questlon I,want to raise now »s this: is there anything in poetry 
specificXS^S-t0tlhe f°rmal structure logical arguments? More 
aware that 'the nh * movement of the ™nd in each case? I am 
sTiesdnt that > 3Se m°V!ment of the mind" is a metaphor. I am 
bofffn kfe?anH 15 a metaphor we cann°t do without. I take it that 
What sort Hk im P°etry WC are offered a disclosure of some kind. 
of the mler 1 ST"*." V* h°W d°es k work? The standard view 
nobod™id ™etaphor makCS poetry work- And I assume that 
of the subtleties n/ & metaphor is crucial for the poetic rendering 
quatdy express ButTs^ WhiCh u°rdinary language cannot ade" 
themselves are HmPi ? me at most metaphors, taken by 
mon with the valid fnSS °r ess and this is what they have in com-
that this is all that the * 1? S ° .argument i° logic. I would hasten to add 
I hope that this is enl c°mmon with logically valid forms, but nope tnat this is enough for the comparison I want to make 
As a beginning consider the following line" 
Bare ruined choirs where late the sweet birds sang. 
have read kmanytimefpart of^A Tr^ silentlj!or aloud- although I 
line can affect me so stron 1 u am after is ttle reason why this 
realize that many peonle ufho & nCW reading- Just by the way, I 
this particular line But r v FC P°ctry will not respond as I do to 
an experience like mine in r<^ UrC l° tkat everyone will have had 
special meaning for them We^6 t0 Si?mC kne °r lines which have a 
the same thing but only about the001 C l° talk sPecificaHy about 
elementary level of " "" 
If we look now at the whole poem from which the line is taken, 
Shakespeare's Sonnet 73, we find that the first twelve lines of the son­
net develop three related metaphors. 
That time of year thou may'st in me behold 
When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang 
Upon those boughs which shake against the cold, 
Bare ruined choirs where late the sweet birds sang. 
In me thou seest the twilight of such day 
As after sunset fadeth in the west, 
Which by and by black night doth take away, 
Death's second self that seals up all in rest. 
In me thou seest the glowing of such fire 
That on the ashes of his youth doth lie, 
As the deathbed whereon it must expire, 
Consumed with that which it was nourished by. 
This though perceiv'st, which makes thy love more 
strong, 
To love that well which though must leave ere long. 
Now, and in much of what follows, I shall borrow shamelessly from 
several writers whose work I have found particularly helpful for the 
kind of inquiry I am engaged in, and most of all from a book by 
Winifred Nowottny, The Language Poets Use.2 In opening her 
discussion of Sonnet 73, Ms. Nowottny quotes a comment on the son­
net by Hallett Smith in which he says that "the richness of the sonnet 
derives more from its metaphorical involutions than it does from the 
clarity of its structure." Smith had said earlier, 
Sonnet 73 is clear in its general design. The three 
quatrains have a relationship to each other and a 
natural development. They proceed from the declin­
ing of the year to the declining of the day to a declin-
- ing of the fire, bringing the metaphorical point closer 
to the subject as the poem progresses.3 
The clarity in this general design or ground-plan is the clarity of 
abstractions, a declining, a declining, and a declining. If we pay atten­
tion to the general design we may come to think that the three sets of 
particulars are intended to illustrate a common abstraction. But this is 
palpably absurd. The general design leaves out the richness of the son­
net, and it could not be otherwise. On this point Nowottny deserves to 
be quoted at some length. She says, 
I cannot think of a better way of putting the dif­
ference between a poetic and a non-poetic structure 
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than to say that poetic structuring consists of more 
. than a clear relation between clear abstractions, giv­
ing a general continuity to an utterance. Though this 
kind of clarity and continuity, obviously, is a marked 
and carefully contrived feature of this sonnet, it is 
equally obvious that to describe this clear and con­
tinuous ground-plan does not throw any light on the 
causes of the excitement we feel on reading the son­
net; there is nothing exciting in merely being told that 
the onset of winter and the coming of night and the 
dwindling of a fire are all examples of decline and 
that they metaphorically describe what the poet feels. 
If that is all, who cares?4 
Just so! But we do care! Why? 
We care because of the way in which these examples 
are particularized. The ground-plan, continuous and 
clear, permits the particularizing but it does not of 
itself effect it. What it does effect is some of the 
relating of the particulars to one another. The 
ground-plan relates the particulars to one another by 
provoking us to abstract from them a common for­
mula and so it makes us relate all three metaphors to 
one another as examples of the same thing.5 
Metaphors are examples of "the same thing'. In this sense they are 
tenseless or static in themselves. But the particulars say something 
else; that these examples are different. What is the same and yet dif­
ferent is a simple definition of what philosophers call an analogous 
term, one kind of which is the metaphor. In general, a metaphor 
seems to contain a contradiction. Its form is "Such and such is the 
case, but really it isn't." The lion is the king of beasts but, of course, 
the lion is no such thing. Lions are not kings and kings are not lions, 
although we can speak of a king as a lion of a man. At this point we 
are inclined to adopt the expression "mere metaphor." Or, to be more 
accurate, philosophers are inclined to make that mistake, or, to be 
even more accurate, philosophers of a certain persuasion are inclined 
to make that mistake. But we can be sure of one thing: it is a mistake. 
Why? 6 
Let us assume for the moment that it is a mistake and ask two 
preliminary questions: What kind of mistake is it? and, is it an impor­
tant mistake or a trivial one? I would suggest that it is both an 
ontological and an epistemological mistake. That is to say, it is a 
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mistake about reality and about the nature of knowledge. And it is so 
far from being trivial we must acknowledge it to be at the very heart of 
the question about poetic or artistic truth. The phrase mere 
metaphor" would refer to a figure of speech which is not to be taken 
seriously, at least so far as its cognitive value is concerned. However, 
we should distinguish between the poet's response to the charge of 
employing "mere metaphor" and the critic's response to that 
criticism. , . 
First, the critic's response. Rene Wellek, in an essay entitled, 
"Philosophy and Postwar American Criticism," points out that 
from the late 20's to the early 60's (and I think we can extend this to 
the present time) critics became "more clearly conscious of their 
philosophical affiliations and assumptions." Elder Olson could say, 
for example, that "criticism is a department of philosophy . Wellek 
reminds us, further, that critics have been influenced by philosophers 
of quite diverse persuasions, all the way from Plato and Aris o e o 
Kant and Bergson. Since Wellek's essay was first published the 
dialogue between philosophy and literary criticism as coninue 
unabated. One might say the critics have learned from philosophy tha 
many of the central problems of criticism, such as poetic truth and t 
ontological status of works of art, are distinctive y p i' °®°P 1 
blems. Philosophers, on the other hand, have learne (o 
learned) from the critics that if philosophy is to support cr^ls 
the arts and literature it must not reduce meaning tothe bare urn oc y 
of formal logic, that, as Aristotle warned, we should^not 
more precision in our inquiry than the subject ma er p ' b 
we expect, then, that the phrase "mere metaphor" would no longer be 
tolerated? We used that phrase when we were comparing p 
with something better, such as a bald statemen . 'no:ntjess 
metaphor is not an instrument of knowledge in any instru 
to speak of "mere metaphor." On the other hand, if it 15 
ment of knowledge (as I think it is) then to spea o 
is not just pointless, — it is a serious mista e. , 
Unfortunately, we cannot conclude that the.ancient Quarrel between 
poetry and philosophy has been, or 1S a'3°u ' , jt name 
problem confronts both the critic an^thep i osop^ ^ lgarn that 
is paradox. If we consult the OED in t receiveci 
"paradox" can mean or has meant a statemen incredible 
opinion, often with the implication that it1S mar ^ ̂  helcl tQ 
but it can also mean something that is discor 
be established truth. It can also mean (and this is I take it he cur 
rently received opinion, a statement or 
of it seems self-contradictory, absurd, o 
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sense, though when it is explained it may prove to be well-founded or 
essentially true. 
Philosophers have a standard response to paradox, one which is 
understandable because it is often justifiable. They try to get rid of the 
paradox by showing that it is, in fact, a contradiction. We can say 
contradictory things, but we cannot mean contradictions. For this 
reason I distrust the notion which critics express almost with satisfac­
tion, that the poet (or painter, or composer) must deliberately strive 
for paradox or ambiguity. This notion is unintelligible. If it were true 
poetry would, in the final analysis, be undiscussable, even if critics, 
for reasons known only to themselves, continued to discuss it. A re­
cent example from the field of music is Leonard Bernstein's broadcast 
talks at Harvard, published under the title The Unanswered Question. 
But among literary critics it is Cleanth Brooks, in The Well Wrought 
Urn and later writings, who has defended the view that for the poet 
paradox is inevitable. The following passage from his analysis of 
Donne's "The Canonization" is representative: 
I submit that the only way by which the poet could say 
what "The Canonization" says is by paradox. More 
direct methods may be tempting, but all of them enfee­
ble and distort what is to be said.7 
But what, so far as I can see, goes largely unnoticed is that in this 
analysis of Donne's poem and other poems in the same book. Brooks 
shows that the paradox is not a contradiction. The paradox is not 
eliminated or resolved by the translation of the poem into the univoci-
ty of a paraphrase, for the very good reason that the poem cannot be 
paraphrased without being destroyed as a poem. I have a suggestion to 
make to the defenders of a paradox and ambiguity, and it is this: We 
do not have to say that the poet deliberately employs paradox in order 
to say what he wants to say. We can say that the poet must risk the use 
of paradox and therefore the possibility of being misunderstood or 
regarded as 'difficult', because he must work not merely with abstrac­
tions but with the complexity of the world and the richness of our ex­
perience when we try to understand our world and ourselves. I have 
always liked this passage from Austin Farrer's book A Rebirth of Im­
ages, 
There is a current and exceedingly stupid doctrine that 
symbol evokes emotion, and exact prose states reality. 
Nothing could be further from the truth: exact prose 
abstracts from reality, symbol presents it. And for that 
reason, symbols have some of the many-sidedness of 
wild nature.8 
10 
I turn now to the poet's response to the charge of employing "mere 
metaphor", assuming that he thinks it worthwhile to respond at all. I 
must make the qualification because we cannot complain if poets 
simply ignore charges of this kind. Why should they not ignore them? 
We want, I take it, poets to write poetry, painters to paint pictures, 
composers to write music, and so on through all of the arts. How 
helpful would it be to an artist if he were told that he is making an ob­
ject of knowledge sui generis which has a special ontological status? If 
he spends a significant amount of time worrying about the ontological 
status of what he is making, he will not get anything made at all. He 
would probably be inclined to settle for W.H. Auden's suggestion that 
we can expect two things from a poem. One is that it be well con­
structed as befits the work of a good craftsman, and the other is that it 
should present to us some aspect of reality about which we already 
possess some knowledge, but in a new way or from an entirely new 
perspective. Ordinarily, in the role of common reader, I should be 
quite happy to accept Auden's account and go on reading. In fact, 
that is just what I do, and what I shall continue to do. But with respect 
to the theme I am discussing, poetic truth, I must say that things are 
not so simple. 
No artist is pure artist. No poet is pure poet. There is a limit to the 
artist's autonomy, which is in any case, largely a matter of skill. He 
cannot escape from the prevailing winds of doctrine any more than 
any of us can. There is a claim, implicit in any artist's work, that the 
thing he creates reveals to us new dimensions of reality and of truth. 
The common reader, again, is not inclined to challenge that claim, 
unless some critic or philosopher puts him up to it. But when the claim 
is challenged, the artist may find himself unequipped to answer the 
charge. An artist qua artist is not under any obligation to justify his ac­
tion. But one of the things I am trying to show is that if nobody can 
justify it, we are all in trouble. We are naturally disposed to think that 
the creator of a work of art or literature knows more about it than 
anyone else could possibly know. And so he does, if we are thinking of 
the artist as the maker of a work. But neither his skill as a craftsman 
nor his intention in producing it are decisive where the question of 
truth is concerned. 
Now, when the poet does choose to answer the charge that he is, 
after all, using merely figures of speech which are no more than ex­
pressive or emotive, his response seems to take one of two forms. 
C. Day Lewis's analysis in The Poet's Way of Knowledge is typical. 
The first response is the suggestion that there are remarkable affinities 
between the method of science and the method of poetry. An interest­
ing parallel strategy is to be found in the writings of some apologists 
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for religion, who point out that an unbiased mind perceives an ele­
ment of "faith" in all human efforts to gain knowledge, and that re­
ligion and science are not so far apart after all. The trick will not work 
with religion and it will not work with poetry either. These won­
derful romantic terms such as "force," "power" or "energy" which 
lend themselves so readily to metaphorical interpretation yield very 
quickly to technical terms, that is, to concepts univocally defined and 
expressed in the austere notation of mathematics. One will never dis­
cern in that language "the force that through the green fuse drives the 
flower". 
The second response, the kind C. Day Lewis seems to prefer, is that 
the function of a poem is to "communicate a unique state of mind." I 
cannot see that a poem "communicates" anything, but anyone other­
wise minded would do well to read Chapter Four of The Well 
Wrought Urn. Consider the following passage from Lewis: 
. . .  i f  p o e t s  a r e  n o t  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  ' l i f e ,  
naked living', at its most intense, and with giving us the 
feeling of it, then I do not know what they are up to. The 
initial stage of making a poem is often a kind of groping in 
the dark . . . The clue, the donnee, whatever it be, may 
have a self-evident bearing on what happens to be preoccu­
pying the poet at the time; or it may seem to have none at 
all. The poet fixes this clue as bait on the end of his line, 
casts it into the sea of his experience, and in a watchful 
passivity waits for whatever may attach itself to the bait.9 
I find it extremely difficult to believe that this is what poets are up 
to, or that this is more than a very small part of what they are up to. 
Their work-sheets seem to show something quite different. But I do 
not want to press the matter. I am, however, certain that this is not 
what philosophers and scientists are up to, even though I think that 
there is a visionary element in both philosophy and science. The 
passage wonderfully confirms the positivist contention that the 
language of poetry, like all emotive language, is an expression of feel­
ings and consequently neither true nor false. The poet, accordingly, 
has no access to knowledge. As poet he may cast his bait, but even if 
he happens to make a true statement it is not as poet that he makes it 
but as something else, perhaps as part-time philosopher. 
Let us return to our sonnet. Branches are choirs, but of course they 
are not choirs at all. Birds sing as choristers sing, but they do nothing 
of the sort. If anyone thinks that all that Shakespeare is doing is play­
ing with words to produce an ingenious paradox, I simply do not 
understand what that could mean. I would expect any reflective reader 
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to perceive intuitively that no adequate substitute for line four could 
be produced which was free from paradox, assuming what we really 
cannot assume, that an adequate substitute could be produced at all. 
The univocal mind will always respond to a metaphor in the same 
way: p and not-p, and therefore, a contradiction. But it is possible, as 
the work of Cleanth Brooks illustrates so clearly, that the apparent 
contradiction is just that, apparent, and that the paradox is not a con­
tradiction. It is not always easy to show this because of the complexity 
of interlocking metaphors in a particular poem, or because the poet 
writes obscurely. Dylan Thomas's poetry is a good example of how 
difficult the task of interpretation can be. But in the example under 
consideration the task is not difficult. I would interpret line four as 
asserting the following: 
empty choirs as bare branches 
absence of human song absence of bird song 
Where is the contradiction? The proportion does not assert that 
bare branches are empty choirs, and we know that they are not. This is 
a comparison not of one thing to another but of one relationship to 
another. In the traditional discussion of analogous terms this state­
ment would be called a proportionality. Using that language for con­
venience, I think we can now bring forward the dominant figure in the 
whole sonnet and say that what we have in the sonnet is a propor­
tionality in the mode of "declining." Read in this way, we can grasp 
at once the dynamic power of line four. Stated in it is a proportiona­
lity stateable, we might have thought, only in a prosaic assertion or 
paraphrase. And it is stated in such a way that the word "inevitably 
comes to mind at once. Shakespeare's incredible ability to do this kind 
of thing over and over again (Keats called it Negative Capability), is a 
practical, poetical solution of one of the most fundamental and peren­
nial problems of philosophy — the problem of the one and the many 
or, more accurately, the problem of the one in the many. If there is 
anything 'inevitably' built into poetic utterance, it is the analogous 
term. I said earlier that a metaphor always says p but not-p. But this is 
to reckon without analogy — because analogy means sameness 
within difference" but without contradiction. 
I can see the thing working and I fancy that anyone can see it work­
ing. Well then, may I simply rest my case and await congratulations 
Of course not. I said earlier that our Greek heritage is not an unmixe 
blessing. But we cannot abandon it. If we do, there can be no intel­
ligible discourse whatever. For that reason confident and robust asser­
tion that poetic truth is sui generis and therefore transcends the 
sphere of logic and consistency altogether is sheer nonsense. ere is 
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no hope of defending poetic truth (and theological truth) by making 
this desperate move. 
On the other hand, it is obvious that poetic utterance will never fit 
the pattern of conceptual knowledge. When we talk about poety, we 
engage in conceptual analysis. Critical commentary and evaluation are 
necessarily conceptual. Otherwise, the critic could only produce 
another poem, leaving to us the task he was supposed to perform, viz., 
the evaluation of the poem in question. All that this comes to, 
however, is that if there is such a thing as non-conceptual knowledge 
we cannot make sense of it by somehow switching off our conceptual 
knowledge while we experience a non-conceptual mode of knowing. 
The only problem here is whether there is, in fact, what must be 
described as non-conceptual knowledge. But let us assume that much, 
for the sake of the argument. Our troubles are far from over. 
One of those prevailing winds of doctrine tells us that a proposi-
tional statement which is not a tautology must be open to verification. 
What stands in the way of the acceptance, of a general acceptance, of 
poetic truth (and also of theological or religious truth) is the princi­
ple of verifiability. If poetic assertions claim to be true, or if anyone 
claims truth for them, all the polite concessions from philosophers 
and scientists will be withdrawn. Do you, by chance, remember C.P. 
Snpw's Two Cultures? And do you remember that there never were 
two cultures, really. There was only one, and that was the scientific 
culture. The pattern is typical, I think: the appearance of a concession 
which as soon as the discussion becomes serious turns out to be only 
that, an apparent concession but not a real one. 
Let us return once more to Sonnet 73. Consider this question: how 
would one go about verifying Sonnet 73? I acknowledge, once again, 
that the question sounds idiotic. It sounds like a question which could 
be asked only by someone who lacks any imagination and who 
possesses an uncommonly literal mind. To the literal mind verifica­
tion means taking a look or getting a pointer reading, and nothing 
more. In that event, there is no parallel between the language of 
poetry and the language of science. There is a parallel, and an impor-
, tant one, but it is between poetic utterances and assertions which are 
made in the context of interpersonal relationships. For example, a 
man tells his wife that he loves her. We cannot get a pointer reading on 
that one. We cannot verify that statement by taking a look, not even 
^ a c,l°ser look. I think that statements of this kind can be 
verified and, in fact, we confirm or disconfirm them all the time. Such 
assertions are also at the very heart of religious language and the 
anguage of moral discourse, but that is another story altogether. 
1 shall assume that the language of Sonnet 73 embodies a truth of 
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some kind, that it illuminates at least one aspect of our human condi­
tion, and that it does so in such a way that we respond to it af­
firmatively. The form of the sonnet is static, of course, as tenseless 
and timeless as a logical form. It must be particularized in order to 
mean anything. However, as soon as particularization begins we are 
no longer concerned with abstract or static forms. The particulariza­
tion introduces action. A poem moves, and its movement is reflected 
in the activity of the mind — our activity in trying to assimilate what 
the language of the poem offers us. (In what follows I shall regard 
knowledge as the assimilation of reality — a reality which is indepen­
dent of the knowing agent.) 
In one of his essays, Louis Mackey makes this observation: 
In the course of teaching mediaeval philosophy I have 
observed that the doctrinal affirmations of the Augusti-
nian tradition, though supported by careful and rigorous 
proofs, tend to bounce lightly and ineffectually off the 
tympana of modern students. But the poetry of that tradi­
tion, its pervasive argumentum ad imaginem, induces 
reverence. St. Bernard's extravaganza on the love of God 
speaks more persuasively than the ontological argument; 
the former enthralls the imagination, the latter (with some 
notable exceptions) inspires refutation.10 
I have had the same experience in teaching. Perhaps the response 
was not quite reverence, but it expressed the conviction that the struc­
ture of images was more important than the formal argument. In con­
firming Mackey's observation I am not putting poetry on a eve 
lower. Here is another passage from Mackey, this one from t e 
preface to his book, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet: 
a "poetic" reading is the best reading of any philosophy 
that still professes to love wisdom . . • Philosophy is not 
only dialectic, producing conviction. It is also rhetorica , 
aimed at persuading. All actual philosophical discourse is 
addressed, not to a putative pure rational anyone u o 
a particular "someone" in a particular context. 
If anyone wants to disagree with this assessment of philosophy, he will 
have to refute Plato and Plato's teacher as well. And anyone who 
wants the job can have it for the asking. Mackey adds another com­
ment which, I think, is squarely on target: 
Nothing, of course, could be less poetic —- nor' J 
less philosophical — than those philosophies that prefer 
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the mechanical clatter of logical symbols, the abstemious 
one-upmanship of language analysis, or the jejune solemn­
ities of the epoche, to the untidy and rather dangerous 
mysteries of the philosophia perennis. But every 
philosopher worthy of this birth-right is also "a kind of 
poet". 
I have now reached the point of no return. So, I may as well keep 
going. We should, indeed, revive the argumentum ad imaginem. But, 
is there any way of showing the possibility, not to mention the desira­
bility, of such a project? One of the more interesting things in Nowot-
tny's The Language Poets Use is her refusal to go along with the 
veneration of the metaphor as the sole repository of poetic power and 
energy. Her discussion of this point is too detailed even to be sum­
marized here. It is designed to show that syntax is in many ways more 
important for understanding a poem and how the poem 'works' than 
metaphor is, but that we shall never appreciate the role of syntax as 
long as we continue to make metaphor the center of attention. If we 
follow this suggestion we shall see at once that the syntactical structure 
of a poem, a particularly clear example of which is Sonnet 73, requires 
that the mind move through the structure of images, often metaphors 
of course, in such a way as to enact or act out the meaning of the 
poem. I realize that the phrase "movement of the mind" is yet 
another metaphor but in the nature of the case nothing less than a 
metaphor will do. The movement of the mind, then, can be regarded 
as an analogue of an argument expressed in conceptual terms. It has a 
beginning (an initial premise), intermediate steps (additional premise), 
and a conclusion (what the poem finally affirms). Clearly, the domi­
nant role here is played by the imagination. Discursive reasoning is 
secondary, although it is still operating. Otherwise — that is, if reason 
were not acting simultaneously with the imagination, — there would 
be no meaning of any kind. We should frequently remind ourselves, 
especially if we are philosophers, that words which in ordinary 
language stand for concepts become symbols or signs when they are 
used in poems. Even the simplest words do this. Juliet says of Romeo: 
".. .and when he shall die, 
Take him and cut him out in little stars, 
And he will make the face of heaven so fine, 
That all the world will be in love with night, 
And pay no worship to the garish sun." 
These are quite ordinary words, but the language is quite extraor-
inary. hat I am suggesting is that we must substitute extraordinary 
anguage analysis for ordinary language analysis. 
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William Poteat has written very perceptively about the symbolic 
transformation of words made to become elements of experience 
which is being acted out. "These symbolic associations," he says, 
"are elements in the structure or shape of each one's own way of liv­
ing in the world. Our way of feeling in the world, the rhythms of our-
being at home here have some kind of order, and therefore may be 
thought of as having a kind of syntax." He suggests further that 
reflective people are inclined to think all intellectual encounters are 
essentially arguments, and all arguments are of one sort, that is, 
arguments in which the assumptions are quite clear and held in com­
mon, where the problem is clearly understood and the rules of in­
ference are clear and well defined. But how many times in our lives 
have we been in that situation? We do not live in the antiseptic at­
mosphere of purely formal inference. I suggested earlier that the 
language we use in interpersonal relationship is closer to the language 
of poetry than to the language of discursive reasoning, although it 
rarely, if ever, rises to the level of poetic utterance. But we have a 
right to call it argument even if the imagination plays a central role in 
what is said and in the way in which it is received. If that is so, there 
seems to be no reason why the movement of the mind as it follows a 
syntactic pattern of controlled images should not also be described as 
a kind of argument. 
But what are arguments of this kind worth? Do they disclose the 
truth of things in any way at all? I said at the beginning of these 
remarks that it would be absurd to scrutinize poems in order to find 
statements which are true. If that is so, it indicates that the answer to 
my question cannot be a simple Yes or No. The question is phrased in 
such a way that it demands a simple affirmative or a simple negative 
answer. The question must be asked in another way. Can poetry 
generally, can the work of individual poets, can a particular poem in 
some cases, — be understood as falling within the domain of the true 
and the false? The answer to that question is an unqualified Yes. 
Someone is sure to ask whether Wordsworth's poetry is true and if so 
whether it is truer than Donne's poetry or whether Shakespeare comes 
closer to the truth than Ben Jonson. Or, we might beget questions like 
these: I like Blake but I do not fancy Coleridge. Does that mean that 
Blake's poetry is true and Coleridge's poetry is false? And aren t these 
questions just plain silly? 
I would counsel patience. Suppose we shift our attention to 
philosophical arguments and raise similar questions. A good argu-
ment in philosophy does not have to reach a conclusion which all 
philosophers would accept as true. Consider, for example, Plato s 
argument for the immortality of the soul, Aristotle s argument for t e 
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Unmoved Mover, or Hume's argument on causality. These are 
famous arguments and all philosophers must study them and decide 
for themselves whether the conclusions of the arguments are true or 
false. But there is no consensus among philosophers with respect to 
any of them. Indeed, many philosophers would reject all of them so 
far as truth is concerned. The point is that the arguments make in­
telligible truth claims, which is to say that there are capable of being 
true or false. They are not expressions of emotive preference. 
Very well, can we find analogues in poetry? We can: "Paradise 
Lost", "King Lear", "Oedipus Rex", but we need not appeal to the 
most famous names. We might choose the poetry of T.S. Eliot, or 
Wallace Stevens, or Robert Frost. If we ignore or reject the implicit, 
or in Eliot's case the explicit, truth claims which these poets make, we 
shall trivialize their whole work and reduce it to a literary game, — 
and any number can play. Perhaps, but what about verification? In 
the first place, good poetry is never didactic. If it instructs or in­
forms, it does so by indirection, which is one of the reasons why it is 
otiose to examine poetry for bits of wisdom or home truths. I do not 
have in mind isolated statements, however edifying, but the total 
vision of a whole body of work. In the second place, the claims made 
in poetry, implicit or otherwise, cannot be verified by an empirical 
observation (or series of observations) as this is understood in science 
or in philosophical empiricism. Instruments of measurement are 
useless because the data in question cannot be quantified. Taking 
another look will not get us anywhere either. At any given moment 
there may be nothing in particular to look at. 
The language of morality and religion provides a clue to the solu­
tion of the problem of verification, although in both cases the prob­
lem is, if anything, more difficult than it is in the case of poetry. 
Nevertheless, I think we can see that there is something common to all 
three cases — the conception of truth as enactment. We are concerned 
not with notions but with motions, not with concepts and propositions 
but with the manifestation of truth in the concrete and the particular. 
The language of ethics and religion does not operate in exactly the 
S aS t'1C 'an8ua8e °f peotry, but there is nothing mysterious or 
odd about the idea of enactment as applying to all three of these 
languages. We are so accustomed to thinking of truth as something we 
te1, that we miss altogether the more important aspect of truth as 
what we do. In some contexts doing the truth, standing in the truth, 
enacting the truth, are the only adequate expressions for saying what 
we really mean. For example, how are we to describe the integrity of a 
S"hoseL who!e life publishes and illustrates his character. His 
e 1 e is the verification of the statements we can make about him. 
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Similar examples are easy to find, the relation of love between hus­
band and wife, the loyalty between friends, or the steadfastness of the 
faithful man in his relation to God. Examples abound. Poetic 
language does not function in quite the same way. Of course not. Even 
when poetry contains convictional language it does not demand that 
we should immediately alter our behavior, as if the poet were prescrib­
ing a rule of life. Enactment in poetry is carried out by the imagination 
controlled by the figuration of the poem, which can be simple or com­
plex but is surely more than an aesthetic thrill. 
Suppose, however, that someone says "You have claimed that 
propositional truth, conceptual truth, is somehow transcended in 
poetry, that poetry yields non-conceptual knowledge and truth. But 
isn't poetry made up largely of propositions?" Yes, but we must 
remember that when words become parts of poetic language they no 
longer function as general concepts. They become parts of a structure 
of images. To understand them we depend upon the imagination 
rather than our discursive reason. If we want our ideas always to be 
perfectly clear so that we can avoid inconsistency and ambiguity we 
must be sure that our concepts are univocal and that they remain so, 
that, in other words, they mean exactly the same thing every time they 
are used. If our concepts do become ambiguous or equivocal, and they 
tend to do so, we may find that the same term has radically different 
meanings. It may become rather tiresome to keep explaining what we 
mean by the term, but it presents no serious problem. We can never be 
accused of saying Yes and No at the same time. In other words we will 
never be guilty of speaking paradoxically. Unfortunately, it will then 
be extremely difficult for us to say anything interesting. The language 
of poetry is the language of analogy, the very heart of all metaphor. It 
is there that we can say "p but not-p", and without contradiction. 
Rather than say that paradox is inevitable in poetry I would prefer to 
say that what is built into poetic utterance is the analogous term. To 
understand this fundamental principle is to be able to see poetic 
language working, and also to see that what is at work is the 
analogical imagination. To understand poetic truth we must learn to 
understand what I shall call the epistemology of the image. 
But, does it make any difference whether there is such a thing as 
Poetic truth? What difference could it make. Might we not say — the 
difference between spiritual life and death? I don't want to be solemn, 
I only want to be serious. We have heard a great deal, in recent years, 
about creativity in the arts and literature. Poetry is always creative in 
the sense of making things which did not exist before. But as Erich 
Heller says so justly, 
. . .  i t  i s  c r e a t i v e  a l s o  i n  a  p r o f o u n d e r  a n d  m o r e  e l u s i v e  
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sense. Poetry heightens and cultivates the creative element 
at is in experience itself. For experience is not the impres­
sions we receive; it is a making sense. And poetry is the 
tore-most sense-maker of experience. It renders actual ever 
new sectors of the apparently inexhaustible field of poten­
tial experience.12 
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Linguistics and Rhetoric 
Eugene P. Cognon 
I should like to consider rhetoric in its relation to modern 
linguistics, a science of language radically different from traditional 
grammar and traditional philology in that it approaches language as a 
purely operational system. I have chosen the subject for several 
reasons. In the first place, it seems to me that the present decline and 
loss of prestige of the "humanities" reveals a deep sense of frustra­
tion, and that this frustration may well be the result of the fact that we 
have expected and led others to expect too much from literary studies. 
What we can reasonably expect from literary studies obviously 
depends on what we think literature is, and in that determination we 
cannot afford to ignore the assistance proferred by modern descrip­
tions of language. Secondly, if literature is still with us its meaning 
seems to have changed, just as its function has changed along with the 
whole panorama of the cultural scene. In the past literature was con­
sidered a suitable vehicle for all kinds of things, a multi-dimensional 
jnedium without a dimension of its own, capable of conveying factual, 
ideational and imaginative information. The appearance of new forms 
of communication and of art forms derived from technical discoveries 
has obliged critics to redefine the proper function of literature. Just as 
photography freed painting from the representation of "reality' and 
from the obsession with the model, the prodigious development of 
new means of information has freed, or deprived in this instance, 
literature of some of its traditional resources. Who amongst us will 
paper read on May 2, 1974 
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write a letter when he can use the telephone? How many will prefer a 
good novel to a good movie, now that movies are better than novels? 
We must approve of their taste. It may not be ours but its dispersion 
among the educated is clearly indicative of the gradual erosion of what 
was traditionally considered as the impregnable territory of literature. 
By literature I mean the narrative and descriptive power of words to 
tell a story convincingly, or to acquaint us with the thousand faces of 
the world. This is not to say that words themselves are becoming ob­
solete, certain uses of words are, perhaps, becoming obsolete as new 
instruments are invented which can better serve the same needs. It 
might be time to ask ourselves whether our idea of literature is in keep­
ing with the development of our techniques, and in particular with our 
understanding. 
There is yet another reason why I chose this subject for my talk. At 
a time when so many specialists in the field of ethnology, sociology, 
economics, psychology, biology, etc., are searching for a new ideal of 
intelligibility directly adapted to their different studies from structural 
inguistics (which has come to play the part of mathematics in the con­
stitution of the "science of man"), it is paradoxical that students of 
literature remain impervious to modern theories of language. "A 
linguist deaf to the poetic function," says R. Jakobson, "or a 
specialist of literature unaware of the problems and ignorant of the 
e o s o inguistics are both flagrant anachronisms in our time." 
1 he reluctance of scholars to adopt new techniques can be easily ac­
counted for by the fact that they have been forced to undertake a 
revi,sion of a11 they h°ld dear and sacred. As humanism 
of old turns into "anthropology" not only the "values" of the past, 
ut also our very concepts of knowledge, thought, and reason, appear 
ar a ,,m1Cf d^fereat llght: the explanation utilized by historians to 
trrnu/th CU tu . Phenomena, with its insistence on genesis, 
replaced hv°in the Hne oftime (diachrony), is gradually 
r . oncern for comprehension based on the analysis of sur-
narHenlaf1 n arrangements' synchrony. Instead of understanding a 
becSnJ tT,°n.35 thC reSult of an ev°lution, the term of a 
cont^nnnrarv wnans StrOVe t0 describe its spatial shape, 
dividual fart r,fearchers turn their backs on history to consider in-
nunc Heir a 38 Thot °rganized "^ems," observable hie et 
critics- thev fa remarkable mutation in the terminology of modern 
level " "dkta °F SP.a"al rdels OVer temP°ral ones; such words as 
no\v^'displaced HIP h "field " "P°Ie>" "transfer," have 
"evolut on "" > T^' vocabulary of "origin," "precedent," 
concerned the T' "hectics." As far as literary studies are 
concerned the weakness of "literary history" is that it is a contradic-
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tory proposition: it can hardly be "history" and "literary" at the 
same time. It can only be one at the expense of the other. Stressing 
erudition, biography, sources, influences and the like, only cir­
cumvents the problem by telling us what is not literary in literature. If 
we believe that literature is primarily the art of language there seems to 
be no other way but to forget as irrelevant all that generations of 
historians have told us about literature as the product of other forces. 
Our contention in this paper is that literary scholarship has a subject 
of its own, and that it runs the risk of losing itself in futility if it con­
tinues to ignore the only instrument that can best help delineate its 
scope with any degree of precision. 
Even the least experienced student of a foreign language, whether 
ancient or modern, becomes aware when he tries to translate a passage 
that to understand the text correctly it is not enough to resort to the 
old procedure of parsing, or grammatical analysis. He senses that the 
text is inseparable from a larger context which he as yet does not 
possess, and that he will not be able to "make sense" of the passage 
unless he knows more about the circumstances in which it was written. 
He needs to know who utters the message, to whom the message is ad­
dressed, and, paradoxically enough, he also wants to know more or 
less what the message is about. Modern linguistics accounts for this: it 
explains how a word is never only a sign but also a symbol. If we ac­
cept the definitions given by de Saussure in his famous Course, "the 
linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a 
sound-image," and is further determined by the intersection of the 
coordinates within an organic whole. A symbol, on the other hand, is 
defined by its relation to a reality which is, by its very nature, alien to 
it. To put it more simply, the word behaves exactly like a monetary 
unit whose value, as we know only too well, does not necessarily 
guarantee its buying power. There is inflation and deflation in 
language as in all value-systems; the meaning of a word as given in the 
dictionary may differ considerably from the meaning it is assigned in a 
Particular sentence. This ambiguity is by no means accidental. It is 
fundamental. It ensues from the hiatus which separates the two levels 
°f speech: the level of signification, related to the word as sign, and 
e 'evel of designation, related to the word symbol. In the first in­
stance, (signification), we are dealing with arbitrary and unconscious 
units, since we receive our language ready-made, so to speak, and 
since there are many different languages. In the second instance 
, Agnation), we are dealing with motivated and conscious discourse, 
since we are always free to choose the words we think are best to com­
municate our meaning. Those familiar with Saussure recognize the 
umous dichotomy between "langue et parole," (language and 
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speech). But Saussure, who followed the ideas of his time and was 
strongly influenced by Durkheim's sociology, believed that language 
r a?i J S£Cia! speech an individual datum, a description we 
rind difficult to accept if only because of "idiolects," speech patterns 
developing within the limits of individual speech, mannerisms of ex­
pression which prove that a process of sedimentation, settling, takes 
place at the personal level as it does at the level of institutionalized 
anguage. n fact, the difference lies elsewhere; while language is 
structured, speech is the structuring (or constitutive) activity. When I 
1 6 W°r S ' Ufe const'tute 3 structure modeled after the patterns 
extran^ngU+agv' .and the reality which I inform in the process although 
the wim|US °+ 1 fn<?S my worc*s' Par3digms, and syntagms (i.e. to 
me J J ,Syem)' e determination which presides over the arrange-
ianm,a° a s5?tence- This reciprocal structuring of reality by 
ficflt n8C at ° ia"gU,age hy reality is probably one of the most dif-
Whieh re!, il°fS ° tue nguistic theory. It raises all sorts of difficulties 
However tt, r°T absolute separation between words and things, 
danee with th'" eractl?n between language and the world, in accor-
conmJi th ! an3lyS1S °f contemporary linguistics, eventually ac-
of""sem!nt!le»0rmat!?n °f concePts'. of "elds and contexts, in short, 
We are th" i 1j00 ln 'he similarities and solidarities of things, 
lieht ofwhat^ C- t° examine the central question of meaning in the 
I would have HS fUS !feD Sa'd' because of philosophical implications 
Which I could HPretf^edht0 aVOid the question' but there is no way in 
meaning fa! f h ® 0 changlng my subject. In our perspective 
tion will he T°vt fmg' *S generally thought, a simple opera-
Saussure and w al°"g Hne °f the Sign/Symbol dichotomy. 
that lan a vP SUCCessors distinguish two poles, for they observe 
says "SVS\SyTJ? °f differences. "In language," Saussure 
generally imnliec m v 1fferences. Even more important: a difference 
but in language !h S1 terms between which the difference is set up; 
Wither wet!L•M%0?y differences without positive terms, 
ideas nor sounds tue,Slgn ie, or the signifier, language has neither 
conceptual and nhn 3 before the linguistic system, but only 
"This differential / Pf5 that have issued from the system." 
to Saussure's descrint^P 103 Anguage imparts a negative character 
tinuous proces^ o"self^ndnc^1 Hlng * SpeeCh iS the rCSuIt of a C°n' 
tions One could aim ucing disjunctions, separations, delimita-
in this vL of l- - 3 diakCtiCS °f PUre °PP°sitions for 
stance, Smhesis wTth®6 ̂  i§ °0 third term" With Hegel, for in-
purely scientific annm ePno?1ent ?f hope; there is no such thing in the 
the by-product of frat ° f°Ur Iinguisticians- They view meaning as y product of fragmentation, and they claim that "thought, 
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chaotic in nature" becomes ordered only through "the process of its 
decomposition." 
In the division of meaning we find yet another example of the 
binary structure underlying the development of language. Meaning 
can always be broken up into two different, though closely related 
realms: the realm of what language means in me, and the realm of 
what I mean in it, the two being necessary to each other as well as in­
evitably inadequate to each other. Hence the ambiguities of our 
speech. Polysemia is unavoidable, and it is useless to recommend the 
use of the "proper" word since there is obviously no proper word, no 
right word. There would be one if language were only a process of 
naming, "a list of words, each corresponding to the thing it names." 
But that would presuppose that ideas exist before words, and that 
things exist before ideas, a state of affairs which is linguistically unac­
ceptable, although commonly held to be true. Strictly speaking, the 
pure meaning of a word is confined to the silence of dictionaries. It is 
lost in the act of designation, or, if you prefer, in the application of 
living speech. Since things have no names polysemia (the multiplicity 
of meanings attaching to a given word or expression) is simply a fact 
of linguistic life; for all the reluctance of a certain pedagogy there is 
nothing scandalous to it. It is the result not of any deficiency in either 
of the two opposite poles of meaning, but of the conflict between 
them. In fact, if we avoid the confusion between words and sememes, 
meaning is always one and simple at the level of signification; con­
versely, a word supported by a given context has never more than one 
meaning at a time. But ambiguity will appear when we attempt to 
force things into a framework of relations which deprives them of 
their singularity and imposes on them limitations and classifications 
fundamentally alien to their nature. In other words, polysemia is the 
outcome of our effort to think the world of things by means of the 
world of language, whereas, we maintain, the two are incompatible. 
But, vain as this claim might be, the practical necessity of expressing 
reality through language will confer upon our thought, which in itself 
is pure logic, the coherence and unity of meaning demanded by the 
situation. 
It also follows that the validity of a message can never be definitely 
established by language alone. This is the easiest part o t e 
demonstration, because it is borne out by everyday observation. Even 
in a simple expression like "a brown leather shoe," nothing in the 
words suggests and only experience will tell whether brown ;ye eTS 
lo "leather," or to "shoe." In a sentence like "this coat is light, only 
verification determines whether we mean "light" as weight, or light as 
eolour, and when I say that, "I knew him as a student, we canno 
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know which of us was the student at the time. This may sound too evi­
dent, but it leads to the conclusion (itself perhaps less evident) that 
language as such is not interested in the "truth" or "untruth" of the 
statement. Just as the linguistic sign, according to Saussure, is ar-
ltrary, we must infer that the whole system of language is arbitrary in 
its relation to the world of "things," that is to say that it is based on 
norms completely autonomous from the norms of reality. 
"t t r,' aC|> tbat we .are deahng with two completely separate 
o a 1 les, or normative systems, each of them following its own in-
, •Fwu61?1 lCan be illustrated in a different way. It is consistent 
hi v, f aV^S f anatomy that a man walks on his feet rather than on 
his head; it is also consistent with the laws of mathematics that 2 plus 2 
equals 4 It is consistent with the established set of facts, designated as 
it k at Georp Washington was born in the State of Virginia; 
nsis ent with the practice of medicine or surgery that operations 
t^er orme under anesthesia, and so on. But when we talk of 
ti^f /v°r. T' °T surSery- when we talk of knowledge, of prac-
T anm° fftS °r ts' we have left the universe of language. 
Language does not care about any of these things, even when it tells us 
enainp ^ &re °r 3rC n0t' to function on its own, like an idling 
"hkFnirl H°PrenS °nt° schizoPhasia, the surrealist poem, or the 
Odd win l°ll- !F hatter's tale) of Lewis Carroll or Boris Vian. 
finp nlrfl l ? not Prevent the message from sometimes fit-
wl fS aii tlF I 3 uea s'tuation> but itis only a matter of chance and 
for inctann I, 'm^ 1 correspondence will not last long. Ionesco, 
laneulee to'r^art n n amusing scenes from this indifference of 
dom vet cnpat I y i?Ut ^ be makes his characters chatter at ran-
seDaratinn het ° if point bp makes us all the more aware of the 
Ionescn'c nia WCen If' tr,° se."e® events. From this point of view, 
nature of fanlS ^ If8 significant examples of the contingent 
above and rearhlff' CHn n°W r.evei;se our observations offered 
isolation instead fe, °Fver.se conclusion in cases of aphasia where the 
anrnle will he • ? bein8 isolation in language, as in the previous ex-
DOSS bilhv Of eS° °n °U o/language' The patients have not lost all 
often nrov expression hy losing their faculty of speech: they can 
Who cannot £?T' Bm CVen then' the* are like instrumentalists 
for lack of annm C1 scor®\ prisoners their own gestures, unable, 
in which thev ha pr e m£diation, to emerge out of the circumstances in wmch they happen to be caught. 
automatism °nfriadllemma' Ekher we are alienated by the blind 
destroys our ai anguage' °[ we become one with a situation which 
cannot do withnu^jF^ reduces us to powerlessness. Grammar 
out rhetoric any more than rhetoric can do without 
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grammar. Normal speech, of course, is halfway between these two ex­
tremes which are not just two aspects but, as we have seen, two poles 
of the system. On the one hand, words tend to become void of content 
under the magnetic attraction of grammar (analysis), though they can 
never be completely transparent or cease to retain some allusiveness to 
reality. On the other hand, they can never exhaust the fullness of 
representation, although they tend to grasp as much of reality as they 
can by means of metaphor and metonymy. Of this dual tendency, the 
source of so many controversies, I will consider only the second in the 
rest of this paper: the one that has to do with the operation of 
reinvesting "reality" in the forms of speech. Rhetoric, then, will be 
understood as the process by which we try, without ever succeeding 
completely, to reduce as far as possible the arbitrariness of signs in­
herent in the system by conferring "meaning," namely an intentional 
direction, upon our messages. 
Dealing with rhetoric, as I see it, is not to abandon the sphere of 
linguistics, but rather to explore the side of it which is less visible and 
almost totally unknown, the dark side of linguistics. We need hardly 
point out at this stage that rhetoric cannot be reduced, as it used to be, 
to a normative discipline, providing recipes for good writing, listing 
figures of speech, and teaching the rules of invention, argumentation, 
and composition. All this would be harmless and a good subject for 
scholars if it did not have the drawback of resting on a false concep­
tion of language. Today rhetoric should be considered cybernetics of 
message transmission rather than a normative science. We are no 
longer dealing with codes but with programs, and the task is to get the 
message across as efficiently as possible. Needless to say, this runs 
counter to the traditional precepts of rhetoric. While the old rhetoric 
insisted on standards of "correctness" it now seems to us that the best 
construction is not necessarily the most "correct" one, but the con­
struction which works best. To take an instance, rhetoricians of the 
old school used to ban repetitions as pleonastic. (Pleonasms and 
repetitiousness are still synonymous with dull and untidy writing.) But 
a blanket condemnation of the practice is untenable because there are 
cases when it is necessary to repeat a word, an expression, or a turn of 
phrase, in order to render meaning more explicit or more expressive. 
Repetition can be highly meaningful. Peguy, for example, Claudel, 
and many of the new novelists in France and elsewhere have 
deliberately used recurrent patterns of expression as incantatory forms 
designed to induce specific mental states. Repetition cannot be con­
demned when it helps the artist achieve certain deliberately sought 
symmetries or echoing effects. "Conclusion" of the sentence, on the 
°ther hand, or "explanation" of an allusion for the sake of clarity or 
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good grammar can certainly impair the effectiveness of the message. 
Among people of the same age, cultural heritage, and education, a 
mere hint can convey more than a long disquisition. A scientific or 
technical term addressed to an insufficiently informed public can be 
an obstacle to communication because of its precision, and the least 
precise word will be the only appropriate one. 
Obviously it is difficult to appreciate the intention of a message, or 
measure its cost and economy, if the situation enveloping it is not 
taken into account. The manifest weakness of the old rhetoric and the 
pedagogy derived from it was that it studied language in the abstract, 
cut off, as it were, from the circumstances of real life. A message is 
never produced in a vacuum. It is conditioned by the factors of its 
situation: its content always refers to a particular discipline or a par­
ticular field of experience; the speaker, or the writer, present even 
when apparently hidden behind the message, reveals his presence more 
or less directly by his personal "touch," akin to a signature tune, or a 
trade mark; the recipient of the message, who looms behind the com­
munication — the public, an audience, the posterity for whom the 
message is eventually destined and which helps to shape it in return; 
and, lastly, the vector which assigns to the message a determined 
amount of time and space. One can hardly hope to satisfy all condi­
tions at one time but none of them can be completely ignored, and on­
ly the occasion eventually suggests the factor which is to be preferred. 
There is no such thing as perfect communication: when the 
speaker/writer chooses the most suitable emphasis he rejects other 
solicitations, other promptings, and choice always entails frustration. 
One feels that something important has been omitted. Robbe-Grillet is 
certainly right when he eliminates metaphor on grounds of principle, 
but he is obviously wrong when he claims that the kind of impartial 
description he recommends is less anthropomorphic than the compla­
cent humanism of old. The impersonal writer remains distinctly pre­
sent in his impersonality: trying to reduce his vision, for instance, to a 
universe of pure "objects" he grants undue privilege to one factor of 
the situation at the expense of all the others and in so doing he con­
demns himself to the outmoded aesthetic of the "right word." In 
short, there is no solution. Each factor of the situation tends to 
precipitate out" the totality of the message. Whether stable or not, 
the various crystallizations contained in the process of the production 
of a message make up the "content" of the message. A message 
oriented toward the "content" is esentially a pragma, the result of an 
activity which does not find its end in itself. Most of our messages 
c early belong to this category: when we speak or write to impart a 
piece ot news or information, to express a wish or give an order, we 
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use language as the vehicle for conveyance of a certain "content." 
And all we demand of the instrument is its immediate and faithful 
response to our intentions. If at the very dawn of civilization prose re­
mained generally anonymous, it was only because it claimed no other 
reality than the reality of what it said. There was no signature, because 
there was no author; there was no author because there was no work 
in the modern sense of the word, since the message tended to 
evaporate spontaneously behind the "things" it conveyed. Its value 
lay in its transparency. 
No wonder that we are sometimes confused when it comes to the 
choice of "models"! In the classroom we have been trained to admire 
a particular type of message which does not correspond to the actual 
practice of living speech. Anthologies purport to teach language by 
encouraging imitation of selected passages from the work of the 
"best" writers. Yet we know that it is impossible to learn to play the 
violin by just listening to the recordings of the greatest violinists. 
Besides, the selections are most of the time closed passages, isolated 
from the context, full of historical allusions, names of unknown peo­
ple, forgotten habits, mysterious intents, which leave the unfortunate 
child with the feeling of confronting an absolute, whereas his language 
is to him a natural activity which can be put to any use, at any time, 
and which does not seem to deserve so much attention or respect. At a 
later stage, the study of masterpieces will reinforce in the student the 
impression that there exists a substantive, generic difference between 
the language of the famous writers and his own. But this is a delusion, 
for everybody is a rhetorician! 
What I am trying to say is that pedagogy should be based on 
transformation rather than on imitation, since the child already 
speaks. We should try not to teach, but train through an intelligent 
variation of parameters a faculty which already exists. The job of the 
teacher is, nonetheless, essential. It is to help the child observe 
himself, and to study the child rather than teach the lesson. Such prac­
tice, based on the actual mechanisms of language, might still incur the 
old accusation of sophistry leveled at rhetoric since the time of the an­
cient Greeks (but which training is not sophistry?). It is, however, at 
least an a posteriori practice, and since it rests on the stu y o 
transformations it offers the advantage of preparing the student tor a 
better understanding of law, government, advertising, computer 
science, in a word of an immense field of possible applications, o 
know one's language is one thing; to know how to use it is another. 
The two trainings go together and it is a fallacy to believe that one 
should know one's language before attempting to use it. 
If this is so, it is no less of a delusion to believe that the development 
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of one's proficiency is the business of the "humanities." There are, of 
course, differences between our use of language and the use found in 
the writings we are given to admire when we go to college. But, as 1 
have already indicated, the difference is not fundamental: it is only a 
difference of degree, by which I mean that most works of literature 
are amplifications, variations, embellishments of what we all do spon­
taneously when we speak. They refer us to the rhetoric of pragma. The 
dazzling and complex organizations of literary devices are still intend­
ed to communicate a particular content, and therefore to become 
eclipsed by what they disclose to us. As a consequence, the 
hermeneutics appropriate to what the "best" have written does not 
have to differ essentially from the hermeneutics appropriate to the 
messages of "ordinary people." When "ordinary" people discuss an 
idea, tell a story, report an incident, make a request, or whatever, they 
aim at something which has its "meaning" outside of the message. 
This imparting of knowledge makes artisans, craftsmen of them. 
Hence the traditional scholarship which has obfuscated and 
sometimes buried masterpieces of the past in order to reconstruct the 
situation which holds the secret of their meaning. Indeed, from this 
vantage point the historical approach seems to be not only legitimate 
but inescapable, since the reference is part and parcel of the message. 
At the same time the new criticism has done well to remind scholars of 
the symbolic value of language, even in its most mediatory function, 
and to insist on the necessity of opening up new avenues of interpreta­
tion, starting from the work itself and leading in all the directions in­
dicated by the development of what is now called the "human 
sciences." 
As far as the study of content is concerned there is no reason why 
each student, each specialist, should not be at liberty to choose his 
point of observation. This is no sheer relativism but rather a sensible 
division of intellectual labour. Not that we condone some of their in­
terpretations: under the guise of "science" too many recent critics 
return to the fold of impressionism, showing arrogance and com­
placency the better to conceal their ignorance of facts. But if a number 
of specialists study individual works of literature in the light of their 
particular disciplines, and if the points of view are sufficiently diverse 
one can hope that, in the end, the truth of the work (if there is such a 
thing) will emerge at the point where the different perspectives con­
verge (if they do). Should this kind of collaboration become 
wi espread, however, and even under the most favorable of c'r" 
cumstances, it is uncertain whether the results would be commen-
ttip nnorroi L effort- A g°od example of what I mean can be found in 
re etween Picard and Barthes, some ten years ago, a quarrel 
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which put criticism in the forefront of literature by boldly reexamining 
the central question of interpretation. For all their talents neither of 
the contenders rose above the level of the rhetoric of pragma, 
although they took radically opposite positions on the problems of 
truth, reality, etc. One might presume that they would have settled 
their differences easily if they had considered the problem not, as they 
did, from the perspective of praxis, where literature gets bogged down 
in the contradictions and obscurities this world is heir to, but from the 
viewpoint of poiesis, where literature comes into its own, so to speak, 
in the world of Forms. 
Poiesis is not poetry. I use the term for the sake of convenience 
because it connotes, like praxis, a specific kind of activity, another 
dimension of rhetoric. Poiesis is praxis inverted, turned upside 
down, a rhetoric of pragma. Instead of being directed toward the 
world of "things" the message becomes apoiema, a moment directed 
toward itself, a structure unto itself, carrying its own motivation and 
finding, as if spontaneously, its own form. All this does not mean, of 
course, that there is no "content" left in the poiema, but the content 
has assumed a totally different nature: the message ceases to be a "for 
something"; it now has no other end but to be "for itself" as so many 
poets have said, from Poe to Baudelaire, from Valery to T.S. Eliot. In 
the words of MacLeish "a poem should not mean but be." We have 
heard the statement so often that it has become a commonplace of 
literary criticism, and I am afraid some of you may wonder why I had 
to take such pains to arrive at this trite remark. The reason is, as I 
have by now said several times, that even the most familiar idea is not 
really perceived and it certainly is not understood until it has been re­
placed in the whole perspective of the subject. And the subject here is 
how language works. Besides, although we "know" that "a poem 
should not mean but be" we usually do not draw all the consequences 
from this assertion. It implies, among other things, that poetry cannot 
be "narrative" or "descriptive," or as we say nowadays "representa­
tional" or "engagee," "revolutionary" or "conservative," much less 
"lyrical" or "dramatic." These are qualities of the pragma; it makes 
no sense to ascribe them to the poiema; it makes hardly more sense to 
ascribe them to literature, if we understand literature as a form of 
language in which the "contents" is a means for the work to exist 
rather than the ultimate justification for its existence. ^ / 
This view of things compels us to revise a number of "cliches. 
Style, for instance, in spite of what Buffon declared, is not man 
himself" but, on the contrary, a quality of writing. And when we 
come to "inspiration" we must also reverse our belief that it comes to 
us as a gift from the gods. The relation of the author to his message at 
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the level of poiesis, poetic experience, is exactly the reverse of the rela­
tion between the speaker and his message at the level of praxis, every­
day communication. Since the poet cannot find the source of his 
words outside of words themselves he is naturally inclined to believe 
that he owes them to a spell of divine origin. For it is true that his 
freedom is, in a way, compromised: the artist is a slave to his act. 
While the craftsman or the artisan acquires freedom in the realization 
of his intent, the artist is ever more obedient to the rules of his 
medium: dancing may lead nowhere but it is nonetheless far more 
strictly controlled than walking. Furthermore, the poem, independent 
of the idea that the poet may have of it and not bound by the impres­
sion it may produce in the reader, does not communicate in the usual 
manner but offers itself as a self-contained universe. In this universe a 
different notion of propriety is at work: the poetic word does not cor­
respond to itself in the connotational mode but to a previous enuncia­
tion of itself, the power of which event calls it into being in this very 
place, at this very time, by virtue of an inner determinism or necessity, 
which, in each instance, renders the recurrence manifest. The sign is 
no longer a symbol, it has become a "motif." The variations of the 
motif within the rigid pattern created by the rhythmic divisions of the 
message reveal to the eye or to the ear, as well as to the mind, a form 
which makes it impossible, for instance, to imagine oneself "A Paris 
sur un cheval gris" without immediately imagining oneself "d Nevers 
sur un cheval vert." In the strictest logic of experience the poetic 
message of Max Jacob's lines does not make sense: there are no green 
horses in this world, not even in Nevers; we all know that. But in the 
logic of the poem the message makes sense, it even makes the only 
possible sense since no other word could be substituted for "vert" 
without causing immediate decomposition of the message itself. 
This example should be enough to illustrate what "meaning" 
represents in the rhetoric of poiesis. If, according to structural 
linguistics, meaning is the reduction of the arbitrariness inherent in the 
world of signs, or to put more simply, if meaning is an expectation, an 
anticipation of a harmony, rejection of what is contingent or subject 
to chance, then it should be clear that rhythm is meaning. We must 
not think of poetry, not even of literature, as the superimposition of 
verbal ornaments on what would constitute reference in the rhetoric of 
pragma. Although Max Jacob's green horse denies experience it 
reveals a form of knowledge. It has been pointed out that we can 
spea o poetry as truth. But the relation between the utterance and 
e.wor °J things has been inverted: poetry is to experience what 
fr»r!nTatf^i!S t0 continue to associate these two contrary 
orms of knowledge" because the dual nature of the linguistic sign 
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encourages confusion. A great deal of what we read as poetry is poetry 
solely from the standpoint of sound. It retains its allegiance to the 
universe of "things" and tries, under the veil of music, to fulfill some 
useful purpose . . . That is why it is so easy to read a confession, a sur­
render in trust, a philosophy, into poems of this kind.The confession 
is there, and the surrender, and the philosophical musings: the ques­
tion for the poet is to force into the narrow straight jacket of a given 
rhythm a message which emanates not from itself, but from actual 
life. The same confusion accounts for the popular superstition that it 
is enough to be in love to become a poet, when it should be obvious 
that strong emotions tend to make one less articulate, rather than 
more. In fact — neither the emotions, nor the ideas, nor the ex­
perience of a man can make a poet out of him unless he has a special 
sense, a unique talent to hear the suggestions of language itself, or to 
quote Mallarm^, "to leave the initiative to the words." 
Such a conception would certainly invite us to revise many of our 
judgments about literature. What we have just said of poetry is valid 
beyond the traditional "genre" divisions and it would be easy, for in­
stance, to show how it applies to the literature of fiction. To take only 
the example of a writer like Robbe-Grillet, the way his narrative 
becomes description and his description narrative in La Jalousie, or 
Le Labyrinthe, clearly shows that the time and the space of these 
works have nothing to do with time and space of the world. The cons­
tant flashback, the kind of musical "da capo," which we also find in 
Marienbad, are, in my view, devices of a structural nature, analogous 
to the refrain in popular ballads and folk songs. But, unlike other 
redundancies, the refrain is a departure from natural speech, an 
obstacle to normal communication. We can find similar devices in the 
echoing dialogues of Beckett and Ionesco. Critics have been too eager 
to recognize in them modern proponents of the absurd: they may 
break up the logic of experience in their novels and in their plays, but 
the pieces they pick up regain a higher meaning, so to speak, revealed 
in the manner of their insertion in the arrangement of a work of art. 
Far from being philosophers of despair or social critics with a message 
for our time, they are in the vanguard of modern poets. 
The close solidarity between the structure inherent in our linguistic 
behaviour and the two types of structures we try to impose either on 
things or on our own messages leads us to offer an irreverent sugges­
tion: literature is perhaps nothing more than a ready-made idea. It in­
cludes artists, naturally, but not all of them since folk literature is ex­
cluded, as well as minor works. But it also includes "craftsmen, job­
bers bent on producing works for high consumption, meant to in 
form, to amuse, to educate and edify, whose subjects are genera y 
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confined to the picture of love, the expression of "personal" 
philosophies, or the invention of fictions. Finally it includes, today, 
those who, like Ionesco and Vian, use literature to carry out serious 
and sustained inquiry into the nature of language. All this is called 
' 'literature'' only because literature presents no clear-cut boundaries, 
and it has no boundaries because it remains coextensive with the un-
surveyable field of pragma. Only if we are willing and prepared to 
draw the line between the two sides of rhetoric, i.e. between the two 
opposite ways in which language can be put to use, can we hope to 
separate the chaff from the grain. For there is just no way to avoid the 
dilemma: either we are dealing with things — and that is not our pro­
vince — or we are dealing with the way in which we tell things. 
In grammar and in the two kinds of rehetoric we have tried to 
distinguish, we sense the same ambition. Whether exploring an 
etymology, discovering an intention, or experimenting with forms and 
patterns, all three are in search of "meaning" (by which we should 
understand some form of necessity), although in different ways. In the 
last analysis, literature, through the poetic function inherent in all 
language, is a perfectly demonstrable entity. We feel that it will be 
cleared of the accusations leveled against it and saved from its present 
disrepute if it can be recognized for what it is. 
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Literary Problems in Interpreting Paul's Letters 
Gordon P. Wiles 
It is a strange fact, when you think of it, that a large proportion of 
early Christian writings belongs to the literary genre known as letters. 
This is true not only of writings selected for the New Testament 
canon, but also of the wider range of early Christian literature. 
Because of this it has been recognized for decades that an understan­
ding of much of the New Testament requires a serious study of ancient 
letter style. This involves a literary rather than a theological analysis, 
even though it goes without saying that the primary reason for study­
ing the New Testament letters has been, and still is, their theological 
and religious content. In this connection a group of scholars in 
America has recently been at work re-examining Paul as letter writer 
rather than Paul as theologian or missionary.1 Their joint progress to 
date, and my own special interest in the prayer passages in Paul s let­
ters, will be reflected in the first part of this talk. The second part will 
take up a recent debate about one letter, the lengthy epistle that he 
sent to Rome. 
Within the New Testament canon four main literary types are 
represented. The first is a strange genre which we call gospels , in 
many ways a unique kind of document. Besides the four gospels we 
find a book of church history (The Acts of the Apostles), an apocalyp­
tic visionary writing (The Book of Revelation), and finally the letters, 
twenty-one in all. Of the letters, seven at least are by Paul himself (I 
Thessalonians, I and II Corinthians, Galatians, Romans, Philemon, 
Paper read on April 10, 1975 
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Philippians; six others (the "deutero-Paulines") are ascribed to Paul 
— somewhat in the Pauline manner, but probably written by his 
followers (Ephesians, Colossians, II Thessalonians, I and II Timothy, 
Titus). The remaining eight documents in letter form stand apart from 
Paul and his direct influence (Hebrews, James, I and II Peter, I, II, 
and III John, Jude). In addition, several other short letters are incor­
porated within Acts and Revelation. It is noteworthy, then, that "the 
dominant literary form found within the Christian canon is the let­
ter,"2 and that this form continued in subsequent centuries to be used 
extensively by the apostolic fathers as a vehicle for theology and 
ethical teaching. In striking contrast, the Hebrew canon (Old 
Testament) and the succeeding Jewish writings preferred entirely dif­
ferent literary forms. 
Of course, the publishing of letters was by no means uncommon in 
the ancient world. We may recall that a century before Paul over nine 
hundred Latin letters of Cicero had been published posthumously.' 
This large group of lively and interesting letters must have contributed 
to a growing habit of making collections of letters. But Cicero was a 
famous man, not unaware that his Latin letters would be preserved for 
posterity. Paul, by contrast, was an unknown figure, who wrote some 
obscure non-literary letters in everyday koine Greek, to some scattered 
little groups of his undistinguished fellow religionists — letters cer­
tainly not originally intended for publication, whatever their im­
mediate use might be. It was only later, through a variety of unfore­
seen circumstances, that they were collected and published and finally 
ecame an important part of the sacred writings of the growing Chris­
tian movement. Eventually they became the most influential and wide­
ly published letters ever written. Why did this come about? Perhaps a 
general answer may be found in the ethos of the Christian movement 
and tins may help us to interpret the letters themselves. 
ristianity was a rapidly spreading missionary movement, 
centered around the believers' memories and growing adoration of 
Jesus of Nazareth, whom they believed to be alive and present with 
m- To adapt an aphorism of Professor Robert Funk, "What the 
gospel stones set in motion, the letters kept in motion." They supplied 
t^r^X1 C VC .on&°ing communication between widely scat-
thp J/rPS ^ Christians. Unforeseen crises and dissensions required 
i ° ^tters °f "paraenesis" (advice), to re-apply the basic 
fetter, thof^fo8 Pr°blems- Certainly in the first extant Christian 
creativitv ,r ° U1 mse^> there was a mood of unexpectedness, 
the canon' } WaS °nly the subseQuent post-Pauline letters in 
the canon that tended to lose this spontaneity. 
range y enough, Paul seems to have written letters unwillingly' 
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unlike the prolific Cicero. It is true that his enemies taunted him with 
sheltering behind his letters. "His letters are weighty and strong," 
they said, "but his bodily presence is weak and his speech of no ac­
count" (II Corinthians 10:10). Naturally Paul objected! Didn't they 
realize that he preferred to confront them in person? "Let such peo­
ple understand that what we say by letter when absent, we do when 
present." This is underlined repeatedly in the well known "travel 
passages", emphasising that for him letters were but a poor substitute 
for his apostolic presence or "parousia".4 For example, in I Thessa-
lonians 2:17-3:2 we read, "But since we were bereft of you, brethren, 
for a short time.. .we endeavored the more eagerly and with great 
desire to see you face to face; because we wanted to come to you I, 
Paul, again and again—but Satan hindered us. . . "5 Indeed, his letters 
were not even meant to be complete in themselves. Usually they were 
mere outlines; much of the development of their message was pur­
posely left to the trusted bearer of the letter to deliver orally. In this 
capacity such messengers as Timothy, Titus, or Epaphroditus would 
represent Paul himself. They would be expected to fill out the details 
and elucidate whatever seemed cryptic (e.g., II Corinthians 8:16-24). 
So it was only the later deutero-Pauline and Pastoral letters that 
tended to become self-contained treatises in letter form a kind of 
"letter-essay".6 His epistle to the Romans, however, seems to be on 
the borderline, as we shall see. 
From the first there must have been many other letters than Pau s 
passing between the scattered Christian communities. But it was Paul, 
with his intense concern for his churches, who made the letter come 
alive. It was his genius that took several of the current letter styles and 
transmuted them into something new in literature, the so-called 
"apostolic epistle". To understand this requires us to study the letters 
of the ancient world so as to place Paul's in their proper iterary 
milieu. . . 
We know for example that there was a vast amount of letter writing 
of all kinds in the Hellenistic world, not only in Greek and Latin but 
also Semitic letters among the scattered Jews of t e la p • 
Thousands of Greek papyrus letter fragments have been uncovered in 
the past century from the dry sands of Egypt, emanating most y ro 
lower social strata and dealing with day-to-day personal, family, a 
business affairs. Letters in Aramaic, on skin, papyrus, and ostracaare 
Presently under close scholarly scrutiny. Besides these, there have long 
been available to us the more literary letters such as those ascnbed 
Plato, Demosthenes, Isocrates, Epicurus, Cicero, Seneca an * 
The various letters of the Hellenistic world may be classified a 
ding to their place in a private, public, official, commercial, political, 
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literary, philosphical, ethical, religious, or some other contest. A se­
cond classification, often bisecting the first, would be as to the various 
kinds of messages they convey, whether apology, rebuke, advice, 
commendation, or other. 
Under our first classification we may begin with private letters, 
especially those written on papyrus in Greek. These everyday letters 
were surprisingly stereotyped and impersonal, limited in range and 
confined for the most part to a small number of stock phrases and 
concepts, with none of our modern chattiness. The following is a 
typical example of their restricted level of communication.7 
Serapion to his brothers Ptolemaeus and Apollonius 
greeting. If you are well, it would be excellent. I myself am 
We,ri • 3Vf made a contract with the daughter of Hesperus 
^and intend to marry her in the month of Mesore. Please 
sen me half a chous of oil. I have written to you to let you 
now. oodbye. Year 28, Epeiph 21. Come for the wed­
ding day, Apollonius. 
private letters was the common business letter, including 
, in8s as wills and inventories in letter form, usually on papyrus 
y stereotyped- In complete contrast was the expressive 
must h fPnvate letters of a cultivated man such as Cicero, but this 
must have been comparatively rare. 
sensed'al government or royal letters appeared to carry with them the 
message tr,e^C ua Presence ("parousia") of the ruler, as he sent his 
eiven annrr, ^ ^ Ject community. For this reason they were often 
ment Weii^"3 C permanence by being engraved on a stone monu-
HeUenishc l",nna°Wl! examples of th®se are the official letters of 
B.C 8 Pnhlir n Cir? t0 êxander> sent to various cities after 300 
proDasanda cr ?pen ^tters were sometimes used to spread political 
(86-35 B C )' 3S °f Isocrates (446-338 B.C.) and Sallust 
or discursive le'tt!^^ 1° open fetters were the various kinds of literary 
tended letters often & rfatlse in letter form or a letter-essay. These ex-
didactic letters! snrh°n a'ned ethical or religious advice (paraeneticor 
dressed to Lucilii 3S, neca's voluminous Epistolae Morales, ad-
tifS and ethS "cachins^ir 7 Epic"™s' 8'™8 hiS^ 
also, to write nseuHrm, summary form. It was not uncommon ,  
the illustrious name fymous letters> often with didactic intent, using 
of false pretences o°r of whT^ w7ter" Far from havin8 any ta'nt 
practice was considered I a. .we today would call plagiarism,.this 
work. For instance the t& eglt*mate extension of the earlier writer's 
or instance, the twenty four letters ascribed to the great physi-
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cian Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.) and forming a sort of biographical 
account of his life, were probably composed pseudonymously in the 
first century A.D., during the time of Paul. 
Less studied and literary than the letter-essay were the semi-official 
letters of Hellenistic religious leaders, preachers, or philosophers to 
their disciples. The ninety seven letters ascribed (somewhat doubt­
fully) to Apollonius of Tyana, a travelling wonder-worker of the first 
century A.D., were addressed to his followers and others. Their style 
lay half way between the elevated language of the literary letter-essay 
and the plain idiom of the papyrus letters. Somewhat akin were the so-
called "Responsa" letters from Rabbinical teachers, sent apparently 
in answer to questions from Jews scattered about the Roman Empire 
in the Jewish diaspora.9 
Where, if anywhere, do Paul's letters belong? In what kind of 
sociological or religious context did they function and how did he use 
the Hellenistic and Jewish epistolary models already available to him? 
We have suggested that he adapted several of these letter types for 
Christian purposes, often mixing them, and thereby fashioning a new 
sub-genre, the "apostolic epistle", which in turn became the model 
amongst Christians for ecclesiastical and theological letters. We shall 
try to see how and why this came about. 
At the turn of this century a pioneer in the field of ancient letters, 
Adolf Deissmann, was so impressed by the similarities between the 
newly discovered papyrus letters and Paul's epistles that he came to 
regard the latter somewhat romantically as spontaneous unliterary 
letters" rather than as studied "literary epistles." For his day this was 
a. liberating insight. He rescued Paul's letters from the traditional view 
that they were literary theological treatises, a pious misconception that 
had distorted the understanding of Paul for centuries. But since 
Deissmann's day there has been a move away from his too simple 
dichotomy between unliterary and literary letters. The pendulum of 
scholarly opinion has swung back somewhat and it has been argue 
that Paul did prepare his letters carefully, not for publication, it is 
true, but for reading aloud in a church community assembled for wor­
ship. We may, for instance, note the solemn injunction that his letter 
to the Thessalonians should be read to the whole community (1 
Thessalonians 5:27). Each of his epistles is addressed not to an in­
dividual but to one or more churches. They are, then, at least on^t e 
way to becoming literary texts with a kind of official character. 
Yet few would go so far as to turn Paul's letters once again into 
theological treatises in letter form. A balance seems to have been 
struck that compares them with those letters already mentioned, trom 
Hellenistic religious leaders to their adherents, or with the Respon-
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sa letters of Jewish Rabbis to their distant questioneers," or even 
with that Jewish letter referred to in a contempoary work, the 
Apocalypse of Baruch. Here instructions are given about the com­
munal reading of a religious letter: ' 'When therefore ye receive this my 
epistle, read it in your congregations with care. And meditate thereon, 
above all on the days of your fasts.'"2 
Even so, to try to fit all of Paul's letters neatly into some previously 
evo ve epistolary type may not be entirely illuminating. It is to ignore 
e spontaneous freedom of the man. As he threw himself creatively 
mto t e new dimensions of his apostolic mission, so he discovered new 
possi 1 lties for the form of his letters. In the same way that he broke-
u o the theological and ethical norms of his previous Jewish 
Heritage, while not completely rejecting them, so he used the letter 
models available to him, while somehow transcending them. Under 
critical analysis, his apostolic letters have been found to go beyond 
ctrnr?,r,eV10U^ or formal stereotypes, both in their general 
is hi?, r detailed components. One instance of the latter 
t«? T„ K I CJUSt°mary prayer forms often found in Hellenistic let-
mpaninn 1S ,ai} se routine phrases become weighted with new 
modified ??? in?nSlty''3 °ther epistolary conventions, too, are 
Snc ion li" ? SUch a way as to adaPt the letters for their special 
munitv a« f aS an integrai Part of the liturgy of a church com­munity assembled for worship.14 
thi^v^ofT',^11611' Lh,at he comPosed "apostolic epistles"; and that 
models must he?' , deriving from previous and contemporary 
It has 'its s?e delineated in its own particular but flexible terms.15 
minority sronn^P S?tlng .wi,thin the subculture of a vital religious 
intensely liherati worked in the doubly stimulating context of an 
porate religions personal r.eligious experience and a dynamic cor-
reflects this as i creative use of the ancient letter types renects this, as I shall try to illustrate. 
one itSS second sort of typology of Hellenistic letters, 
This classification was bSi? tVhe gUide thdr le"er Writi"g' 
employed and om • , Particular mode of communication 
hMdl">oto like tha, of Demetrius, 
art PrẐ Cn̂ T' EPf3Uk0i' be,wce" '«> B-C. and 300 A D.) 
Characteros,' fourth cen'tur'v A rff Th" Ty"" <Peri EP'sl°limai,0° 
large number of hack i +, A-D.). They give school examples of a 
advice (parainetikos or? erK )es; ^he letfer of friendship (philikos), 
tion (sustatikos) ironic y™doule.utikPs)> introduction or commenda-
separate types!16' Such * " 6 ^eironikos)> up to a total of forty one 
help in interpreting New^esSm6*?"0^ ,models offer us additional 
g ew Testament epistles. Where do Paul's letters 
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fit in this second classification? 
It is fascinating to try to discover how he selects from several of 
these types, according to the situation. But because he follows no fix­
ed letter mode, it is a complex matter to decide exactly what styles he is 
using in any letter. Let me illustrate from several of his epistles. 
The tiny little letter to Philemon was written towards the end of the 
apostle's life. It contains no overt theology, is in no sense a letter-
essay, but an ad hoc real letter. But its very simplicity is deceptive. 
Paul is pleading on behalf of a converted and reformed runaway 
slave, Onesimus, who had attached himself to Paul in prison. The let­
ter commends the slave and begs his master Philemon to accept him 
back with the forgiveness due from one Christian to another. Clearly 
this is an example of the letter of commendation (epistole sustatike). 
We find a textbook model in Demetrius: 
So-and-so, who is conveying this letter to you, is a'man we 
have proven and whom we love because of his faithfulness. 
Please be hospitable to him both for my sake and his, and 
indeed for your own sake also! You will not be sorry if you 
trust him . . . When you have learned how useful he can be 
in everything, you will even praise him yourself to others.18 
Compare Paul to Philemon: 
I Paul . . . appeal to you for my child, Onesimus . . . 
Formerly he was useless to you, but now he is indeed useful 
to you and to me ... no longer a slave, but more than a 
slave, as a beloved brother especially to me but how much 
more to you [then Paul puts it into the Christian context] 
both in the flesh and in the Lord. 
But this is not the whole story. Cleverly interwoven into the ex­
pected language of a letter of commendation are a number of stock 
commercial terms that half playfully transmute it into a kind of 
business letter." For example, "If he has wronged you at all, or owes 
you anything, charge that to my account. I, Paul, write this with my 
own hand, I will repay it" (vv. 18f.). It is from prison that Paul offers 
this symbolic kind of commercial guarantee on behalf of the reforme 
Onesimus. Yet there is still more in the style of this little document. 
Besides being a letter of commendation with business overtones, it 
manifests also many of the marks of a quasi-official apostolic letter, 
|tot a merely private one. For instance, it is addressed not simply to t e 
individual Philemon, but "To Philemon, Apphia, Archippus, and the 
church in your house." In its general structure it contains the full ad­
dress and blessing, the thanksgiving and intercession, and the lormai 
hturgical conclusion that characterize his more extended epistles. 
41 
our first classification it functions as an ecclesiastical apostolic epistle, 
letter^ °Vert°ne* from the world °f commerce. In our second it is a 
quest. COmmendatlon> Pressed '"to the service of a Christian re-
rebukeaddrefrpH^ WC tUm t0 a much longer one - a letter of 
if In Galatianc p° Ghnstians in Galatia. But what kind of rebuke is 
seems to heh J* Wntmg aS an authoritative apostle, in what 
piSck from i h°tly chastising the readers for slip-
as we are " freedom into legalistic bondage. Yet, bound 
consciously mis * ffentl®fb century use of language, we may be un-
ample of a verv^ mg 1 C mood °f tbe letter. For here we have an ex-
as the "tunos Jir if10" tj?e °f ancient letter, described by Proclus 
this is that after th" °S ' 6 'etter °f ironic rebuke.21 One mark of 
Paul omits his usua! oneSS^ adc?ress and greeting at the beginning, 
launches into an ?8 amenities (thanksgiving and prayer) and 
(thaumazo hotnapparen1tly abrasive attack: "I am astonished that 
the grace of Christ ° ff6 S° duic^ly deserting him who called you in 
1:6) Yet surnri Lw ^u8 t0 3 different gosPel • • •" (Gabtians 
violent attack hut a enough, the readers would not take it as a 
irony that the writpS u ge e one. They would be well aware of the 
may compare this with fS afonished at all> but disappointed. We 
as °f Slmilar Greek and Latin letters, such 
was certainly surprised fadm?"? Attlcfs: "When I read your letter I 
terly changed your opinion ^wLTh v ?6™ SUm) that y0U had S° Ut" 
was that you should use the woTds eS.- bey°nd 
ly used where goo^relations11131 lr°nic Phraseology was frequent-
of a rebuke Such * ? •! WCre exPected to be maintained in spite 
' 'Pbilophronetic language T eWOulj signal this by the use of 
keeping with rhetnHeoi ' ? endearing terms and phrases. In 
clear the benign intention^?hT' *biS apProPriate sty'e would make 
ears so angry and hnct-i if w.nter- In the Galatian letter, to our 
astonished" would he f 1 fil Ironic use of the phrase "I am 
"Brethren, I beseech v^r GF f^ar'f'ed by such gentle sentences as 
• • • though my condition 1 1 fommand you"] become as I am 
despise me, but received m W&S 3 tn&1 t0 you' you did not scorn °r 
plucked out your eves anH f 3S 3f ange^ °f God . . . you would have 
enemy be telling von the t^If o, m to me' Have I then become your 
rebukes the cK meeh. <4:12"16)- As •»**"«• P""1 
readers of that day would h*' ln Su.ch a recognizable style that 
him. Because of this sid r if !f t0 ma'ntain friendly relations with 
estimate of the heated It 1 from ancient letter style, our usual 
° of the Galatian letter is modified in im-
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portant ways and our estimate of Paul and his relations with his 
churches needs to be altered. 
Next we glance at I Thessalonians. It has recently been argued by 
Professor Malherbe of Yale that the whole letter should be seen as a 
typical "paraenetic" letter of advice (tupos paraienetikos).23 
Malherbe has shown a striking number of parallels of idiom and style 
between Paul's letter and many Hellenistic letters of paraenesis like 
those of Seneca, or certain discourses of Isocrates. One stylistic 
parallel among many is Paul's exhortation that the readers imitate 
himself (1:6). This view of the letter will most likely change our 
understanding of its basic intention and tone. 
Each of the three letters so far mentioned may be seen as a genuine 
letter of a quasi-official nature, each dealing with a different kind of 
historical situation, each using different letter styles. It has now 
become untenable to talk too simply about "the Pauline letter struc­
ture or style." We have at least as many styles as there are letters and 
the basic structure itself is subject to some fluctuation.24 Each of these 
variations, however, seems to be pressed into the service of Paul's 
"apostolic epistle." 
The last letter that we have time to consider, however, seems to be 
of a widely different character. It is an extended and complex 
theological writing addressed by Paul to the Christian community at 
Rome. Exactly what species of document may this one be? Of course, 
we could ask more substantial questions about such a profound work 
as Romans — about its theology, about its dialectical or contrapun­
tal texture, about where, if anywhere, its central theological thrust is 
to be found. But the prior literary question as to what type of letter 
Romans is, is also a basic question of interpretation. It has a direct 
bearing on all the questions of substance. For instance, our under­
standing of its epistolary type will affect and be affected by our 
estimate of what is central in the letter and what only peripheral. 
The literary question is confusing and much debated,25 but the 
answer seems (perhaps over optimistically) to resolve itself into three 
principal options: that Romans, like Paul's other letters, is a genuine 
letter, i.e. shaped for and directed to a specific group of readers in a 
concrete situation at Rome (the so-called "historical" view); that it is 
a letter-essay or treatise, concerned with some important generalized 
theological problems, while assuming the guise of a letter (the "non-
historical" view); or, third, that Romans is a more complex kind of 
letter, used by Paul in an unprecedented apostolic situation. 
First, the "historical" view. Several explanations are offered as to 
how such a treatise could be a genuine letter. The most straightfor­
ward, propounded by Professor Minear of Yale,26 is that Paul writes 
43 
in response to a particular crisis in Rome, a crisis that the letter is 
specially designed to alleviate. The apostle treats of dissensions at 
Rome between liberal Gentile Christians (the "strong in faith") and 
Jewish Christians of a more conservative cast (the "weak in faith"). 
According to this view the whole thrust of the letter centers in a prac­
tical section near the close (14:1-15:3): "As for the man who is weak in 
faith, welcome him, but not for disputes over opinions. . . One man 
esteems one day as better than another, while another esteems all days 
alike . . . Why do you pass judgment on your brother? . . . Welcome 
one another, therefore, as Christ has welcomed you, for the glory of 
God." So the letter is directed to an actual situation at Rome. We will 
return to this view later. 
The next explanation of the historical view centers the letter in the 
apostle s own plans. It points to both opening and closing passages for 
a clue (in chapters 1 and 15). In these passages Paul seems to show that 
his basic purpose in writing is to inform the Roman church about his 
own missionary program and enlist their aid, rather than to deal with 
t eir problems at Rome. He hopes to visit them and gain their support 
or his further work in the Western half of the Roman empire. Early 
in t e letter he writes, "So I am eager to preach the gospel to you also 
w o are in Rome" (1:15). Near the close of the letter he says, "I hope 
th see you 'n Passing as I go to Spain, and to be sped on my journey 
Th^H r y°U' once * have enjoyed your company for a little" (15:24). 
delicacy of the circumstances and the eager impatience of the 
apost e are shown by his restrained tone at the beginning, as he 
esitates to take too much for granted (1:10-12). He postpones his real 
th»,UeS^ near the end, when he comes out openly to appeal for 
matLrSSvf-tanCe (15:22-25).27 In addition, according to this view of the 
thp tnn't -S Strfegy to work through friends and acquaintances on 
adds r,' ° er to introduce himself in an uncertain situation. So he 
thocp h U1 f CO?trary to his usual practice, a long list of greetings to 
mose he already knows in Rome (16:3-16)." 
bodv n/tv,10 t^lis. exPlanation is a third one that interprets the whole 
main nurr,6 ep e as showing that Romans is a genuine letter. Pauls 
self-introH,°Sf- 1S exphcative and apologetic. He is writing a letter o 
readers' c, C 1-°-n' t0 exp'a'n his controversial gospel and disarm the 
church thafSh1C1^"S' He must en8age the sympathy of a strategic 
partly distmstf }mse^ has not founded and which he knows to e 
understandino rV-u ^ ^m." Furthermore, by defending his own 
to be accented ° st'araty he is attempting to substantiate his rig 
letter he Sal *8 3 tFUe apostle" At the beginning and the end of the 
apostle to the r-OPe? claims to being specially commissioned as an 
the Gentiles, thus establishing a right to minister to the 
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Roman Christians (1:1-7 and 15:14-24). The long and complex bulk of 
this weighty letter would serve a double purpose: defending his gospel 
and establishing his own authority. 
A fourth indication that Romans was written as a genuine letter is 
found in its various liturgical elements, especially those that form a 
recognizable liturgical pattern at the close of the letter. I have tried 
elsewhere to demonstrate that Paul shaped even this difficult epistle to 
be read as an integral part of its worship by the church that received 
it." It was tailored for this specific use. Each of these four explana­
tions on how Romans may be seen as a genuine letter has merit; each 
has ardent support among some scholars. 
We turn to our second principal option: that Romans was a letter-
essay, edited to look like a real letter, but actually a treatise about 
general theological problems — a "non-historical" document. Again, 
there are several explanations put forward in support. The first points 
to textual signs that we have here a circular or encyclical letter, sent to 
several churches of which Rome was only one. One hint of this is that 
in some manuscripts the word "Rome" is omitted from the address at 
the head of the letter (1:7). Another hint is that the document, as it has 
reached us in various manuscripts, appears in at least three recensions. 
This is thought to suggest that Paul used slightly different versions for 
different groups of churches. The basic letter was adapted in only ex­
ternal and superficial ways for reading at Rome. In further support of 
this is the theory that chapter sixteen, with its surprisingly long list of 
persons purporting to be already known to Paul at Rome, where he 
had never been, must in fact be a separate letter of recommendation 
and a covering note added to the copy sent to Ephesus. Had not Paul 
recently worked at Ephesus for three years, and would he not know a 
Jarge number of people there?30 All this would show that Romans is a 
™d of letter-essay, only tenuously related to the actual situation at 
Rome. 
A second explanation, offered recently by Bornkamm,31 sees 
Romans as Paul's "last will and testament", a summary of his 
theology occasioned by his sense of the impending extreme danger 
t at would attend his proposed trip to Jerusalem. Or perhaps it is a 
raft of what he would say in his defense in Jerusalem, with a copy 
sent to Christians in Rome for their information.32 
A third explanation sees Romans as a general treatise written for the 
Purpose of introducing his views to Rome, but with no signs that it 
Was sPecially adapted to the Roman situation. 
oo there is no lack of plausible theories, each mustering some sup-
Port from the text of Romans, each taking some account of the 
istorical situation surrounding the letter, each aware of the epistolary 
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and other models available to Paul, but each weighing the available 
evidence differently. My purpose in the time remaining is to concen­
trate further upon one phase of the current debate between the 
genuine letter and the letter-essay proponents. 
The former may be represented, as we have noted, by Paul 
Minear.33 In addition, Wolfgang Wiefel has done careful research, 
using a wide variety of classical sources, into the historical situation in 
Roman synagogues after the Emperor Claudius' expulsion of the Jews 
from Rome in A.D. 49 and their subsequent return.34 The strong and 
slanderous anti-Semitic sentiment in Rome would form an obvious 
matrix for the Gentile and Jewish tensions to which Paul seemed to 
address himself. It would, for example, account for the positive pro-
Jewish coloring of chapters nine to eleven, as contrasted with his 
t0ne in 1 Thessalonians (2:15ff.): . . the Jews, who 
killed both the Lord Jesus and the prophets, and drove us out. . . so 
as always to fill up the measure of their sins. But God's wrath has 
come upon them at last!" In the Thessalonian situation it had been the 
Jews who ^were doing the persecuting. Contrast his later cry in 
omans. ... I have great sorrow and unceasing anguish in my 
ea"- °r could wish that I myself were accursed . . . for the sake of 
my brethren, my kinsmen by race" (Romans 9:2f.). So now the situa-
lon may e reversed, with Paul trying to counteract the fierce anti-
Semitism especially virulent in Rome at this juncture. 
inear s approach complements Wiefel's background research by 
concentrating on the text of Romans itself and analysing the striking 
anH r^ £°)^r"-hrust °f the devel°ping argument between Gentile 
ansmmpTi, ristians. As the letter progresses, each position is 
S " 7oa counterposition from either the Gentile or Jewish point 
wav " i q ™,u ^ advanta8e has the Jew? . . . Much every 
all " 1111' T ? Are we Jews any better off? No, not at 
fV, ? ' I.am peaking to you Gentiles ... Do not boast 
tion Ohan^nC m el"C* Jews)" this is leading up to a climactic sec-
delineate thJV " uw^ere Pau* w'b bring to a head and clearly 
vative Jewish rhP-U ^ f)etween liberal Gentile Christian and conser-
He will nlpaH f f°' so-called "strong" and "weak" in faith, 
recinrolai a tolerant acceptance of each group by the other, in a 
Various Teh3: 2°f dSewhere in his liters (15:1-13). 
is after all not aHH ° 3 ary natUre are offered to show that PaU' 
o glance at onL ? & definite situation at Rome. We have time 
in a doctoral di« ^' st' as early as 1910 Rudolf Bultmann argued 
by the diatrihe ,tvi f°n °n Romans that paul was heavily influenced 
their rhetorical thr C t° c?ntemP°rary cynic and stoic preachers, with 
thrust and counter-thrust between fictitious opponents 
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conjured up for the occasion. In Romans Paul is using this rhetorical 
device rather than facing a real situation among his readers.35 But 
more recently Bultmann's whole analysis has been indirectly called in­
to question by the work of some classical scholars.36 The elements of 
diatribe style are found to be so widespread in classical liaterature, 
that Paul might have used this kind of rhetoric quite naturally, with its 
generalized positions, even when dealing with a specific situation. 
Here Donfried draws attention to a passage in Quintillian:37 
Further, in questions in which have reference to a par­
ticular person, although it is not sufficient merely to han­
dle the general question, we cannot arrive at any conclu­
sion on the special point until we have first discussed the 
general question . . . But Cicero has relieved me of any 
feeling of shame . . . since he . . . instructs us to abstract 
such discussions from particular persons and occasions, 
"because we can speak more fully on general than on 
special themes, and because what is proved of the whole 
must also be proved of the part." 
This is is precisely the progress used by Paul in Romans, from the 
general argument (chapters 1-11), through a narrowing application 
(chapters 12-13), to the particular application for the specific situation 
at Rome (chapters 14-15). Evidently the diatribe style would not 
preclude a specific situation for which the letter was intended. 
A second rebuttal of the genuine letter view concerns itself especial­
ly with the paraenetic (exhortation) section of the letter (chapters 
12-15). This argument claims that on stylistic grounds Paul's moral 
teachings appear to be a patchwork of well-known maxims garnered 
from popular stoic preaching and popular Hellenistic Jewish 
teaching.38 But against this it is pointed out once again that Paul uses a 
purposeful progression from the general to the specific. He is carefully 
arranging and shaping older ethical material for the particular intent 
of the letter, leading up to the special problems at Rome.39 We are 
warned by this fact "not to be led astray in thinking that traditional 
formulations cannot serve specific situations,"40 and are reminded 
that one of Paul's contemporaries, Seneca, "although he has a high 
regard for traditional wisdom, nevertheless realizes that the task of 
selection, adaptation and application always remains. 
I have long since overtaxed your patience and must draw this con­
tested matter to a close42 by moving briefly into our third principal op­
tion: that Romans must be a more complex kind of letter, improvise 
by Paul for an unprecedented and complex apostolic situation. 
It would seem that in Romans we have a document both like and 
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unlike the Hellenistic letter-essay. In writing it, Paul may well have 
made use of his previous notebooks and jottings. This is not at all im­
probable, as Stirewalt has pointed out in connection with the letter-
essays of Epicurus, Dionysius and Plutarch. He sees these as outlines 
or summaries of other work by the same author, or as substitutes for a 
work projected for the future.43 Plutarch, for instance, writes in his 
De Tranquilitate Animi, "I gathered together from my notebooks 
those observations on tranquility of mind which I happened to have 
made for my own use . . Elsewhere he writes, "I have therefore 
drawn up a compendium . . . putting it in the form for brief com­
parisons that it may be more easily remembered."45 May we say that 
Paul, too, is drawing together from his notebooks46 a summary of 
arguments already thrashed out in his debates with the Corinthian and 
Galatian churches, but also adapting them carefully for the situation 
in the worshipping Christian communities at Rome and for his own 
J"™nary pla.ns- Then we have an apostolic epistle that is both a 
r>nr- CSSay rT f genuine letter with a specific address and purpose. 
n"afr Paul "ses; but g°es beyond, conventional norms. 
„nrrp ^.We from such bterary analysis of Romans, and from 
analysis of Paul's other letters? Experience shows that 
these docZ'pnfc ^6- PC' m?re authentic insights into the nature of 
whn vtwT meaning, weight and intention. Those 
I believe^ trt to S,UC writings as sacred scripture, should, 
terms ' speak in their own way and on their own 
1' DahlTha? thC F°rni and Functi-on of the Pauline Letters, N.A 
I iteratnr^ iman; auspices of the Society of Biblict 
be arhitmrth reP°rt!ng on their unfinished work I shall have t 
presentlv w/ sejective and more conclusive than the debat presently warrants. 
wor^vTr Usefu' survey °t this area of research, includin 
LTL UPwLv em̂ rS.°f the Paul Seminar, see W.G. Doty 
Letters in Primitive Christianity, Philadelphia, 1973 
2. Doty, p. 19. 
3. Doty, p. 2. 
4. See Funic *tTVia , 
Significance J apostolic 'Parousia': Form am 
W.R. Farmer « Interpretation, ed 
5. See G.P. Wiles, Paul's Intercessory Prayers: The Significanceo. 
48 
the Intercessory Prayer Passages in the Letters of Paul, Cam­
bridge, 1974, p. 48, n. 2. 
6. M. Luther Stirewalt, Jr., "The Form and Function of the Greek 
Letter-Essay," privately distributed to the Paul Seminar in 1971. 
7. Doty, p. 13. 
8. C.B.Wells, Royal Correspondence of the Hellenistic Period, 
New Haven, 1934. 
9. M. Luther Stirewalt, Jr., "A Survey of the Uses of Letter-
Writing in Hellenistic and Jewish Communities through the New 
Testament Period," privately distributed to the Paul Seminar in 
1971. 
10. Wiles, p. 9. 
11. C.f. Acts 28:21, where local Jewish representatives in Rome 
speak of letters from Judea instructing them about Paul: "We 
have received no letters from Judea about you." 
12. Syrian Baruch 86:1-3; c.f. Baruch 1:14. 
13. I have tried to examine this fully in Paul's Intercessory Prayers, 
See p. 293 and passim. 
14. Wiles, p. 10, n. 2, etc. 
15. So as not to overburden this talk, I am omitting all discussion of 
the general structure of the Pauline letter. See J.L. White, The 
Form and Function of the Body of the Greek Letter, S.B.L. 
Dissertation Series, Missoula, 1972. 
16. See Chan-Hie Kim and J.L. White, Letters from The Papyri: A 
Study Collection, Society of Biblical Literature, 1974, pp. 15-30; 
A.J. Malherbe, "Ancient Epistolary Theorists," Ohio Journal 
of Religious Studies, V (1977) pp. 3-77. 
17. I have had to bracket out the complication of how far each letter 
has been edited or conflated, before reaching the form in which 
we now have it. 
18. Kim and White, p. 16; translated in Doty* p. 10. Compare 
Cicero's numerous "Litterae Commendaticiae", included in his 
Epistolae ad Familiares, XIII. 
19. For details see Wiles, p. 216, n. 7. 
20. See Wiles, p. 217. 
21. N.A. Dahl, "Paul's Letter to the Galatians: Epistolary Genre> 
Content and Structure," privately distributed to the Pau 
Seminar, 1973 and available at Yale University Divinity School 
Library. See pp. 12ff. 
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22. Att. XVI, 7, quoted in Dahl, p. 19. 
23. A.J. Malherbe, "I Thessalonians as a Paraenetic Letter," 
privately distributed to the Paul Seminar, 1972; forthcoming in 
Aujsteig und Niedergang der romischen Welt, II, ed. Wolfgang 
Haase (1978?). 
24. See above, n. 15. 
25. Here I make use of K. Donfried's recent article, "False Presup-
K™ StU,dZ°f Romans>" Catholic Biblical Quarterly, 
XXVI (1974), pp 332-55, in which he draws together the com­
plex debate in a thorough way. 
26' LSFMiwea"' T]le °bedience °f Faith- The Purposes of Paul in 
the Epistle to the Romans, London, 1971; Wiles, pp. 72-76. 
27. For details see Wiles, pp. 191-93, 263-70. 
28. Wiles, p. 92. 
29. Wiles, pp. 95-97, 263ff., 301f. 
30' n,r;„"aST,. "St; ?aul's Letter 10 the R°°>ans - and 
„ .s ' "f ,he Jo,m Wands Library, Manchester, 
1948, pp. 3-10. But see above for a contrary opinion. 
31. G. Bornkamm, Paul, New York, 1971, pp. 88-96. 
197^CIpp''61 73^ Br'C^ Jerusa'em'" Studia Theologica, 
33. Minear, Obedience of Faith. 
^ ^^.ju.^sc^e Gemeinschaft im antiken Rom und die 
65 88n8e S r0mischen Christentums," Judaica, 1970,"pp. 
35. A few examples of diatribe style in Romans: 
L ' erefore you have no excuse, O man, whoever you are, 
when you judge another ... y 
D°U Sfuppose' ° man' that when you judge . . . 
3:1 ThVn h Ca" yourself a Jew a"d rely on the law . . . 3.1 Then what advantage has the Jew?. 
what shall MrVeS to show ,he iustice °f 
Ŝ 'LTatt̂  B/no ™ansArc " ,0 C°n""Ue " 
answer tackToS°me,he" ' ' ' Bl" Wh°areyou' aman' 
36' j48' Cit,mg H' Cancik *"<1 especially H. Rahn. 
Morphologie der antiken Literatur, Darmstadt, 1969. 
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37. Quintillian, Institutio Oratoria. III. V. 13ff. (Loeb). See Don-
fried, p. 33. 
38. C.H. Talbert, "Tradition and Redaction in Romans XII. 9-21," 
New Testament Studies, 16, 81-93. 
39. V.P. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, Nashville, 1968, pp. 
lOOff. 
40. Donfried, p. 341. 
41. Malherbe, p. 19, n. 6. Seneca wrote, "But even if the old 
masters have discovered everything, one thing will always be 
new — the application ... of the discoveries made by others 
. . . Prescriptions must be adapted to the particular disease and 
to the particular stage of the disease." Ad Lucilium Epistulae 
Morales. LXIV. 8 (Loeb). 
42. One more important omission from this talk has been reference 
to the continuing study by W. Wuellner, R. Scroggs and others, 
concerning Paul as rhetorician, influenced by both Jewish and 
Hellenistic rhetorical and forensic customs. 
43. "The Form and Function of the Greek Letter-Essay," p. 2. 
44. Moralia. VI. 464 (Loeb). 
45. Moralia. II. 138 (Loeb). 
46. Cf. II Tim. 4:13, "When you come bring . . . the books" (ta 
biblia), "and above all the parchments" (tas membranas). Mem-
brana meant a leaf-book made of parchment, widely used from 
the first century B.C. for note-books, memoranda, first drafts 
of literary work. Donfried, p. 352. 
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Iris Sacred and Profane: Iris Murdoch as 
Philosopher and Novelist 
Susan Minot Woody 
Iris ^ a PbdosoPher; she is also a novelist. Hence our title 
tion betwepn h™ 7° e' Hence also our task: to seek out the rela 
quest oie mav^il" phllosopby and her literature, hoping that in the 
to the wavs i uUmv!"ate °ther and in the process enlighten us as 
literarv Mns^nf utemtUre Can be Phil°sophical and philosophy, 
possible- the!* i. "S ac^nowledge' however dimly, that both things are 
literature nor fhat <5h n° diSpUt6' for example' that Plat0 ™te 
most of us arlcnn baspeare Philosophized supremely well. And yet 
both undertakino W 6 ,1^' p®rbaPs also dimly, the hazardousness of 
for the sin of writ' .Murdoch herself scolds Jean Paul Sartre ror rne sin of writing didactic drama.1 
posed- Hris^sacrpH^ ̂  dse^ Pr°Poses an answer to the question 
fane to novelist ̂  uT !° COrrespond *> 'philosopher,' 'Iris pro-
mean to sav that nh'i C ™citure. lhe title then tendentious: do I 
novels is somehow 1 °®°Ph12mg is a sacred activity, while making 
luminated. merely profane? This question, too, needs to be il-
assumptfon^haU^r^ic ndertau-Cn under the guidance of the minimal 
which requires to S is something here - a puzzle and a problem -
tivities of the philosopher^hmdd h*™ l° be demandin8 that the ac-
the novelist and mn™ i ° bear uP°n, illumine the activities of 
seem that any of the folTn ^ 1 -Wu y? Abstractly considered, it would 
any of the following might be the case. First, Iris Murdoch's 
Paper read on April 17, 1975 
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philosophy and her literature have nothing to do with one another: 
they are perfectly unrelated. In this case, the philosopher and the 
novelist just happen to inhabit the same skin. But, secondly, it might 
be the case that one enterprise is thoroughly subordinate to the other; 
for instance, maybe her novels are nothing but literary illustrations of 
her philosophy; or her philosophy is perhaps only a sustained apology 
for, or conceptual transcription of, her literature. But finally, maybe 
none of these accounts is correct. Perhaps while thoroughly indepen­
dent activities and productions, there may be both a species of consis­
tency and of mutuality between her philosophy and her literary output 
such as to make them reciprocally illuminating while not negating the 
complexity and obscurity of their interrelations. In fact, it is this third 
situation, I believe and hope to show, which we actually face with Iris 
Murdoch's diverse and heterogeneous opera. Like her namesake, the 
rainbow, Iris Murdoch is in no one place: hers is a spirit of genuinely 
broad yet curiously unified reach. I shall try to prove, at any rate, that 
this is so, in a discussion divided between her recent novel, The Sacred 
and Profane Love Machine and her book of important philosophical 
essays, The Sovereignty of Good. As between the title of her latest 
novel, The Sacred and Profane Love Machine, and its narrative line, 
there is a deceptively simple, even transparent correspondence. Its 
main character (certainly not its hero), Blaise Gavender, an educated, 
upper middle-class and middle-aged psychotherapist, is living a dou­
ble life, pivoting on two loves — one sacred, licit, public; the other, 
profane, illicit, hidden. The first life is that with his wife, the other 
with his South London mistress of nine years' standing. His wife and 
holy love is Harriet: luminous, curved, quiet, loving. His profane love 
is Emily: dark, angular, condemnatory, passionate. Harriet, whom 
Blaise originally loved and married in recognition of her ability to 
redeem him from the dark and potentially ominous aspects of his 
chaotically appetitive consciousness, remains even as his wife curious­
ly apart. She never, for example, becomes for him a woman with 
whom he could have impetuous, instinctive, insatiable sex. Emily, in­
exhaustibly sexual, poised passionately for whatever a wild and lusting 
mood might demand, is almost more himself than he is, Blaise knows. 
Only with Emily is he fully himself, only with her does he genuinely 
exist. She is his key to authenticity. She is his soul. 
Both women have borne him sons. Each child is, both physically 
and spiritually, iconic of the love which called him into being. David, 
Harriet's son, is blond, cool, chaste, beautiful. Even the anguishes of 
adolescence, through which he is living as the novel unfolds, do not 
seriously compromise his luminous, attractive, altogether sweetly ac­
ceptable being. Emily's child, Luca, is in every aspect of his being an 
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embarrassment: a bastard, of course — but also solitary, dark, largely 
speechless, endlessly watching. His motives and perceptions remain 
throughout inscrutable and mildly repulsive to his father. For Blaise, 
and indeed, for Harriet, Luca will prove an instrument of fate from 
the moment when he invades the other world his father inhabits — the 
world of his father's licit life with Harriet and David, lived in their en­
chanting, flower-ringed home, Hood House. Indeed, it is Luca who 
signals the beginning of the end of Blaise's double life. After one of 
Blaise s regular weekly sessions at Emily's slum flat, Luca secrets 
lmself under the floor carpet of his father's automobile and is unwit­
tingly transported by Blaise from Emily's South London tenement to 
the enchanted, garden-ringed home he shares with his sacred and licit 
love, Harriet. On the evening of the day Blaise's life begins to unravel, 
Luca, standing like a spy at the foot of the garden, in the luminous 
late night air of midsummer's eve, gazes uncomprehendingly yet 
, , ITer s. other house' as he does so he is seen, uncom-
i v-Hyi11® y' y.,^arnet i° turn- Before the gods have had their last 
31' Harriet wdl have come to know and love this mysterious, dark 
S Indeed more: she will finally demand and seize motherly 
possession of Luca (as her price for releasing Blaise), and she will die 
weTnheedetorna°therimP^r!fnt characters in the book, not all of whom 
He Hve! n ? Vl v! J.®™®** There is' for one> Montague Small. 
the far end nf th ?® °S®r h°USe which stands on the property, at 
the full stow Cn' 1 recently I°st his wife to cancer (well, 
curiouslv diVna m0r! macabre> and is almost totally absorbed in a 
Montv knowfh ^ YGt anguished Process of mourning her. 
^itherin^ effect hnth ^ °Ving> dinkal Precision which has a 
In an almoiu ondr^- °n 1 and those who come within his orbit. 
JLractos nd^J^nTr11^ h® tFe"Ches uP°n the lives of all the main 
porarv British nhil n° ®m 3 yet manipulative. (Is he contem­porary British philosophy personified? There is good reason to think 
maTs?eTofhanrOxSforddcnn DeN?oraay- A classicist, about to become 
wife, Sophie. He drinks too much'ctreTtoomuc? M°nty'S 
full of need and love. Although hi's word! ' 15 comPassionate' 
ones spoken by anyone through i T™8 th® °nly healing 
the workings of the sacred and nrnfl i e1' he 1S not exempt from 
ap in its workings l0V® machine" k wi" catch him 
Well, perhaps-enough has been said to suggest that th* tu r 
Sacred and Profane Love Machine is nofhe e n 'i 
superficial survey of ,„e narra,iv. suggesls. ^ 
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the novel, whether major or minor, oscillates in a measure of anguish 
or blindness between sacred and profane loves, and neither we nor 
they are perfectly sure whether any particular erotic episode to which 
they give themselves is sacred and saving, or the opposite. To be more 
accurate, we do not know what a sacred and saving love would be. 
The novel poses the question — indeed, poses it repeatedly and in 
every light — without providing an answer. To add to our difficulties 
Iris Murdoch delights in causing things to turn into their opposites, 
with the result that we have not merely the, so to speak, normal am­
biguities of experience to deal with, but more exotic uncertainties as 
well. For instance, we are made aware through most of the novel 
that Emily and Blaise's illicit love is a sunless, violent, driven, cor­
rosive passion. Yet at least at the beginning, it had seemed to Blaise 
salvational, the key to his true being: 
"A philosopher said that the spiritualization of sensuality 
is called love. Blaise had certainly felt his early love for 
'Emily to be all sense, all spirit.' The absolute interpenetra-
tion of the two gave him, together with experiences of 
pleasure which he never previously knew existed, a sort of 
certainty about the whole thing which seemed to create its 
own truth and its own morality. In the light of this truth, 
his relations with Harriet seemed hopelessly insincere, not 
only in this situation now, but fundamentally and always. 
Emily told him that he had married Harriet for snobbish 
social reasons, and he did not deny this, because although 
it was not true, something rather like it, it then seemed to 
him, was. He had loved Harriet. But he had married her in 
a muddled, compromising, impure, deliberately blinded 
state, thinking this to be the best possible. He had com­
mitted the sin against the Holy Ghost ... by wilfully ex-
luding the possibility of perfection. 
All this he saw in the illumination of the dark rays of his 
glinting girl. Could one doubt the absolute incarnate truth 
when confronted by it, as by God? He felt like a disciple in 
the presence of Christ."5 
Could so true, so redemptive a love ever go bad? . . . ever turn into 
its opposite? Murdoch's emphatic answer is, Yes! Under the pressure 
of guilt, inward shame and Emily's ceaseless condemnations, his 
secret life begins to become poisonous to him: 
"Blaise felt shame before Emily, before David, before 
Luca. Where Harriet was concerned, something much 
stronger had been happening which was now his chief and 
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most awful preoccupation. As one mystery wound its way 
into deeper defile of horror, the other mystery, though 
without thereby bringing him any hope or release, had 
emerged into a new brightness. At one time Blaise had 
scarcely recalled Harriet when he was with Emily. Now he 
scarcely recalled Emily when he was with Harriet. Once 
Emily had seemed real and Harriet a dream. Now Harriet 
seemed real and Emily a dream. He had told Emily that he 
had no sexual relations with Harriet. This had been true. It 
was true no longer. Harriet had, of course, silently, 
perfectly, waited. How much, if only it were not for the 
devils, he would have enjoyed, and somehow in spite of 
them did enjoy, being once more with his chaste, modest, 
virginal dear wife. How much more satisfying this was 
than doing things with Emily. Harriet had once seemed to 
lack what Emily possessed in such abundance, "seductive 
vitality." But now his wife drew him with quiet power, 
rousing in him mixed intensities of reverence and desire. 
He had never felt any such emotion in his life before, and 
he regarded himself with awe."4 
The sacred and profane love machine indeed! A loom that unravels as 
much as it weaves! 
Blaise's crucifying oscillations cease, of course, with Harriet's 
g astly and unforeseeable death in an airport massacre. In the wake of 
5ar"etS death> Emily becomes Blaise's legitimate wife, moves in to 
Hood House and begins its transformation into her home, her do-
ma£" . ,y and Blaise together engage in a real and ritual expunging 
ot Harriet s recent existence there. 
f • „he .and Emily worked silently, surreptitiously, 
everishly, like people trying to conceal a crime, to erase all 
traces of Harriet's existence from Hood House. A 
perpe ual bonfire burnt in the garden, onto which the 
nnpHSfh' ^Uady av°iding each other in this chore, quietly 
u,, e Harriet's more dispensable belongings, the poor 
u ?.!° Harriet's finished life: the contents of her desk, 
hnAt f mementoes, the water colours of Wales, her 
rp -* /eapes' her newspaper cuttings about her father's 
j ea ' Plcture postcards from her father and brother, 
, , er u s °f cosmetics and combs and ribbons and old 
rnnti'im'j" underwear. The strange funeral pyre gradually 
_• . e ^m all. Harriet's clothes and her few inexpen-
ewe s had gone to Oxfam. Only a silver-gilt bracelet 
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engraved with roses had been coveted by Emily, who had 
prompted Blaise to urge her to keep it. She had never worn 
it, however."5 
At a certain moment, Emily and Blaise know that their task is done: 
every last hairpin and handkerchief has been turned to ash. Hood 
House harbors not a thread which would lead back in any way to Har­
riet. And now at last the once-guilty pair sink comfortably back into 
the bland, unexciting and undemanding business of being a married 
couple. Blaise anticipates their future in the following way: 
"They would have money, comfort, a pleasant house, a 
pleasant easy life. They had suffered together, and would 
now enjoy worldly consolations and rest at last. How or­
dinary we shall become, he thought without much regret; 
and he felt in himself a sort of achieved moral mediocrity, 
a resignation to being unambitious and selfish and failed 
which gave him a secret wry delight."6 
For the moment, at least, no mementoes of their guilt are in 
evidence. David, mourning and outraged, has moved temporarily into 
Locketts with Monty. Luca, whom the distraught and fleeing Harriet 
had taken away with her on her impulsive departure for her brother s 
home in Germany, is mercifully out of sight. He had survived the air­
port massacre physically but not emotionally or spiritually (they had 
found him under Harriet's bullet-riddled body). He has been placed in 
a psychiatric home for severly disturbed children. He may or may not 
ever be restored to them. David assuredly will not be. He will make the 
geographically innocuous but personally decisive journey up to Ox­
ford at summer's end, and the strong implication is that he will never 
return, at least not spiritually. One of Blaise's patients, Dr. Ainsley, 
inadvertently became a blood-sacrifice. In a state of acute suicidal 
depression he had left a telephone message for Blaise with Emily. But 
Blaise, deeply preoccupied with his need to retain Harriet s dying °ve, 
had put off responding to the call until it was too late. The novel ends 
in a way that provides the story with closure and yet manages to sug­
gest vistas into the future: while on the one hand, Blaise and Emily are 
tucked snugly into Hood House to anticipate the child of their newly 
legitimized love, and their tale, in a sense, thus ends, David, bound 
for Oxford, will be sought out there, at Monty's insistence, by Edgar. 
Meanwhile, at least three strong, erotically charged women are 
descending on Edgar! Each of these women has been suddenly treed 
from a variety of constraints as a collateral effect of Emily and 
Blaise's regularized union. One almost hears the "whirligig cranking 
up again: the love machine preparing for yet another go-aroun . 
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Frankly, whenever I finish an Iris Murdoch novel I vow to myself 
that it will be the last. . . not because she is a bad novelist, but on the 
contrary, because she is a good one — because she does what she does 
so well. And what is that? She causes us to dwell for a season in the 
almost palpable presence of her characters, and that we do not willing­
ly do — not because her characters are human and flawed; after all, so 
are Shakespeare's, and so are we. But they know only one song and 
the song is me. Ego. Ego sum. Ego sum. Ergo Ego. The living love 
machine of which they are the unwitting gears and cogs moves 
through time and history fueled by the most polluting distillate 
known: self-love; an absolutely powerful but blind energy source. 
Thus, our unwillingness to spend time with the people Iris Murdoch 
creates has to do with the fact that however disparate and differently 
situated they may be, their souls are all importantly similar in at least 
one way: each moves exclusively on the terrain of self-love; that is, 
each is either a confirmed lover of self, or has recently been victimized 
by such a one. None seems to know how to move from that terrain to 
any other; on the contrary, the victims usually show excellent promise 
of becoming the victimizers — at least when they are not simply 
sacrificed. Such a landscape, with such denizens, is profoundly 
disheartening, all the more so because Iris Murdoch delineates it with 
unflagging fidelity. In this respect, Henry James, her primary literary 
inspiration, taught her well indeed. 
And what says Iris the philosopher of this novelist's world? 
Nothing, of course, directly; but indirectly and obliquely, she says a 
great deal. What she says we may begin to gather by reflecting on the 
fact that Iris Murdoch embraces and affirms Plato's greatest 
metaphor, that of the Cave, as pointing to fundamental and perennial 
truths. You 11 remember that the cave contains prisoners in chains 
who watch the flickering shadows cast on the cave wall by two-
dimensional cut-out figures carried in front of the fire, which burns 
behmd them at the far end of the cave. Beyond the cave, of course, is 
the sun-lit world of real, three-dimensional existents, but it would take 
courage to make the long, arduous climb out of the cave to get to that 
sun-drenched world, and supreme courage to bring oneself to gaze 
squarely at the sun. For Socrates, telling this parable of the cave, the 
sun, the source of all light and illumination, stands for the Good. 
Murdoch preserves that sense. 
It is inevitable that a myth so fundamental as that of Plato's, even 
w,he" affirmed without reservation as Murdoch affirms it, will be 
a ap e y succeeding generations of philosophers to their special 
r^Sf ^ tu°PijS 1 jS at Murdoch's special adaptation of 
the great myth. Having done so, we will have the materials for a 
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somewhat systematic overview of her position. 
"Plato has given us an image of this deluded worship (of 
false suns) in his great allegory. The prisoners in the cave at 
first face the back wall. Behind them a fire is burning in the 
light of which they see upon the wall the shadows of pup­
pets which are carried between them and the fire and they 
take these shadows to be the whole of reality. When they 
turn around they can see the fire, which they have to pass 
in order to get out of the cave. The fire, I take it, represents 
the self, the old unregenerate psyche, that great source of 
energy and warmth. The prisoners in the second stage of 
enlightenment have gained a kind of self-awareness which 
is nowadays a matter of so much interest to us. They can 
see in themselves the sources of what was formerly blind 
selfish instinct. They see the flames which threw the 
shadows which they used to think were real, and they can 
see the puppets, imitations of things in the real world, 
whose shadows they used to recognize. They do not yet 
dream that there is anything else to see. What is more likely 
than that they should settle down beside the fire, which 
though its form is flickering and unclear is quite easy to 
look at and cosy to sit by. . 
This powerful thing (the empirical psyche) is indeed an 
object of a fascination, and those who study its power to 
cast shadows are studying something which is real. A 
recognition of its power may be a step towards escape trom 
the cave; but it may equally be taken for an end-point. T e 
fire may be mistaken for the sun, and self-scrutiny ta en 
for goodness."7 
This long but important passage from her paper, "The Sovereignty 
of Good," in which Murdoch discloses her peculiar use of The Great 
Cave Myth, also and at the same time places us close to the heart 
her philosophical position. Indeed, the passage just above is replete 
with sign-posts pointing us in the direction of The ur 00 • 
First, there is the rueful sense of the terrible, consuming en gy 
se!f and of its hypnotic power over us, so m uch  stranger and less 
resistible than the hypnotic fascination of a leaping fire, w 
n°t bring ourselves to stop gazing into dreamily, gam,, 1 Qf 
Passage, Murdoch expresses her awareness of t eeas 
going astray - of venerating, not God and no the Good but onlya 
cunningly disguised version of the self agar11- ( e f our 
of Kant's sage warning not to be too confident of the moral y 
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motives; if we take a more seeing look, we may find "the dear self.") 
Finally the passage expresses the sense characteristic of all 
Platonists that the real is not disclosed — or at least not unambiguous­
ly disclosed — through the appearances, but lies elsewhere — beneath 
or beyond — and must be made the goal of conscious striving by 
anyone who hopes to escape illusion and fantasy. — Together, these 
three themes nearly triangulate the core of Murdoch's position. 
Needless to say, much thought of importance, developing out of this 
core of concerns, moves beyond it, but time is too limited for us to 
trace these many areas of development. Suffice it to say that the uses 
to which she puts these themes and insights is determined by the fact 
that her primary concern is to explore and elucidate moral life. For 
this purpose, she confesses to having found much of twentieth century 
philosophy, both British and Continental-existentialist, emphatically 
inadequate, and while I don't want to dwell on the polemical dimen­
sion of her philosophy, a telling passage from "On God and Good" 
may help us to understand why the dominant themes of much twen­
tieth century thought are ones which she finds not only alien but also 
unpalatable. 
"Much of contemporary moral philosophy appears both 
unambitious and optimistic. Unambitious optimism is of 
course part of the Anglo-Saxon tradition; it is also not 
quite surprising that a philosophy which analyses moral 
concepts on the basis of ordinary language should present 
a relaxed picture of a mediocre achievement. I think the 
charge is also true, though contrary to some appearances, 
of existentialism. An authentic mode of existence is 
presented as attainable by intelligence and force of will. 
The atmosphere is invigorating and tends to produce self-
satisfaction in the reader, who feels himself to be a 
member of the elite addressed by another one. Contempt 
for the ordinary human condition, together with the con­
viction of personal salvation, saves the writer from real 
pessimism. His gloom is superficial and conceals elation. (I 
think this to be true in different ways of both Sartre and 
Heidegger, though I am never too sure of having 
understood the latter.) Such attitudes contrast with the 
vanishing images of Christian theology which represented 
goodness as almost impossibly difficult, and sin as almost 
insuperable and certainly as a universal condition."8 
Thus, from both sides so to speak, contemporary moral 
p 1 osophy, following Kant's lead, depicts the moral agent in these 
terms: 
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"How recognizable, how familiar to us, is the man so 
beautifully portrayed in the Grundlegung, who confronted 
even with Christ turns away to consider the judgment of 
his own conscience and to hear the voice of his own reason. 
Stripped of the exiguous metaphysical background which 
Kant was prepared to allow him, this man is with us still, 
free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible, 
brave, the hero of so many novels and books of moral 
philosophy. The raison d'etre of this attractive but 
misleading creature is not far to seek. He is the offspring 
of the age of science, confidently rational and yet increas­
ingly aware of his alienation from the material universe 
which his discoveries reveal; and since he is not a Hegelian 
(Kant, not Hegel, has provided Western ethics with its 
dominating image) his alienation is without cure. He is the 
ideal citizen of the liberal state, a warning held up to 
tyrants. He has the virtue which the age requires and ad­
mires, courage. It is not such a very long step from Kant to 
Nietzsche, and from Nietzsche to existentialism and the 
Anglo-Saxon ethical doctrines which in some ways closely 
resemble it. In fact Kant's man had already received a 
glorious incarnation nearly a century earlier in the work of 
Milton: his proper name is Lucifer.'" 
This emphasis upon the free, lonely, self-determining ego has 
become characteristic of both Anglo-Saxon and Continental 
philosophical attention. Both brands of contemporary moral thought 
are preoccupied with this lonely individual's making leap-like choices 
and acting in a public space-time world in such wise that finally we 
come to say, with Hare or Hampshire, that the moral agent simply is 
the sum-total of his chosen acts. Meanwhile, Iris Murdoch complains, 
neither Continental existentialism nor its British counterpart has faced 
UP to the challenge of Marx or Freud. Concerning the latter's view of 
man she says the following: 
" • . . it seems clear that Freud made an important 
discovery about the human mind and that he remains still 
the greatest scientist in the field which he opened. One may 
say that what he presents us with is a realistic and detai e 
picture of the fallen man. If we take the general outline ol 
this picture seriously, and at the same time wish to o 
moral philosophy, we shall have to revise the current con­
ceptions of will and motive very considerably. What seems 
to me, for these purposes, true and important in Freudian 
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theory is as follows. Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic 
view of human nature. He sees the psyche as an egocentric 
system of quasi-mechanical energy, largely determined by 
its own individual history, whose natural attachments are 
sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to understand 
or control. Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of 
ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than 
reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to 
human beings."10 
To revert to her dissatisfaction with much twentieth century moral 
philosophy, Iris Murdoch finds the dominant perspectives both in the 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental worlds both alien and misleading. The 
onely agent with his transparently clear choices and his fully con­
scious will not only fails to encapsulate the moral experience of 
t oughtful lay persons, but as an image of moral life it altogether 
ai s to appreciate the fact that the central task of moral life is and has 
a ways een to love. To be more accurate, it is her conviction that we 
are ca ed upon to love well; so demanding is this task and so 
numerous the obstacles to our achieving it that it is literally an age-
ong a or which goes forward ceaselessly as the central activity of the 
ora y serious life. But before going further, we must ask what it 
tT?c . m^n' aCCOrding to Murdoch, to love well. (Some might think 
ni^t. J? ° ti, 9aestlon to pose 'n an age such as ours, so plenteously fur-
Plin V t?/ lllustnded> low-cost sex manuals.) Murdoch's reply is like 
lnvahlp' a° ^ 
Wf ^rst Place> to love only what is genuinely 
won't s'nrr. • 1S Good. Secondly, we must love it selflessly. It 
ins th t y05,6 anyone to kuow that she amplifies this answer by say-
BeauM?'. > "a"1' °°0d is like seein8 ~ «*•» - the 
Beautiful, as we do m the contemplation of nature or great art: 
n a t n r p a n C !  e x p e i  s e l / »  t o  c o n t e m p l a t e  a n d  d e l i n e a t e  
disHnUnp1 a 3 ar eye>.ls not easy and demands moral 
man anH • iuCat ardst is' 1° respect of his work, a good 
art h«L m 1 6 tFUe sense' a free nian. The consumer of 
ennnah t 3na °gous task to its producer: to be disciplined 
sucreprUH ^ &S reality in the work as the artist has 
art or n m putting 'nto 'I- The appreciation of beauty in 
easiest avaTw °nly ~ for a11 its difficulties - the 
adeonatp t 6 sPlntual exercise; it is also a completely 
selfishnp«en I11"0 good life> since it is the checking of 
selfishness in the interest of seeing the real."11 
Again, on the same theme she says: 
m not simply saying that suppression of self is required 
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before accurate vision can be obtained. The great artist 
sees his objects (and this is true whether they are sad, ab­
surd, repulsive or even evil) in the light of justice and mer­
cy. The direction of attention is, contrary to nature, out­
ward away from the self which reduces all to a false unity, 
toward the great surprising variety of the world. The abili­
ty so to direct attention is love.'"2 
The vision of her teacher, Simone Weil, shines forth here. (Weil sug­
gests in many places that praying ought to be understood in the first 
place as a concentrated and devout attending to God.) 
Here, then, is the bridge from Murdoch's sense of the Beautiful to 
the Good; the bridge is love, understood as a just and selfless atten­
ding to what is there. But how can paying attention, even in this rather 
exalted sense, be an account of the moral life, we may be tempted to 
ask in irritation. Part of her answer is as follows: 
"Realism — the ability to attend with fidelity to the real 
— I treat as a moral achievement, and in so doing, I make 
another assumption in the field of morals: that true vision 
occasions right conduct.'"3 
Thus Murdoch's view of the task of moral life suggests that only 
through the exercise of such vision, just and merciful, can the moral 
universe, properly speaking, come into being because only then will I 
see the other as distinct, separate and yet with needs and hopes as real 
as mine. 
In her essay, "Against Dryness," Murdoch praises the great 
novelists of the 19th century. — Scott, Austin, Tolstoy — for their 
depiction of other persons as "eccentric, opaque, messy, contingent, 
different and real.'"* That is the beginning of moral consciousness: 
to see that others are three-dimensional, real. The just and loving gaze 
through which this recognition comes is in itself a moral triumph over 
e8o, which knows the other only as a tool of its purposes, as an item 
within its landscape. (I am haunted here by those appalling lines from 
Husserl's Cartesian Meditations: the transcendence of the other is 
wholly immanent within my consciousness.) Beyond ego, indeed, lies 
®y self to whom I am also called to be morally just and merciful, but 
that, of course, is a very late achievement if it ever comes. We nee 
0n'y add that moral life, with its inner struggle, its vision, its refusal of 
consolatory "magic" is good for nothing else in the world; it is 
autotelic - it is its own end — and constitutes a realm of grace. Or-
inarily human love fails of this ideal. 
"If one is going to speak of great art as evidence , is not 
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ordinary human love an even more striking evidence of a 
transcendent principle of good? Plato was prepared to take 
it as a starting-point. (There are several starting-points.) 
One cannot but agree that in some sense this is the most 
important thing of all; and yet human love is normally too 
profoundly possessive and also too 'mechanical' to be a 
place of vision. There is a paradox here about the nature of 
love itself. That the highest love is in some sense imper­
sonal is something which we can indeed see in art, but 
which I think we cannot see clearly, except in a very 
piecemeal manner, in the relationships of human beings. 
Once again the place of art is unique. The image of the 
Good as a transcendent magnetic centre seems to me the 
least corruptible and most realistic picture for us to use in 
our reflections upon the moral life. Here the philosophical 
'proof', if there is one, is the same as the moral 'proof'. I 
would rely especially upon arguments from experience 
concerned with the realism which we perceive to be con­
nected with goodness, and with the love and detachment 
which is exhibited in great art."15 
When the prisoner, who has escaped from the cave and dwelt in the 
sun-lit world for a while goes back into the cave, he finds he is almost 
completely blind, and must grope. Similarly, when we leave Mur­
doch s philosophical discourse on love to return for a last glance at the 
and of the love-machine, we stumble: someone has turned off all the 
lg ts and only the palest and most distant glimmer of philosophical il-
umination remains with us, like the flashings of an underground 
phosphorescent river. But its light is sufficient for us to see now more 
certainly the law that rules this land. 
Specifically it is clear that the machine of self grinds out 'sacred' 
n fu e ?ves ^differently. Everything is grist for its mill. Blaise 
ca e arnet his sacred love, Emily his profane one. But, we may 
now as , as he ever really seen either woman, with that truly seeing, 
unsentimental, just and merciful gaze which is love? And David: is he 
no a ove a in love with his own pain, rather than genuinely engaged 
said-°Urmn^ 'S mot^er^ t^lat the philosopher however, has 
tVpv.^n sufffring itself can play a demonic role here, and 
e 1 eas of guilt and punishment can be the most subtle 
tools of the ingenious self."16 
knowlerW ̂ 4^ ^6SF!.e»Ct t0- ai7^ Monty, with his poisonous self-
. ur och s philosophical text provides the following com-
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ment: "One's self is interesting, so are one's motives interesting, even 
the unworthiness of one's motives is interesting; one's pain, unless it is 
very intense indeed, is far too interesting.'"7 Thus, all the characters 
in The Sacred and Profane Love Machine are deeply caught in its toil-
ings; and for nothing and no one will it stop. To attempt to alter its 
workings is dangerous in the extreme, for, like the juggernaut, it will 
crush anything in its path. It is frightful because its perpetual motion 
is combined with perfect sightlessness. It does not and never will see its 
victims — those whom it has maimed, destroyed and sacrificed. And 
contrary to the laws of merely physical machines, the longer it runs, 
the more fuel is available to it. Some who watch it, or manage to ride 
it, are delighted but that is because, like the deluded prisoners in the 
cave, they do not know or even suspect that beyond the land of the 
machine, lies a land of freedom and grace, and that it is worth every 
attempt to get to. 
NOTES 
1. See Iris Murdoch's Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, pp. 70-71, and 
the whole of Section X, in which she discusses Sartre's theory of 
'La Litterature Engagee.' 
2- At any rate, Monty's fictional detective-hero, Milo Fane, is 
strongly reminiscent of some personification of contemporary 
British philosophy. Consider the following passage: 
"(Monty) was "rescued" by a seemingly felicitous per­
sonification of his "demonism" combined with his mtellec-
tualism in the person of Milo Fane, the ironical, disillusioned, 
diminished man of power. Milo was, at first, almost t erapy. 
With the help of this scornful, sceptical homunculus, Monty 
could criticize his earlier yearnings while at the same time quie y 
gratifying them." Sacred and Profane Love Machine, p. 
2- Sacred and Profane Love Machine, pp. 76-77. 
4' Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
5' Ibid., p. 346. 
6' Ibid., p. 350. . _ 
7- "The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts" in e 
Sovereignty of Good, PP- 100-101. 
8' "On God and Good", Ibid., PP- 50-51. 
9' Ibid., p. 80. 
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10. Ibid., p. 51. 
11. Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
12. Ibid., p. 66. 
13. Ibid., p. 66. 
14. Quoted by Frank Baldanza in Iris Murdoch, p. 24. 
15. "On God and Good ", Ibid., p. 75. 
16. Ibid., p. 60. 
17. Ibid., p. 68. 
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Toward An American Epic: Four Poets 
James R. Baird 
We have no national epic in our literature; we are not likely to have 
one. But the questions rising from aspirations toward epic expression 
are insistent. The major ones take these shapes. Why should American 
culture, among the major modern cultures of the planet, have unique­
ly, without even remote likenesses abroad, expended so much literary 
energy toward epic statement? What urgencies in American national 
being have prompted so much poetic will to define an American 
typicality, an essential Americanness, past and present, as though to 
establish a monument for human beings in our area of this continen . 
What may be said of divergences within epic intent since the c ose o 
the eighteenth century and the American reflection o e 
Enlightenment? Of these divergences why is it that the first thrust, 
coming upon the close of the Revolution and the federation of the 
States, is of so superficial a character, and the second, springing rom 
romantic individualism in the mid-nineteenth century, o so eep a 
teach in our literary currents? . , h 
We should begin with some broad assertions. American culturehas 
been, and it continues to be, essentially amorphous, res^tent to defi 
Eon. Since the end of the colonial era, there has been no R eenter 
of American being. American spokesmen began with Emerson and the 
Ttanscendentalists to attempt specifications of American . 
Present years of the twentieth century the effort continues, some of U 
expatriate and frequently denunciatory, for examp e, 
Paper read on May 12, 1977 
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measurements of Gore Vidal. I am thinking here of free-standing 
observers who seek to address us with a self-elected oracular power. 
On the academic front we have intensified our efforts to get at the 
character of American being, efforts marked by near-anxiety, as our 
broad-spread curricula in American studies have proliferated over the 
last thirty years. In this academic venture we are as amazing as we are 
peculiar, remembering, as we should, that there are no such com­
parable native studies in Britain, Scandinavia, France, Germany, 
Italy, or, for that matter, in the major cultures of the Far East. No 
doubt we bear gratitude toward foreign universities, certainly spurred 
to action by Fulbright grants, where a new discipline in American 
studies has been introduced. This foreign modishness aside, we grant 
that foreign scholars illuminate the work of individual American 
creators in the arts, and that they offer interesting addenda to our 
now e ge of American history. But I have not seen evidence that they 
are any nearer than we are to specifications of Americanness, the 
essentiality of our national being. 
American culture is amorphous. Our brief history is essentially a 
history of emergence and mutation. National identity becomes in­
creasingly elusive of definition. The image of New England is said by 
rlutf °- ^VC *tS authority as a giver of intellectual posture, 
thtc! f 1St- y some to be the Paradigm of our future. What do 
meanl They mean nothing more than that American 
A ni exPress aPeculiarly American rage for definition. 
urf>ecthic^0nSf ovv an American epic come of the source which 
Ameriran Inuin® Quest for definition. If one had to choose a single 
untrnnhlerl 1S C^C wbbout ePic intent, he should indeed be 
Twain frnm °h- a ,ernatlves- That one is Mark Twain, the real Mark 
Hucklehprrv p- 1S uerary beg'nn'nSs through the publication of 
tionallv enir T-r"" 1S refP°nse to American culture was uninten-
the constancv Ut y faithful to American amorphousness, to 
American heino R mergence and mutation as the essentiality of 
an archetvnal mle i,W6 proP°s.e to talk of Americans who followed 
definitivelv tn th S • °W t0 acb*eve a form in language to give speech 
American our faC ~ness ^aS °PP°se(f to the becomingness) of this 
obvSv w?u?f und diverse tribal existence-
archetVDal auecte TT, e concerned with American poets as these 
Hart Crane Fzra^ If1-' ?ur maj°r aspirants are Walt Whitman, 
each need not be pressed ^orfS ̂ arlos Wilh,ams- The magnitude of 
Urdichter ftn cb °f these has addressed us as an 
singers as clos UP°n m°re exPbcit German term). They are 
Greek sense Their ̂  p.ossess to the classic makers of epikos, in the 
poetic speech did not, indeed, subsume and define 
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national being. But this t/rishness among them, this aspiration to 
speak for the tribe marks each as the quester. Whitman, with broad vi­
sion if little learning, would name his prototypes in the ancient makers 
of saga in the Vedic lore of India; Hart Crane found his prototype in 
Virgil; every reader of Pound's Cantos is acutely sensitive to his insis­
tent reach toward Homer and Dante; and Williams, in all his digging 
down to sources in but one American place, Paterson, New Jersey, is 
near Pound as he closes Book IV of his mindful epic, Homer's 
Thalassa, the sea of the voyager, and the great theatre of Dionysius. 
All these wished to assume the role of the maker of epikos. If they 
could, they would become singers of a new tribe, the Americans, 
speaking to us in a language of a new identity. Their speech is difficult 
to grasp, to understand. The audience is small. As our great 
Ursangers, they are would-be spokesmen of primal being. We read 
them as great poets. Yet we know the close confines, the singularities 
of each would-be epic which they left us. And, if we are acute readers, 
we know their frustrations. 
This archetypal quest implies some notice of manifestations in other 
areas of American art. We should need to study the urgency toward 
epic statement in James Fenimore Cooper's The Prairie. This vast 
novel, finished in Paris in 1824, seeks to relate the epic vision of the 
Puritan convenant, mordant as Cooper wrote, and the vision of inex­
orable Western expansion in the regulum of manifest destiny stem­
ming from the Enlightenment. One should pause to consider the epic 
urgency of John Dos Passos' trilogy U.S.A., the longest novelistic se­
quence in American literature. We should ask questions of Eugene 
O'Neill's epic intent in his plotting of a "Nonology" (incomplete at 
his death) to embody the epic sweep of American history. And what 
shall we say of epic vision as we encounter it in MacLeish s Con-
Quistador or in Benet's Western Star, though these works are essen-
tially poetic statements of events in North American history, ta e 
these widely separated expressions as evidence of a typical American 
impulsion. They are, apart from any consideration of their in­
dividual merits, large figurations of American experience w erein 
their makers sought to specify an American uniqueness. 
The archetypal thrust has alike had some grotesque manifestations. 
The late Aline Bernstein Saarinen, a great historian of;Ameriman u 
jtml a superior art critic of the contemporary for e e™ , 
T'mes, named our biggest monument as one of the seven 
w°nders of the modern world: Gutzon Borglum s four American 
Residents carved in bas relief on a cliff face in the ac 
S°uth Dakota. What on earth, she asked, could pr.omp.such a 
monstrosity? Why carve the land in a quest for American epic. 
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Because, she said, there is a persistent anxiety in our American being, 
some curious unhappiness that we are not well defined. In thegrotes-
querie of this reference, she was speaking of this same archetypal 
long which I have suggested. 
The surface current in the epic stream may be measured rather 
quickly. Two poets are here for consideration before we turn to the 
°^maj- Tflgurresii named for emphasis. Joel Barlow and Henry 
VPI i W°r+ ongfellow are epic poetasters, if that term is permissible. 
..'TJ argae that tbe Propulsion of each came of the source which 
Americanness ' man' ane> Pound, Williams: the search for unique 
that small n °Ur 1fSt WOuld"be national poetic spokesman. He was of 
Yale-bred «°h P K wntf rs on tbe ^rst national frontier, most of them 
somewhat'a °t- Ca-r name, the Connecticut Wits. He was a 
France as a Jem T8 int^"ational figure, as well. In 1788 he went to 
seventeen vJars rfJ J" la"d company. He remained abroad for 
as we read a me ° • |S n(?stalgia for his native clime is most touching 
in 1793 it is iWnt.ten at' of a11 Places, Chambery, in Savoy, 
Martha wJ2 ?' ^ ."The Hasty Pudding," dedicated to 
recipe- "He nJ8h°n' 3 exhibiting an epigram with a simple 
mush] with mousses "wJ0/ br<:akfast who mixes Pudding [i.e., 
presence of AN A ' . grant.the wit. But we also sense the small 
Barlow went on to^J10311 ldentity beneath this mock-seriousness. 
1805 he had hern mC American consul to Algiers in 1795. By 
he was senttn3 COnsultant in diplomacy in Washington. H !8H 
Napoleon When h Urope to negotiate a commercial treaty with 
Emperor he died t0 Wilno in Poland for an interview with the 
mies from Moscow eXposure suffered in the retreat of Napoleon's ar-
broad poetic °tatemen7Jf C.Unously marked by his aspiration toward a 
in the history of Ame • American being. It is the first such marking 
France 787 P°etry' In the year before his departure for 
The % on'oferPnT1fed 5 subscriPtion a long verse narrative, 
American Menlv h^"5- ' °ne is to advance a "detadon of 
nation which came to fi £ n°u better hegin with Columbus? The new 
books. Every student °ansb in the New World is revealed in nine 
dentured state of A ° . me"can literary history is aware of the in-
liberated it. What mer.lcan P°etry until Emerson and Whitman 
Bradstreet and Phvllk'wvJ J,°1Ce would we have had, from Ann 
English masters nrm/H j fa y to tbe Connecticut Wits, had not the 
sody, of course Rut' ^ ^ mode.ls? Pope is Barlow's mentor in pro-
was later to call it d; S1,nce parlow intended a "patriotic poem," as he 
call it, disclaiming any intent to write an "epic," what bet-
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ter guide than Milton, as he planned nine books of vision? The poem 
opens with imprisoned Columbus in chains, at the close of his second 
voyage. An Angel-instructor comes to him to offer solace in a vision 
of the New World. The hero is the counterpart of Adam in Paradise 
Lost; the Angel is the counterpart of Michael sent to instruct Adam of 
man's future. Much is written today of the Adamic strain in American 
expression. This interview of Columbus and his angel is the longest ex­
position of the American Adam to be found in American literature to 
the date of Barlow's writing. In Book II "Columbus enquires the 
cause of the dissimilarity of nations." What a strange and wonderful 
transposition, from Milton's Adam inquiring of Raphael, his first in­
structor, concerning the creation of the world and the diversity of the 
creatures thereof! The angel informs Columbus that the dissimilarity 
of nations is to be understood in recognition of dissimilarity of the 
parts of the human body. Milton is the prototype; but in unraveling 
Barlow's mind one can discover some evidence of Tom Paine s deism, 
as well. 
The transporting vision of Columbus, directed by the Angel, revea s 
the shape of marvels to come. Succeeding books of the poem recoun 
the venture of the Spaniards in Peru, the colonizing of North America 
and the settlement of Canada, and the American Revolution. 1 here 
follow a dissertation on the arts and commerce of the union ot tne 
states and a discourse on the progress of science. Boo Pr°P 
a council of all nations, this to be, of course, inspire ^ 
Americans. This prediction, the first of its kind in m 
literature, strikes us as rather uncanny. 
To wander through The Vision of Columbus is to feel theunstab> y 
of quaking canvas. The mise en scene is most precarious y ix . 
there is no more security in Barlow's revision of the poem, 
his return to Washington in 1805, Barlow set to wor an^-
umbiad appeared in 1807. Why he should have persisted is an ^ 
teresting question. As a would-be singer of nationa I ' ' 
doubt, felt compelled to repeat, the better to 1"scnb^fTh"^nst8ructor 
not many. The Angel of the first vision is exchanged for an ^ 
hearing the name of Hesper, the guardian genius o ® a , <mount 
nent. The prison of Columbus is exchanged for 'ce wjth the 
of vision." A new Book VII celebrates the French a l ance with the 
new American states. Expansions of the succeeding f. j 
the addition of a tenth book, which predicts "a™***® 
nmon of all languages" as the general congress of nat rtain 
ed. Barlow's struggle to define the nation, its thin_ past, 
Present, and its claim upon the future of humankind enc^ 
Columbiad. What recommends him to our attention. 
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definition is, of course, artificial in its end. But his poem, the original 
or the revision, tells us much of a typical American craving for anti­
quity, as though the new nation had somehow to justify its presence 
among the old cultures from which it derived. Barlow was seeking the 
weight of a deep past, the weight of history. These he attempted to im­
pose, seeking the weight in the voyages of Columbus, in Spanish Peru, 
in the speeding duration of the colonial era. Having exhausted these 
possibilities, he had then to celebrate an American greatness of the 
future, its arbitration among nations, its founding of universal peace 
(very much, we must add, as though he had resurrected the Puritan 
doctrine of the Covenant.) 
But it is this craving for antiquity, this insistent appetite, which 
most engages my attention. Wallace Stevens wrote once to a foreign 
friend of Mayan art and the American search for age: "This art con­
sists very largely of glyphs and sacrificial and calendar stones, all of 
them completely hideous. They are found in Mexico and in the jungles 
mm Cf Fa ™nCa/„ ' Many PeoPle believe that these early Indians 
came from the South Pacific. We feel a special interest in things of this 
sort because they give us the antiquity which the English like to deny 
WhJpv English insist that Americans have no background." 
WnTL Y °nC °f ? m3y think of Mayan art- this observation of 
whTh L f nt pa"lcular ^levance. The judgment of the English, 
7til sense 77,77 Cra °f the First W°rld War and which we 
AmJim- Prt°f .y had much to do with Barlow's search for 
sciousness ^SPficaj!ons- In h'm it amounts to an American con-sciousness or insufficiency. 
lite^afvhSvT11 L°ng[ell0W follows in this surface stream of our 
present enWrf 77 Wh° °f 3" American poets this immediate 
named The nbLS r u1™? the widest public reception that can be 
find an Iffinhv nnfv° 7 al°"gSlde Barlow will seem to you odd. I 
American antiauitv f'" • ^ 263 °n tbe part °t each for claiming an 
BaTow?deSnTs n,,ivr g'Vmg W£lght' for establishing background. If 
ter Stsman^77,7* 7 CanV3S' 7" LongfeU°w, although the bet­ter crartsman, left us a stage even less secure. 
ongfellow graduated from Bowdoin in 1825 and in r n £SF 
til his resignation in 1854. Our present judgment o^T f n hdd T 
rather to center upon his contribution to Amer can h^n 7 °Ug 
than upon his diminishing image as a ooetFnr n gT educatl0n 
Harvard, accomplished in the languages of Western Europe 
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overturned the rigid authority of the Greek and Latin curriculum and 
thus became one of the founders of our present concept of humanistic 
study. We should note, too, the breadth of his reading in the mythic 
diversity of Teutonic literature, and, in the later years of his life, his 
accomplishment in his translation of the Divine Comedy. But 
Longfellow's record as educator and scholar is not our concern here. I 
wish to emphasize his appetite for antiquity, his recognition of the 
weight of European cultures in the depth of history. As a poet, he 
sought to satisfy this appetite, an actual passion, in making American 
statements from American materials. The satisfactions for us are 
small, if even existent. What is there to note in those verse narratives, 
Evangeline and Miles Standish other than a genteel pallor and emacia­
tion? 
Were there nothing else from Longfellow to observe, we should find 
little reason to associate him with the surface current in which we en­
counter Barlow. But there is another venture to note, one which has, 
really, no counterpart in American poetry. It came of Longfellow s 
Teutonic quest in Europe. It was published in 1855, the year, inciden­
tally, of Whitman's first Leaves of Grass, and but one year beyon 
Longfellow's termination of his Harvard professorship: The Song oj 
Hiawatha. That the poem was intended as an American epic (however 
frail we find it in its twenty-four swift books) is rather certain. 
Longfellow called it an "edda." Based upon American Indian legend, 
Hiawatha is cast in the mould of the Finnish Kalevala and written in 
an emulating trochaic meter. (We might note here, as well, t at ar 
Gustav Jung, who had studied the poem, found archetypal altuiities 
between it and the Babylonian Gilgamesh epic!) Hiawatha•tells the 
story of an Ojibway mythic hero. But its consequence in American 
literary history must be related to the American quest for antiquity. 
Wallace Stevens' notice of anxious American claims for ayan 
"«ike a weight for American distinctiveness seems to have a cunou 
applicability to Longfellow's effort in Hiawatha Bo,°k * 
Longfellow's poem proposes for our attention Indian picture 
writing, his term for pictographs. It was a mode of 
the white man; it defined the cosmos of the Indian and t f 
tribe; it was, then, an epic form. Longfellow established nothing of 
Atnericanness in his "edda," despite his vision ofthewhite m 
'"heritor. Hiawatha is merely an evidence of an A™eri"*n ,P di 
quest; its effort to claim a weight of American ^pose 
"tk Ure fails. But, then, Longfellow is no more curious ini hi(purpose 
Jan is Barlow who resorted to the Spaniards in Peru in his elabo 
ej'gn of a visionary Columbus. nnefellow in this surface 
have intended to suggest Barlow and Long 
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current as American poets disturbed and frustrated by the expense of 
American newness. Each is a public poet; and each, by his own self-
election, seeks a statement of American distinctiveness in his public 
address. Barlow amuses us with his dependence upon Popean prosody 
and Milton's epic. The insubstantial Longfellow rather disturbs us, so 
much of his poet's life, save that period when he translated Dante and 
wrote some compelling sonnets, having been devoted to attempts at 
American legend and American definition. He is an anachronism: 
Hiawatha in 1855 as Whitman published Leaves of Grass and 
changed the course of American poetry! Whitman was the maker of 
the unique American poetic voice. He remains our progenitor in this 
present. We remember Emerson's exclamation when he read his copy 
of Leaves: "Americans abroad may now come home. For unto us is 
born a poet." 
This brief tracing of Barlow and Longfellow has attempted to sug­
gest the duration of an American search for antiquity, for American 
uniqueness, and for American identity. We have been speaking of a 
traditional regard for poetry as the primary instrument of epic state­
ment; and we have noted some of the residuum of foreign models in 
this American expression. In the expression of the NEW American 
poetry, i.e., that of Whitman and his successors, there are evidences 
of aspiration akin to the surface current, however deep their passage 
in the stream. Each seeks to articulate a uniqueness of American be­
ing. Each is intent upon epic statement. But the deep current which 
sweeps from Whitman onward is as it is in the voyage of the SELF. I 
quote, then, the most important lines in American poetry. Whitman 
opens "Song of Myself": "I celebrate myself, and sing myself,/ And 
what I assume you shall assume,/ For every atom belonging to me as 
good belongs to you." 
The consequences from Whitman are vast. The voyage of the self 
perseveres into our time. The last great epic singers of the self are 
Found and Williams, Pound continuing with the Pisan Cantos and the 
°iir / Cantos during his years of confinement as a mental patient 
m Washington, Williams ill and struggling with the last fragments of 
Paterson as his death in 1963 approached. Whitman's great purpose in 
the lines I have quoted from "Song of Myself" should give us pause 
Here is the annunciation at the center of Leaves of Grass, that declara­
tion ot independence for American poetry, set in type by Walt Whit­
man s own hand and published on the Fourth of July, 1855. What is 
this speech of annunciation? We know that it was inspired by Emer-
r * c a U  t 0  a n  ̂ m e r i c a n n e s s  o f  b e i n 8 '  b y  E m e r s o n ' s  c e l e b r a t i o n  o f  J sovereignty of selfhood. An American epic of selfhood begins "I 
celebrate myself, and sing myself." This new epic is to be double-
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voiced. Here the first voice praises individual being. "And what I 
assume you shall assume,/ For every atom belonging to me as good 
belongs to you." And here the second voice speaks. What I sing of 
this American existence within my being is to be a song of your 
American being, for in human flesh we are one. But this annunciation 
does not comprehend the all that is to be in this epic praise. Whitman 
inherits from his predecessors as the stream flows. He becomes the 
seeker of antiquity. To be an American Adam upon new American 
soil is not enough. He must claim for his epic of the self the weight of 
history. The depth of the quest becomes strangely, marvelously the 
weight of the song. All that was, before Americans, became and 
became to an apotheosis in the American self. I am speaking of Whit­
man's trust in the deep, the primary current. He seeks American 
primal being; he seeks lyrically to define it. Thus Leaves of Grass 
becomes the source book of every epic quest following Whitman. It 
remains Leaves of Grass through every new and expanding edition, as 
more and more poems are added. It must become an epic without end. 
The passion for definition urges its onwardness, even to the threshold 
°f death. And it is this same passion which we recognize in Hart 
Crane, Pound, Williams, each set upon the endless voyage. 
Whitman in "Song of Myself" and in.the great poetic clusters 
adhering to it is the plunderer of time. "I am an acme of things ac­
complished, and I an encloser of things to be." All priesthoods, all 
faiths of human history become one in him; the soul in him evo ve 
from the immense history of the universe; and thus it encompasses a 
forces that moved to complete him. For his embryo the ne u a 
cohered to an orb. This vision of genesis is accompanied throughout 
Leaves of Grass by visions of a cohering of all human events in t e 
df. And in the sensuousness of physial being there is t e ™arYe ° 
ln8s accomplished, the long, slow work of primordial life forms 
" o w  r e a l i z e d  i n  t h i s  h u m a n  b o d y ,  t h e  t e m p l e  o f  t h e  s e l f .  l o b  
Am«ican in this American place is to feel a culmination of these pa 
tlem Processes. It is to stand free and secure among the nations ot 
earth, to admit of subservience to none, to know, in 
American realization as the acme. These brdhant affrrmat ons by 
pitman, spoken in a language, an idiom never before encountered 
readers of poetry in English, reveal the streng Amerjcan 
°ngside these, an imprisoned Columbus seeing in Lake 
or a rehearsal of Indian legend from the shores ofLake 
uPerior are, indeed, timorous and hesitant, an eve ames his 
If we must choose one part of Whitman's.epic: which names his 
Jtotype as epic saying, that recognition, as e 
ent in "Passage to India," his song of praise written 
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memorate the opening of the Suez Canal. The poem is a supreme 
revelation of the epic voyager; and nothing from Whitman's address 
to us more clearly illustrates his rigorous quest for the depth of human 
i!^n°r^u-^e 'n Pr^ise of modern technology, inventiveness and 
skill which made the canal possible. He follows with a celebration of 
great navigators, Columbus, Vasco de Gama, and with ascriptions to 
the great explorers of the East. The voyage of the poet leads to India, 
o quote him, "to primal thought." His soundings, again to quote, 
plunge below the Sanscrit and the Vedas." Farther he goes in search 
ot primal being. The poem ends with the limitless expanse beyond In-
ia, the source. It is a voyage without end as the poem closes: "O my 
brave soul!/ O farther farther sail!/ O daring joy, but safe! are they 
not all the seas of God?/O father, farther, farther sail!" 
hilTv h-"1311 th" epk of the Self mus< c°ntain this weight of 
JS' thls tse*rch ufor Pnmal being of which the self is the ac-
riSment- f ?re's for our study the other part of selfhood; 
whichnm
qrfS ° k!ndlvldual bein8> the particularity of experience 
he if Twnii ff 3 S°vereign identity, the individual to himself as 
must' snffirf TSf f,0nS- um thiS Province Whitman's expression 
Paumanok'-nT^H ^ co"fession °f the poem "Starting from 
befinninf of ,f r g °f Myself-" rt is a reflection upon the 
homeonI nLt fdtS' 38 the poet's Pagination returns to his 
for Lone Islandf'h ' m'!beginning on Paumanok (the Indian name 
Cradle Endlesf ^ in "Potion with "Out of the 
awa^nefs t 3 mUrn to the beginnings of self-
youthful resolve °° • Starting from Paumanok" reveals a 
sayer The secondP°n eP1^..stature> the assumption of the role of epic 
Smbollc rendeiPOf^ downs°™ twenty years later, fa a 
beach the nlace of n°r -fi awakening to the rocking sea, on the 
is called "I ?Lt Tm Se"lng f0rth- "The outsetting bard," he 
tongue sans of the self f ̂  tongue's use sleeping." The awakened 
towns and cities of tillVT®1 °f Manhattan streets, of builders of 
Itfsfnf was of 'fme ' * °f the violence of the Civil War. 
complished." AmS^h Amenca was the acme of "things ac-
one life It was also the" Cmg W3S tbe immediacy> the presentness of 
The closing Hnes of repoS"°ry of the total past of the race of men. 
He would be the spokesman e?pose Whitman's aspiration, 
who I am or whf f / « nation. "You will hardly know 
theless,/ And filter anf fibre Ut 1 bf g°°d health to you never-
« cmfi. Few know today'. " ̂  C°~ 
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tellectuals as an aspiring maker of American epic, and a successor to 
Whitman. He had published parts of The Bridge in the late twenties. 
The full text had appeared in 1930. The eight sections of this work 
pose difficulties in analysis which we expect in major American 
poetry, especially that appearing since the publication of Pound's 
Hugh Selwyn Mauberley and Eliot's The Waste Land, at the close of 
the First World War. Crane is the immediate inheritor of modernism, 
as we think of it, though in his time the modernism of Whitman was 
certainly for an American audience equally forbidding and arcane. 
We may cite at once a line from the close of Section IV (entitled 
"Cape Hatteras") of The Bridge. "Thou, Vedic Caesar, to the 
greensward knelt!" One needs to know: that Whitman is the con­
queror invoked, that Vedic refers to Whitman's analogy of his own 
song to the primal speech of the Indian Vedas (to which we have just 
referred in a notice of "Passage to India",) that the figuration of the 
one who knelt on the green grass mantle of the earth refers to Whit­
man's symbol of his poetry as leaves of grass, common to all men as 
the earth beneath their feet. In his brief essay "Modern Poetry 
Crane argued that the function of poetry remained unchanged in this 
century: it should present "the most complete synthesis of human 
values." But he acknowledged the inevitability of complex statement 
in an age of technology and science. 
what in this twentieth century is the expense of our worship oftHe 
machine? It is a facturing of faith. Hence Crane in the Proem to 1 he 
Bridge will seek a complete synthesis of the values of his countrymen. 
He chooses Brooklyn Bridge as a symbolic instrument, the ri §e in 
its arching sweep a triumph of technology. Its cables will be the strings 
°fhis harp, the instrument of an epic bard. The last line o t e r°em 
reads: "And of the curveship lend a myth to God." There must be a 
new music, one of modern speech, one to recapture faith in the soul, a 
new age of soul united, harmonized with the inexorable vigor, the jor-
Wrdness of modern science. Who, then, will work this harm°ny. 
Po«. Crane was twenty-seven when he set forth. The more astonishing 
^ assumption. • a u i 
And more astonishing even his proposal as J^°ut^ne .! ̂  Pn^!! 
of his poem in a letter to Otto Kahn in 1927. "The Aeneid^s no 
wr'tten in two years - nor in four, and in more than one sens: [fed 
justified in comparing this historic and cultural scope o ,, 
totJis great work. It is . . . [to be] a symphony with an epic the ^ 
ARMa VIRUMOUE CANO "Arms and the man I sing • • • 
«'«™KVirgU. I doubt that Cranet wasa compt, 
'ent Latinist. He probably used a translation. But in g 
an ePic voice, a synthesis of values, a summation of history, a song 
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of heroic voyaging. Virgil's poem is epic in pure form. It is, in no 
sense, a voyage of Virgil as the celebrant of the poet-self. 
Crane would give to his countrymen an epic of national being. But, 
as with Whitman, and with Pound and Williams, it is an epic of the 
voyaging self. The music of Crane passes through eight sections. The 
first theme celebrates the voyage of Columbus; the second section is 
wrought in a counterpointing of materials from American history: the 
Indian and the colonial past, the advance of the Western frontier in­
tricately combined with prospects of New York harbor and Manhat­
tan in the poet's present; the third and fourth sections trace American 
science from the era of the clipper ships to the conquests of aircraft; 
the fifth and sixth turn to meditation upon the American loss of an 
iconography of the soul in its relation to divinity; the seventh marks a 
descent into a Hades of the dark machine, with an almost Dantescan 
vision of captive humanity, modern Americans in the New York sub­
way, the eighth and last is a song of resolution, a prophecy of the 
American future when the promise of Columbus sailing to a New 
World will be realized in a new faith, a new myth lent to God. Science 
an the soul will be united; mind, with its increasing power of inven­
tiveness, and beauty will become one in indissoluble marriage. As an 
epigram or this final movement in his music Crane uses a sentence 
rom ato. Music is then the knowledge of that which relates to love 
in harmony and system." 
J-!' is obvious that Crane sought a depth of history, even as Whitman 
evidpnrp feryie^ t'ie American past for Crane is actually the 
htm? Tn ° u Ffne S seif~exPl°ration. What of this past is vestigial in 
enir mnrip^ti ° 6 °u ^r'd£e is then a long confessional cast in an 
bm is th^ c ,/ne5 t'le comPlex imagery of the meditation on Colum-
one tn aff^ "re^erence of a poet who seeks a new symbolism of being, 
Laudanms Wlth a new myth> one to replace the Te Deum 
scraners nf°w evlips, Columbus. It is Crane who regards the sky-
dedicateH tr, thW as m°aurnents to our technology, cathedrals 
his music nn thC w°rship of science, empty of any altar of the soul. If 
to God "a 6 Ca?? Brooklyn Bridge was made "to lend a myth 
American heinPTu ,_0f harmony affirming the significance of 
and for him alone 60 nCW myt^ eventuates for the voyaging poet, 
he was fhimf writ*ng HuSh Selwyn Mauberley in 1915, when 
quence is a 6 poen*s were published three years later. This se-
weight of a„th„Tent dismissal. Pound purposed to remove the 
sion and to den" ^ stei"ming from Victorian and Edwardian expres-
the mode of rm°U"Ce allegiance which he himself had invested in 
of Imagism. The yield of these poems was for Pound a 
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stripping-bare. With Yeats, Joyce, Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, he became 
one of the makers of modern literature in English. He intended with 
them a total liberation from the preciosity which, as he judged it, 
marked expression at the close of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth. Soon after Mauberley he asserted in his 
Homage to Sextus Propertius (a Roman poet B.C. 50-16): ". . . long 
is my life, long years . . . God am I for the time. "We must emphasize 
this exaltation of the poet as God. For, as this liberated American, ex­
patriate though he was, set forth on the voyage of his Cantos in 1925, 
he disclosed nothing of those mystic visions of a new religion which we 
find in Whitman and Crane. Pound detested all religions, Eastern or 
Western, all symbolisms of religious ascription. As self-elected god, 
he intended to create his own world in his voyage-as-process, a voyage 
never completed. 
Yet it is of impressive moment that Pound, arrogantly despising the 
gross materialism of Americans, and the veneers of their thin culture, 
deliberately allying himself with the intellectual circles of London and 
Paris, chose to acknowledge Whitman as he prepared to begin the 
'°ng sequence of the Cantos. The poem is a short one, entitled "A 
Pact": 
I make a pact with you, Walt Whitman — 
I have detested you long enough. 
I come to you as a grown child 
Who has had a pig-headed father; 
I am old enough now to make friends. 
It was you that broke the new wood, 
Now is a time for carving. 
We have one sap and one root — 
Let there be commerce between us. 
°f the voyager, the epic' singer who plundered time and dredged 
istory to the encompassment of the self. "I celebrate my se , an 
rnvcolf n i _ — -t . _ i \r \*/r*r*n 
79 
poses, is the whirlpool of poetic energy passing into form. Of this 
energy at the center of a poet's total speech it must be said that primal 
being requires form which is traditionless, uniquely of the self, depen­
dent upon no other form. The display of Pound's energy in the Cantos 
is all but matchless. He left 116 of these intricate poems, many of 
them impervious to full critical explication. I am perhaps over-bold in 
suggesting that Whitman is a direct predecessor of Pound, the vor-
ticist. For, though Pound intended 120 Cantos modeled on Dante's 
Divine Comedy, these to be divided into hell, purgatory and paradise, 
and though upon this design he intended to superimpose images of the 
omeric voyage, there is something peculiarly American, savagely 
American in the energy displayed. Pound, after all, admits in Hugh 
belwyn Mauberley that he was born in a "half savage country." What 
one has from Pound's maelstrom, the vortex of energy unleashed, is a 
"ge ep*?°f self" Into il he Poured all the vastness of his learning, 
ail his skill in some ten languages, ancient and modern, and, for good 
measure, is partial knowledge of Chinese ideograms. It is no wonder 
a some would-be readers find themselves in the presence of an im­
mense an wild churning, a turbulence of images crowding as though 
™kagC fro™ almost countless sources. Indeed, the art of the Can-
u/itvwvf11 3S *S non"rePresentational. I find in them an analogy 
with the manifestoes of Cubism: Nature smashed into fragments and 
£ T according to the will of the painter becomes for 
semhipH £ ' realities of history invaded, smashed, reas-
whirh ic 1 k ragm*rnts fr°m the present. It is the unique self alone which is to be served. 
th Jsettle <'r,,:r.d,'S of a modem Odysseus. Canto I marks 
breakers, fort? „„ "7? '° 'he S", ̂  i" enprov r>f ,, „ goaiy sea. . . The voyage memorializes the 
born American°r CX' WC °f tbis enerSy is the passion of one, 
man thTS' fWh° acknowled8ed sap, one root with Whit-
Swe.nhr of th 3 selfhood wWch would encompass the 
Poimd s^reiteratinn fS ^ ̂  °f b°th paSt and present" 
and nresent hpp ° ° usar^ as tke source of all human ills, past 
bons of Al'cr u5 a continuing.threshold for his emerging defini-
should be sai^rif a61"8* <Tanto.thirt;y"e_ight suggest the scope. What 
ennobling MYTH? A country Wlth so little history and less of any 
fieTn SSnJ £H^ iS t0 be read in the evidence of traf-
"And that year II9291" M C fmfd and plunder of the Stock Market, 
was,/ We sunDose hp m dney ^ Said how useful short sellin' 
liar." This in essenpp e ,to jbe brokers/ And no one called him a 
capitalistic democracy' TheT Pound's measurement of America, a 
•emocracy. I believe him to have been sane when he served 
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the cause of Italian fascism, sane throughout a decade of internment 
as a mental patient in a Washington hospital. Not until the atavistic 
longing of old age in his last years in Venice did he wish to return to 
the land of his birth, and then to the Idaho of his boyhood. Whatever 
one's response to the Cantos, there lie before the reader the broadest 
epic design in American literature and much of the greatest American 
poetry written since Whitman. As for redemptive vision, there was 
none. There was nothing save the celebration of great art as redemp­
tion; and in that Pound joined his friend and fellow poet, Yeats. 
My final comment is directed to William Carlos Williams, close 
friend of Pound when the two were fellow students at the University 
of Pennsylvania in 1904-5. Williams was preparing for medicine, 
Pound for a career in teaching, which he soon abandoned. The friend­
ship endured, though one can scarcely imagine two American poets 
whose directions in the experience of poetic expression became so 
sharply opposite. As writers, they were linked only in epic intent. 
Williams came to detest expatriates, and to detest the poetry of erudi­
tion so fully represented by Pound and Eliot, Americans who, as he 
put it, gave poetry back to the academics. Recalling the impact o 
Eliot's The Waste Land as he wrote his Autobiography, Williams 
wrote: "Eliot returned us to the classroom just at the moment w en 
felt that we were on the point of an escape to matters much closer o 
the essence of a new art form itself — rooted in the locality whicn 
should give it fruit." To my knowledge he never spoke with equal 
denunciation of Pound's academic posture, of his deliberate loading 
of every rift of the Cantos with the vastness of his encyclopaedic 
knowledge; nor did he condemn Pound's desertion of his 
place. But Pound's charge against his old friend reache 1 1 
the correspondence of the two. It is preserved again for us in ° ' 
Section III of Williams's Paterson. Pound to Williams. o , ,, 
b in the bloody loam, but what I'm after is the finished Pro™ct. 
Pound's recognition is exact. The loam of America ( 
Woody" part as a mere Briticism of Pound: this loam is the 
stuff of Williams's making, that and no other, n , G ^ 
Person one finds Williams's resolve: "a reply to Latin and Gree^ 
*lth the bare hands." He is not replying to Homer andI g; , 
f°und. I, Williams, answer you, larding your artwdhyouracademic 
'earning of the ancients, I answer you with this loam dug 
American pla.ee 
This insistence of Williams upon the myself 
hitman's resolve as he closes "Song of Myse . again look 
0 ^e dirt to grow from the grass I love / If you"ant me JJjntaD* 
for me under your boot-soles." If Williams had never mention 
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r u/m3"' T should stl11 know from very feeling the inspiriting source 
ot Williams s genius. But there are ascriptions enough to Whitman I 
mention only two We learn from the Autobiography that Williams at 
the University of Pennsylvania adored two models as he began to 
BmwS S Cmft; KeatS and Whitman (an odd pairing indeed). 
But when it came to his notebooks, he wrote: "I reserved my Whit-
thoughts', a sort of purgation and confessional, to clear 
my head and my heart from turgid obsessions." He went on to say: 
H„nZraV " ased to assault me (as he still does) for my lack of educa-
diff rea mf' .e Y°uld say that I should become acquainted with 
• • • differential calculus - like himself, or course. I'd reply that a 
came^oallv Wms^lf^ 3nat°my wouldn't at all harm him . . ." Ezra 
Whitman Bm it ' m^SoWe' with the American root, the sap of 
power in Whitman^5 hams who found an American purgative 
obsessions " Keats & S3P *° H r beacl and b's heart from "turgid 
sought anAmS IT , treasured, certainly. But as Williams 
who encouraged him m"! an me"can language, it was Whitman 
asecrdascHolnT' " a htle esfy entitled "How to Write" there is 
verse And here S™1"6 °f Whitma". the value of his model in 
statement on dep,"fnYxprSn- "i'tt i" C°m™' f 
personality that must hp ? u j *-r primitive profundity of the 
u." what we d0 Ias wrii5rs'is to h<™ 
the primal nature of Amp 3S ln ®earch °f this primitive profundity: 
unique self. "can eing and the primal sources of the 
1926.Vjom\kh?sCfncIJdoiiamS'S P"tfrson was Published in the Dial in 
the langu^e to clothe i°were^^wl^taking'formenB 0^WC f 
print in 1946 and the follow,™ f taking form- Book 1 appeared in 
vals through 1958. Dr Willia °Ur s at ab°ut three year inter-
New Jersey. Close bv the Pa mS j^actlced medicine in Rutherford, 
Bay. Upstream is the 'city of Pa^rso^^™* C°UrSe t0 NeW3rk 
tion with the river because of s beann8 a Particular identifica-
ment. Paterson is the site of an e. Jacent falJs over a high escarp-
five completed books of the P1C named for the city. Through the 
Williams undertook and extende^v 3nd the fraSments °f a sixth 
which it encompassed was to he a h 1S voyage of the self. The history 
one place and its urban adiaeer. • ° remained a" American history of 
the history of one American ^?S|itheseextending to New York, and 
choice of this urban comnW "? los Williams. The poet's 
every man, in the modern sense e^ ated to the complex life of 
river passage. Thus Williams wr'nt Jo7It!3n 3S 3 dty' The voya8e is a 
follows the course of the Passa" D- structure of Paterson-. "[It] 
the Passaic River, whose life seemed more and 
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more to resemble my own: the river above the Falls, the catastrophe of 
the Falls itself, the river below the Falls and the entrance at the end in­
to the great sea." One should add to this statement Williams's first an­
nouncement in the epigram to Paterson: "o local pride; spring, sum­
mer, fall, and the sea." The voyage will, then, proceed through the 
seasons of his life. His death at the union of river and sea will ter­
minate it. 
The difficulties for us in reading Paterson, in grasping its total 
speech, come of its intricate braidings, the strands of local history en­
twined with the personal history of the symbolic persona. There is a 
reflection of Pound's vorticism here, a vortex of energy in which 
memorials of existence, both public and private, reach us in 
fragments, cohering in odd associations, passing through metamor­
phoses in the work of imagination — and evidencing the non-
representational in art. But we must stress the utter adherence of 
Paterson to American place and one American self. Stand where you 
are on American ground, dig deep into the layers of American history, 
however thin the deposits in comparison to European age, dig deep in­
to yourself. Thus Paterson, in its great range and in its magnificent 
faithfulness to American language, is an exemplum, as much as to 
say: how it might be for other Americans, identifying the place where 
they stand, identifying themselves. Through love, imagination, tota 
involvement in the joy and the beauty of life itself they may yet be 
saved from the tyranny of mechanisms — yes, even in the gaseous ex 
panse of northern New Jersey. 
Paterson, the epic of an American self, was left unfinished, u 
may think of Williams's last poem, Asphodel, That Greeny Flower as 
a coda. It is one of the great lyric meditations on love, imagination, 
and beauty - even the beauty of death - in the language, English or 
American. It reaches to the place of the soul, through waters dark and 
de*P. to the primal being which Whitman touched in his.late se­
quences, "Whispers of Heavenly Death" and "From Noon to Sta y 
Night." 
'twas initially contended that we have no national epic, norarewe 
fe to have one Whitman, Crane, Pound, Williams 
Self, each distinct from the others in the nature of his voyaging, 
merican being is becoming and becoming. t totauy of 
mergence. The singer to encompass the All o 1 , P 
Jwian being in poetry, to record "a synthesisof.til va uetr (as 
Crane aspired ro do), has yet to come. Whitman offered every 
at°m of himself to his countrymen. Few Americans are ta . 
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1100 A.D.: A Crisis for Us? 
F. Edward Cranz 
tC> ta^e advanta8e a friendly audience, though I hope 
no firm cr.i t.°ne' to speculate about some problems to which I have 
proWems S^S;-mdeed 1 am "0t even sure that 1 understand the 
ed- mavhe tooptv,6 1SSUes are imP°rtant; the problems ought to be fac-
The oriein of tvf1 we,fan come a little closer to the solutions, 
the West ca 11 DO lPr» i!eS in SOme simPle intellectual history oi 
that historv as l an 1 trouble seems to be that we cannot do 
situation i J the o"8 &S WC ,remain who we have ^en. In a way the 
science where it her SUC °i that faCed not so long ag0 in modern 
ciently small we ea aTC ^ ar that when we deal with things suffi-
thr.hvf,ou:affec,ing ,hemV ,he 
7 f The —. nd n0t always comfortable, 
tonight, and I'll get to them a?°ry °f l'00 A'D' 3re my main inter6St 
shall first have to nntr ^ as soon as I can. However, it is clear that I 
or we'd newrearThis,°«' ' shall no. try to 'prove' i. 
tell you that manv i.,.f r°,^ m.s 1 m concerned with. It is only fair to 
wrong. I have listened t "r'n °'ars believe that my history is all 
simply become m"e and moS"™" 'hiS !0r, a year or so, and I have 
detail I may be euihv , m°re.convinced that whatever errors of 
1100 A.D. still holds R e ^. S1S °f a fundamental reorientation ca. 
proof. ' u course my conviction hardly ranks as 
Ltiis talk was eivpn . 
Department Lecture in Marches"1 d(fferent f°rm as a Hist0ry 
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I contend that toward the beginning of the twelfth century, say in 
the generations of Anselm of Canterbury and of Abelard, there oc-
curedinthe West an over-all reorientation of the categories of thought 
and experience. The reorientation was so complete and so successful 
that we ourselves are to a large extent the consequences of it and, as it 
were, trapped within it. The event can be illustrated first from the 
special categories of knowing, sensing, and making. In each case the 
ancients, by whom I mean the Greeks, the Romans, and the Graeco-
Roman Christians, experience all three processes conjunctively 
through a form of union; in knowing, for example, the knower 
somehow becomes one with what he knows. With Anselm, in con­
trast, each of these processes is experienced in the context of a 
dichotomy: in knowing we no longer find union but rather a 
dichotomy between the knower and what he knows. Behind the 
reorientation of the categories of knowing, sensing, and making, lie 
two more fundamental changes. In the first place, ancient experience 
falls within a single realm of which the individual is in the fullest sense 
^Part; with Anselm, experience is divided between two realms, one of 
meanings,' and the other of 'things.' In the second place, there is a 
change of structure within the realms. The ancient single realm was, 
for want of better terminology, an aggregate order; the two medieval-
modern realms, again for want of better terminology, are systematic 
universes. 1 shall try to show that the ancient categories of thought 
and experience involved conjunctive knowing, sensing, ana mjA in8 
within a single aggregate order; the reorientation of ca. 1100 . • c 
to disjunctive knowing, sensing, and making within two systematic 
universes. 
To demonstrate the reorientation I shall examine the categories of 
Rnowing, sensing, and making. In each case I shall argue that there is 
dear evidence of a reorientation but that we cannot do a history or 
any one of them in isolation, or indeed of all three together; hence we 
ate driven to expand our field of inquiry to include the change; fro>m 
e single realm of ancient experience to the two realms o n.,,:hie 
°f Abelard. But here again it turns out that no history is po«We 
ess we also take account of the change from aggregate order to 
systematic iinivprQp^ • 
me begin, then, with knowing and mte l l ec tmn-  The dominan-
c'ent tradition is that we have here to do wit a urH . j ^ 
0n°f the knower and the known. One could illustrate it with 
•umiliar passages from Aristotle's De anima: 
say once more that the soul is somehow all be 
lngs, for beings are either sensible or inte igi 
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science is somehow the knowables and sense the sen-
sibles ... 1 
And, 
In what is without matter, what intellects and what is 
intellected are the same . . . Theoretical science and 
that which is so scienced are the same . . . Science in 
act is the same as the thing (to pragma).1 
The Platonists hold the same position, and one might note as a last 
epigrammatic summation of the tradition the remark of John the Scot 
in De divisione naturae: 
The knowledge of what are is what are (Cognitio 
eorum que sunt, ea quae sunt est)3 
But with Anselm, and even more with Abelard, we encounter fun­
damentally different categories of knowing. In the ancient tradition 
just noted intellection occurred as the intellect became, or was con­
joined, with a being or form. In the famous 'ontological argument,' 
however, Anselm assumes without question that 'in the intellect' (in 
intellectu) is always distinct from 'in the thing', or really (in re).4 And 
after he has analyzed thought and knowledge in terms of the internal 
word, he explains in Afonologion: 
For the word, in so far as it is a word or an image, is 
so in relation to something else (ad alterum est), for it 
is not word or image except in so far as it is the word 
be meaningless (and the anc^wSeth. 
meaningless). The change 
it was invisible. was so thoroughgoing that 
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But one could then ask about the massive reception of Aristotle in 
the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Didn't that make the reorien­
tation obvious? No. By then the new categories were so firmly 
established that one medievalized or modernized Aristotle not only in 
the commentaries but even in the translations. One decided whether 
Aristotle was talking about meanings (intentiones) or things (res), and 
translated accordingly (and it might be noted that the Oxford transla­
tion of Aristotle into English still does this). Thus the reorientation 
was made invisible not only for knowing but also for the other 
categories. 
The more important point to be made is that while we now have 
some date for a history of knowing we do not have any real history for 
the ancient period, since there we can't make use of the data. To use 
Anselmian terminology, we can, like the fool, say in our hearts 
that the knower becomes one with the known, but we can't truly say it 
because we cannot think it. It calls for a change not only in the content 
of our thought (that we can manage) but in the categories of °or 
thinking, and here our knowing seems a prisoner, willy-nilly, of the 
modern categories. 
I believe that one can show a comparable situation in the tradition 
of sensing, notably seeing, and of making; in each case we in a 
radical reorientation ca. 1100 A.D., and in each case we confront an 
impossibility when we try to move beyond the reorientation. e 
multiplication of instances supplies further evidence for the reonenta 
tion, but it doesn't solve the historical problem, so this evening s a 
not deal specifically with sensing and making. It simply compe s us o 
®ata use of wider perspectives in an attempt to move his oric 
beyond Anselm and Abelard, and even to pursue risky and inade­
quately based hypotheses when they seem to offer any hope o 
ou' of impossibility. What follows is speculative and tentative, b 
sl«ll not burden it with constant qualifications and caveat®- . n 
•would first suggest that as we look at the period a™unf . • "h' 
^ begin to see a reorientation on a larger scale than a entatjon 
gories of knowing, sensing, and making; this arg 
ls m some sense the cause of the special changes, not they of it, 
makes them understandable rather than they it. t„t;nn is to 
r MV best guess at a general statement of this larger reorientation s to 
rePeat what I said at the beginning, that the ancients somehowlived 
";t.hln'be single order of the cosmos or rd°h0wever, ex-
. beings; beginning with Anselm and orders of mean-
fence was categorized into the two dichotomized orders 
order was all-embracing, and individuals were in 
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the fullest sense its parts. Texts illustrating this single order are not 
easy to lind (though in a sense they are everywhere), and this is natural 
enough. The best of the ancient thinkers never had the slightest suspi­
cion that anything so odd as our post-Anselmian world would ever 
e^e".Ce thC^ wasted no time in explaining that it was not their 
hernm ontrariwise, even in Anselm the ancient world seems to have 
world°) invisible, so he doesn't have to explain that it's not 
w 'ith^ h f ^ r n n 'v /r°m. 3 tCXt 'n Flotinus' Ennead, since he works 
1 ion of conjunctive knowing which we have already seen. 
ri'tihe in.tfHft is truly the beings ... and hence it 
said knowing and being are one and the 
., ^. armenides) and 'Science of what are without 
sought 1S %Sam! as the thing' (Aristotle), and 'I 
sought myself out' (Heracleitus), namely as one of 
the beings. (my emphasis).6 
De animcr ^ ̂  l° realize the full import of what Aristotle says in the 
ST weSa™mari.zin® what has been said about the 
ines' For th ?g31n at the soul is somehow all be-
and scienrf.6' eings are either sensible or intelligible, 
sensibTes" " S°meh°W the Scienced' and sense the 
among then^and if!?/!3/8 the order beings one finds the si 
includes all beings The/ ^ the SOUl one finds that n somehc 
of the conscious self^!s a " & Smgle °rder' Unbrok^ by the existen 
For evidence from a r).fSLeparate and discrete universe of meaning 
connection with his arm! erent school, one might cite Chrysippus 
souled (empsychon) anri"1?!/ the °ne kosmos is a rational, e 
souled is clear from lntellectual animal: "that the kosmos is e 
it-"8 Or Cicero in thZ n°W" S°Ul Which is a Particle detached fro 
complete (perfectust hut t^tUra deorum: "Man is not in any sen 
the world or mundus) "9 18 & partlcte of that which is complete ( 
In 4.i_ _ 
as the ancients 'nfrned^hhin'^the 6 fdf h*" °f thiS Singk °rder' 
with the highest elementc e u found that the self was iden 
* the diJSf ofthe° ' v ° °?er; As '"ustration one might I 
Paraphrase of Aristoti^'J r> an of 'my essence' in Themisi 
with the factive and potential fTn0' 11 occurs in the section dea 
P°tential intellects, and as usual Themistius i 
88 
sistent that the intellect becomes what it knows. He finds that the 'I' as 
individual is a composite of the two intellects, but 'my essence' derives 
entirely from the factive intellect which alone is form in the strictest 
sense, indeed the form of forms, and the highest point which nature 
could reach.10 Themistius concludes, "Therefore, we are the factive 
intellect."" He goes on to present arguments for the unicity of the ac­
tive intellect; it is one in all men. The specific theses of Themistius on 
the factive intellect were of course not universally accepted, but I 
believe he is typical of ancient experience where as one turns within, as 
one tries to 'know oneself', one finds that the movement is to a univer­
sal and impersonal single order of Being. And when Neoplatonism 
developed the doctrine of a One beyond being, they soon moved also 
to identify the 'I' with the One or with the 'One in us."2 And thus the 
ancients lived within a single order, and the self or the I was identified 
whh or conjoined with the highest elements in that order. 
But when we move to Anselm and Abelard in place of the single 
order we find a new context of two large orders, the one of the newly 
invented 'meanings', and the other of the newly invented 'Things'. 
I don't believe that this reorientation from single order of ex­
perience to two discrete orders requires much documentation. It ap­
pears clearly, as we saw above, when Anselm sets up a sharp division 
between what is 'in intellect' and what is 'in thing' or in reality. In 
scholasticism, as in Thomas Aquinas, it appears typically as a contrast 
etween spiritual or intentional being and natural, material, or real 
e'ng. And of course we all remember Descartes' decisive formulation 
® 'be distinction between 'thinking substances' on the one hand, and 
extended substances' on the other. We may thus assume, at least as a 
forking hypothesis, that the reorientation of categories in Anselm 
and Abelard involved not only the shift from conjunctive knowing, 
fusing, and making to disjunctive forms of the same but also a rn°ve-
' eJJ' from the ancients' single realm to the two realms of t e 
mebieval-modern categories. _ „ 
Have we now gone far enough in our analysis so that we can finally 
a?. r historically into ancient thought? I am afraid not, for when we 
.. ,mPt " we encounter a last difficulty, namely the ancient single 
Jlm of intellects and beings is structured differently and reasoning 
reai^ P'3Ce differently within it than in the two me 1^va 
cJs of meanings and things to which we are accustomed. Inthean-
world the structure appears primarily in the beings wi 
w rffl6CtS are conjoined in knowledge; in the rnedieval-modern 
se i Structure aPPears primarily in the universe of m^" "Js a" 
'worn ,nly in the universe of things. For termmology to contrast th 
modes, I shall use 'aggregate' for the ancient and systematic 
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the medieval-modern.'3 
To look at the ancients first, the order of the kosmos, or mundus, is 
denMn7hate order of natures °r °f beings; there is no whole antece-
anH 7 ne P- a? ° WhlCh the parts are functions. Human thought 
of'thS Eo? 7 PlaC£ aS the intellect is conjoined with the beings 
the kosmos. Ancient reason remains within this context It rests 
upon conjunction with what is, and its force and dynamic come from 
EES It" ,hV""="« """joined, no?ftZS* 
Herly, mSofar as 11 has beings within it). 
treats reason aTaTi^d V"* °f Augustine's analyses of reason. He 5Ef i°&^ r̂trmembered ,hatfor 
reasoning Sf>at'S a-ViS-°? <aspectus) of the mind, while 
reasomng (ratiocinatio) is the search of reason, that 
be seem°VCment °f SUCh vision through wbat are to 
S n  o f  r S i l S 3 5  i n  t h e  f 0 l l 0 W i n g  C O n C l U "  
buKlTev^XCdd5:any other eood: 
f̂aTdtTefŜ  ST• " « » 
emerges1 i^Anselm's unhmrse of mea6"' S'rUC,U'e "hidl 
the case of the meanings T tv , eamn8s and universe of things. In 
his 'reasons' and his 'argument" with tho" TA eaS'ly by contrasting 
example, adapts the Augustine 7 of Augustine. Anselm, for 
but the context has chaneed m ° ̂ r°° of God which we just noted, 
only dimension is that of savim^nr therC iS n° 'seein8'> and the 
sentences: meaning. Here are the opening 
whatever*(things) are laid 1° u" Wh° WiU take notice that 
that in relation to one'ZQZ 7hSOmething in *uch a way 
or less equally then nnt"0 77 y 3re Sat0 ke so more 
the same ^ \"d 'hen anoth^ 
whether it is judged m v, lg^ ln these diverse (things), 
(my emphasis)16 6 m m dually or unequally. 
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The same point can be illustrated, perhaps even more clearly, in the 
ontological argument of the Proslogion, where the whole basis and 
motive of the proof is something meant or 'cogitated' but not seen. 
Compare, for example, Anselm's cry of triumph at the end of his 
responsio: 
The meaning (significatio) of this expression (that than 
which nothing greater can be cogitated) has so much force 
of itself that that which is said, by the very fact that it is 
understood or thought, is of necessity not only proved to 
exist but also to be that itself which we ought to believe of 
the divine substance, (my emphasis)17 
Both quotations from Anselm bespeak the existence of a separate 
realm of 'meanings,' but my point here is the different role of reason 
or thought in Anselm, compared with Augustine's and the ancients'. 
Augustine's reason and thought lay in the vision of beings. Anselm 
has no such vision, but he has something which Augustine lacked. He 
works with a 'systematic' coherence of 'meanings' or 'cogitations, 
and this coherence is the motive of his proofs: if you say or cogitate 
[his, then you must say or cogitate that. To risk an extreme statement, 
in the ancients the thrust of the argument lay entirely in beings, and in 
the mind only insofar as it contained beings; for Anselm, the thrust 
of the argument is entirely in meanings, and in things only insofar as 
they are taken into meanings. And it seems to me that this thrust in 
Anselm is usefully called 'systematic.' 
Anselm's main works are called meditations about the reason oj 
Jf'th (de ratione fidei). I would argue that the reason involved is ac­
tually systematic coherence, in which parts of the faith 'prove the 
wh°le and the whole 'proves' the parts. To use the example of the on-
to'ogical argument again, Anselm starts from an experienced faith in 
the existence of God and in his being that than which nothing greater 
be cogitated. He then starts from the second alone and proves 
Je first. Similarly, in the more elaborate argument of the Cur Veus 
°wo, Anselm assumes all the faith but the Incarnation, an 
r°m this starting point 'proves' the Incarnation.'8 
As the new order of 'meanings' is a systematic order we find tha 
. new order of 'things' is also systematic. In Anselm this P 
e s t  s e e n  i n  t h e  u n i v e r s a l  o r d e r  w h i c h  h e  s o m e t i m e s  c a U s  G o d s  
^ in the Cur Deus homo. In part what needs to besaid[here ha 
in 5 been said in commenting on Anselm's 'proofs 
°me way the systematic whole 'proves' any YP . j. 
? this is as true of the external and real order: of tangs as it^ 
"hernal and intentional order of the mind. 
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that th/- °rder °f G°d's honor is an vernal order which 
precedes any of its parts and which no action of men or of angels can 
change. Anselm brilliantly explains this with the analogy that those ZSXSFSSSZF cod,s — « 
If what are contained under the circuit (ambitu) of heaven 
heaven ThVv ^ °T t0 become distant from heaven they could nevertheless in no way exist except 
under heaven nor could they in any way flee heaven For 
whence and whither and however thev moved, they would 
still be under heaven." " y 
po^f™^ We T CaU 3 halt in °Ur search for further 
categories of human th Jthe/ncient and the mediaeval-modern 
found might I h^i thought and experience. What we have already 
wi,hin which ,o 
higaS?X? S K f^tive forms of knowing, sens-
thf'anctrexpfrience T ̂  £aVC the beginni"gs of a 'history' of 
some of 
and inadequate3for1m0^Now1^^)tnr?',' admittedly in a very summary 
volves a Idnd of crSs for u iS P°mt °Ut h°W this history in" 
geometric and brother kind;^ n 8UmenL1S SUrdy going t0 lack 
the material around three points- l RpS°n' i" attemPt to group 
A.D. is impossible- 7 At u use of us the history of 1100 
necessary 3 The third t < e,Cause of us a history of 1100 A.D. is 
tried avenues which mipht "h^i 3 qUeSti°n: are there any so un-
history which is for us both '6 P US-ui° acfueve at least in part this 
First as tn til S lmPossible and necessary. 
now ieS tha^heTn^ f °f 'he 1100 AD- " ̂  ™til 
of them, but in the end it tinnff Tof?8 c''"'cu'1 ollr understanding 
for the difficulties which anne t, 1 we ourse,ves are responsible 
Pogo, '' We ha ve met the nm h! ' '"s"™ountable. To paraphrase 
path to the ancients but it does mo we.are lt'" Maybe there is a 
still within the Anseimian wi A s'f'j we tan 'ake it: we are 
Anselm's analogythfsTlrh. AWfd,a" ™>™ntatio„. To use 
â d o'ufi'lS.?"'̂  Sh°W t̂h" 
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Dilthey, Croce, Collingwood and Cassirer. Its main assumption is that 
understanding is possible within the human worlds of meanings and of 
symbols. It places the past within this context so that it can rethink 
understandable past thought and its symbols and thus 'reenact' the 
past (and clearly this was a great triumph as against not being able to 
'rethink' or 'reenact' the past). Further, I suspect that systematic 
coherence gives such rethought symbols whatever life they have. 
But from the data we have discovered it seems that we cannot apply 
such a historical method in our study of the ancients. We found 
ourselves confronting an ordering of experience which was not 
systematic, which was not based on a dichotomy between meanings 
and things, and which was, therefore, not 'understandable.' We can 
without obvious trouble translate 99%, perhaps more, of the ancient 
tats into post-Anselmian categories. But the remaining 1% on which 
we have been concentrating are the most central and in some ways the 
most important, since they are the constant context of all the rest. 
Hence our historical method based on post-Anselmian categories, far 
from opening up to us the ancient world, has the opposite effect of 
making entry in to the ancient world impossible. 
We might then take the chance on abandoning our historical 
Method. Instead of changing only our 'meanings' in order to reach the 
P®, let us go further and change our categories of thought and ex­
perience; let us put off the Anselmian and put on the pre-Anselmian. 
fortunately, however exciting such a procedure might be it 
wouldn't do us any good as historians alive today, since when we 
Were there we couldn't talk to those of us who were still here. When 
0ne of us came back, if indeed he could come back, he would have no 
Memory Of his there experience: he would suffer the fate of those with 
life a J VV1UUI1 UiC llllliLa 
t l i "  t h i n k i n g ,  w h i c h  w a s  g o o d  f u n  a n d  g a m e s  
® leave us in 'e us in peace. 
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So the first argument is that the history of 1100 A.D. and of the 
thought of the ancients is impossible for us since it would destroy not 
only our old historical method but also, and more importantly, our 
old selves. 
But there is another argument leading to the opposite conclusion, 
that since we are who we are and since we have the commitments that 
we do we must do a history of 1100 A.D., and we must reach out to 
» !P"C Y' As t0 what these commitments are, I suppose 
InH ru t Tre general SrouP come ultimately from the Jewish 
and Christian traditions, and they persist today even if secularized. 
civnlzatTnT^hn5 l° 3nd SUpport of other lives and other civilizations however different from our own they may be even 
on°y ̂  thought and C1Vtlllzations of the Past this can be accomplished 
Son of^hfr S m aCtl°n" Such commitments compel our re-
now that we havf-^ abandon our search for the ancients 
Jews and The ChH dlSCOVuered huow alie" they are to us, since both the 
had said <'I am a I3™ S they themselves wcre aliens. Moses 
II 22) and beSuse th"^ here' in an alien land" <Exodus 
phasis' on the dml, h CWS W6r£ 'alienS' they placed ""usual em-
fook over the °Td °ther dangers. The Christians 
commandment of nv r When h comes to the central 
neiTbor aTin the SH, the Stranger and alien is the 
alien (xenos) that the riS g°°d Samaritan. Indeed it is as the 
The Marcionite here nfians receive Christ (Matthew XXV,35). 
treme when it worships God a r\es cer 1 ain Christian drives to an ex-
save sinful men no A ' ahen °ne' who out of love chose to 
It is sureW He; Th S CrCatIOn' Wh° WCre in turn 'aliens' to Him. 
fullest sense of the word ^nTh*?• ̂  hlstorical neighbors to us in the 
wh° a~^~her can 
not rrmrworking in the same direcd°n d° 
historians or mutatis mutant 3S persons but more specifically as 
some ways un^ufamonc e r Scientlsts- Greek civilization was in 
origins of our modern imehectua^d"' * «S unicIueness lie the 
historians compelled to Veer. disciplines. We are therefore as 
understanding of the Creek °Pen 'Tt0 reopen a road to the historical 
tures of ourTnteU^tuaf 1,6 """" *K S° '° SpMk ,he ^ 
answers to all the imrxirom l,.3' tkere |are universal, demonstrable 
is the obligation of man to an 10"s whlch concern man, and that it 
°* ma" IO answer the«e questions. No other civiliza-
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lion, to my knowledge, ever made such a claim or asserted such an 
obligation, except in dependence upon the Greeks. Modern history 
and the other modern intellectual disciplines have inherited the claim 
and obligation, though the context in which we believe such asking 
andaswering to be possible has been severely limited by the reorienta­
tion of 1100 A.D. One sees both the inheritance ajid the limitation in 
Robert Nisbet's summary of what he calls the academic dogma: 
"Knowledge is important. Just that."20 Such a position is, I believe, 
traditional in the strictest sense, passed on to us from the Greeks. 
Clearly it cannot be proven, and I do not know that there has been any 
new prophetic proclamation since the Greeks. 
Hence the crisis for us if we cannot reach the Greeks is far more 
serious than if we cannot reach the ancient Eygptians or the modern 
Balinese. In the latter cases we simply come to a stop with the realiza-
tion that for the moment we have reached the end of the road for the 
particular method we have been using. In the case of the Greeks, 
however, we do more than reach the end of the road if we cannot 
'each them historically: we also lose the method, derived from the 
Creeks, by which we had progressed as far as we had. Historical 
scholarship would thus be cut off from its roots and would wither 
®ay; to give my gloom full sway, so would all the other theoretica 
disciplines. 
I suppose that 1 have made clear my conviction, though surely I 
haven't proved it, that the history of 1100 A.D. is a crisis for us or, at 
the very least, for me. Maybe I should stop here. However, my nature 
s such that I cannot for very long enjoy basking in the existentia is 
tensions of tragic contradiction, so I've continued to explore various 
alternatives in the hope that at the end I might leave you, and myself 
II something more comforting than an 'impossible necessi y 
pessary impossibihty.' Those of you who know my intflec.t^_ 
J31>« will not be surprised to hear that among the van' . 
tirw one which now seems to me most hope u is; a ^ 
a  nof  the position of Nicholas of Cusa, or Cusanus, (1401-
Possible analogue to a solution. . , . th hone 
en I reread Cusanus in preparation for this ta an 
Doii! Some of the problems arising for us out of 
readhirIirUCk,me- First' 1 saw for thefirStfn00 AD and how much 
uinrp n I'ght of the reorientation of «'already noted, I 
wa HU,nderstandable he is in this context" SeC -Station truck me 
Sighted to find that his response to th.%^onSe. 
lng °f significant potential help in formu ai ing ^ Jn a 
PoJ?1*5' almost unique achievement, as ti n noo A.D. 
P0Werful fashion he made use of both the reorientation ot 
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and of the pre-Anselmian tradition; in using both he had to modify 
o h. In the first place Cusanus saw clearly many of the consequences 
of the reorientation of 1100 A.D., and he was very sensitive to certain 
dangers in the post-Anselmian development, notably in Aristotelian 
sc o as lcism. However, Cusanus had no intention of trying to reject 
un,verses of meanings and of things; his purpose was rather to 
and n^er£Tne!S !10? A-D- in a context where it could be fulfilling 
the ane' * E" 6 second Place, he seemed to have found in 
the ancient tradition, particularly in those aspects with which have 
caSorierTnd hCUreSdf°rv.the deficiencies of the new post-Anselmian 
for the new • 6 USC ^ asPects in constructing a larger context 
recognized that1VerSCS °f AnSdm and °f Abelard" Cusanus ^ 
iSs or of th.n °nf cannot.intr°duce systematic universes of mean-
are Beine and thVr' ° &n traciition where the central structures 
hL pumose Se haSiOU I dng- HenCC he f°Und that t0accomPlish 
onein which to work out a new metaphysic or first philisophy, 
complicated^ resnr! a ™eamng> not Being, were ultimate. Out of this 
of the innovatin f'"A US.anus fashioned an answer which made use 
ed wouW have lv Zi Z Abelard' and which, had it prevail-
his successors ^ C C ve^°Pment which led to Descartes and 
tance oTthTcentral felturerof^he8 illustration of Cusanus' accep-
In the first nlaee o! reorientation of 1100 A.D. 
creatures and the othe^on^™ W°rldS °r universes> one of things or 
of human meanings and conjectures. 
wornideCtcomSesCOfmetuf0rth fF°m °ur mind as the real 
reason Th^ fr0m the divine and 
its conjectural ,I?an mind ls therefore the form of 
form of the real'world? ^ ̂  °f G°d 'S the 
And, in De beryllo: 
natural Vorrns0^ 'S ^ Creator of real beings and of 
ings aid ' S,Tma" LS the creator of rational be-
nothing bm th/ !?Cia f°rmS; man's creations ar^ 
creaturi " e^he . f65865 °f his intellect' iust as 'he tures are the likenesses of God's intellect.22 
And in modification of the well ir™ 
anima (III, 8 43lh29t r„\ known passage in Aristotle's De 
of the mind is not a real ,anus wntes: "The stone in the knowledge 
In the second IZ 8 but 3 bein8 of reason."22 
systematic structures of'th^USanUS glVCS precise statement to the 
tructures of the universes of things and of meanings. 
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The universe does not exist except contractedly in 
things, and every thing which exists in act contracts 
all things (universa) so that they are in act that which 
it is.". 
In his later writings Cusanus largely drops the notion of the 'universe' 
as a system, but he continues to give a systematic definition of the 
realm of reason as an explication of what is complicated in the in­
tellect. 
Despite this acceptance of the central categories of the reorientation 
of 1100 A.D., Cusanus, as already indicated, works out a new context 
within which to place them, and I find, somewhat to my surprise, that 
it is possible to discuss the new context in terms of the same three 
topics which we used to contrast the ancient position with that of 
Anselm: 
1. The ancients see knowledge as vision; Anselm finds the mind and 
r®on to be defined not by vision but by understanding and com­
prehension; Cusanus restores vision as the central and culminating 
function of the mind. 
2. The ancients see knowing as the conjunction and union o t e 
newer with the known; in Anselm knower and known are separated 
/a sharp dichotomy; Cusanus reestablishes for the intellect in par 
tlcu'ar the identity of the knower with the known. 
h In the ancients the self as it turns within finds itself conjoined or 
ntrcal with the highest elements of the all; in Anselm the self tends 
®0r5 and more to be limited to the level of meanings, to become^ 
flunking substance;' Cusanus reestablishes the self as existing 
identical with thp AKcni„t» 
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But Cusanus point is that the loss is characteristic only of the realm of 
reason. When one rises, as one should, above reason to the intellect 
there one encounters vision, experience (experimentum), and taste 
(gustus). Here are a few texts. 
Therefore logic and all philosophic inquisition fail to 
reach vision . . . But in the region of the intellect, 
the vision of the mind, without discursive reasoning 
(sine discursu) attains to the coincidence of unity 
and plurality, of the point and the line, and of the 
center and the circle.26 
And further, in De non aliud: 
All things which are investigated by reason but which 
adei thnf^ I thC Cye °f the mind (°culi mentis 
fis f S nf ,!' SCem 10 aPProach truth, never-
comnL • ultimate certitude. Final certitude, 
complete in every respect, is vision.27 
run deep and*thaTl^3* ^ effects of the reorientation of 1100 A.D. 
reason ' ̂  constantly tempted to retreat from vision to 
in the3 c8oinm'd^ieVTent l° fix oneself with stability 
know that ^ " u °PPOsites" But even though we 
s-a -
ture an almost°Augustin!anntal phll°soPhy'' Cusanus is able to recap-
the level of vision. As he re Sensle ° ai? argument which never leaves 
apice theoriae, "Whatever Tmar S to disciple in his last work, De 
mind, will also see."29 SCe' y°U t00' wt*en y°u have applied your 
back to the anctentTfoTmafeS h°W Cusanus has in °ne sense reached 
nant post-AnseSi, ̂ 5^n™," Which l° transform the domi" 
which he has been comne en r' als° Sees' however> the extent to 
the process. The ancients hnH transform the ancient inheritance in 
Cusanus, but their vision nf .,eraP ,slzed 'vision' almost as much as 
knowable beings- Cusanus' • 6 mind was a vision of articulated and 
cidence of opposites and of th^011' h°wever> is a vision of the coin-
beyond the categories of T.MTD he S'a'eS " in a Ca" 80 
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Therefore the power of the mind to see exceeds its 
power to comprehend. Hence the simple vision of the 
mind is not a comprehending vision but from com­
prehension it raises itself to seeing the incomprehen­
sible.30 
A second phase of Cusanus' revision of the reorientation of 1100 
A.D., involves the unity of knower and known. This dominant 
characteristic of ancient thought disappeared with emergence of the 
dichotomy between meaning and thing in Anselm and Abelard. 
Cusanus accepts the dichotomy between the conjectural world of man 
and the real world of God's creatures, and he fully accepts the fact 
that we cannot know the creatures in themselves, but only by conjec­
ture. But for the realm of intellect, the realm of vision, the ancient 
unity is reestablished, almost in the words of Aristotle's De anima. 
Cusanus says in De coniecturis: 
You see that you cannot know any intelligible as it is 
if you take your intellect to be a different thing from 
the intelligible itself.31 
And, further, in De filiatione: 
The most pure intellect makes any intelligible to be 
the intellect itself, since every intelligible in the in­
tellect is the intellect itself .... Every intelligible in 
the intellect itself is the intellect.32 
Hence at the level of his 'mental philosophy' Cusanus has reestablish-
ed the ancient identity of the knower and the known, and mutatis 
Mutandis of the sensor and the sensed. 
But here, even more obviously than in the case of vision, Cusanus 
tuust effect fundamental modifications in the ancient tradition and in 
the categories of Anselm in order to be able to maintain both the 
dichotomy between the conjectural and the real words, and the essen­
tial unity of knower and of known. I can only indicate what he does in 
the broadest outline. His basic innovation in relation to the ancient 
tradition is that in place of a structure centered on Being or on the One 
as the Ground of Being, he substitutes a structure in which the Ab­
solute is one of intention or vision or manifestation; he effects a com­
parable revision of the Anselmian categories in so far as Anselm s 
things' or Thomas' 'objects' disappear in favor of the 'intentions of 
the Absolute. 
. Thus in one of his latest works, Cusanus explains how the Absolute 
ls related to the real world; he here calls the Absolute the power itself 
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(posse ipsum), which is the last of the many names he uses for what is 
unnameable. 
Since therefore the power itself (posse ipsum), than 
which nothing is more powerful, wishes to be seen, 
this is the reason for everything.33 
And in application of this position to the creatures Cusanus declares 
that every creature is an intention of the will of the omnipotent. He 
was well aware here of his departure from the ancients, since he goes 
on to explain: 
Neither Plato nor Aristotle knew this, for clearly 
each of them believed that the creator intellect (con-
ditorem intellectum) made all things by necessity of 
nature. From this all their error followed.34 
So when Cusanus asks why God led the beauty of this visible and sen­
sible rose to emerge from the thorn, the only answer is: 
What can one reply except that (God's) marvellous 
intellect intended to manifest Himself in this his 
word . . . ?35 
there are two of these theses Cusanus can then go on to explain that 
and hiaher ° frSr thI manifestati™s of the Absolute. The first, 
includes all the &th m s' which are the images of God; the second 
Both orders stn°t f' CreltUreS which are only explications of God. 
orders are 'inte t- r°i™ i Absolute, and like the Absolute both 
dichotomv h ° 100V nce Cusanus can maintain the Anselmian 
substantTa, andtZ COnjectural an* the real o'rders, yet both are 
characterized bv th C emS' .Wlthin the order of minds intellection is 
different ancient singled™ ofbttag"iU°Cti°" f°Und wilhi,"he vt,y 
1100 A.D. ,s^eh°/ ̂ .usanu® transformation of the reorientation of 
the realm of meanin^6^5 ^ ̂ ef'nh»°n of the self as located within 
tually crystallize in8^ °r reason' the definition which will even-
substance 'Once again^ Cu^n ** ^ °f the T as a 'thinking 
from the ancient inhP 't ^ reaches back to borrow and to adapt 
ultimately coninineH ancients had found that the -T was 
whole of Being or with'th 'rf hif?est Portions of the all, with the 
self is ultimatelv to he f 6 P"6' usanus similarly finds that man's 
Just as Cusam. re ' Und n°Where but in the Absolute. 
ogmzes and justifies the realm of reason, though 
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it is not ultimate, so he recognizes a kind of self on this level, but it 
must be relinquished in order to reach one's true self.36 Even in the 
early De docta ignorantia, Cusanus writes that the creatures reply to 
the inquirer that he can find his self only in God. 
If you would know anything of us, seek it not in us 
but in our reason and in our cause . . . Nor will you 
find yourself anywhere but in Him .... Go on then, 
says our knowing ignorance, and find yourself in 
Him.37 
In his later writings Cusanus develops the point in greater detail, 
particularly in the language of vision. Thus he declares: 
Then (O God) you raise me so that I realize how it is 
that whoever sees you . . . sees himself in you, for he 
receives from you what he is.38 
Cusanus also goes further and identifies man's seeing of God with 
God's seeing of him. 
What else, O Lord, is your seeing, when you regard 
me with the eye of piety, than your being seen by me 
. . . Nor is your being seen anything else than that 
you see him who sees you.39 
In the highest action of the self, the vision of God, the self is therefore 
seen as the focus where the seeing of God coincides with His cing 
seen, and one might relate this to Cusanus' speaking of God^as t e 
ultimate of all perfection of intuitive vision of everything. 
Such, in broad outline, is Cusanus' response to the reorientation o 
H00 A.D. . While the avowed purpose of my analysis was simply to 
see if Cusanus could offer any suggestions to us for ways out ot our 
dilemma, I am afraid I may sometimes have been carried too far by 
the sheer interest in what Cusanus had to say. But I believe that 
l°ng digression was worth it and that there is indeed a harvest for us 
here. 
As I see it, Cusanus' essential insight is that the ancient 
thought and experience were in important ways more adequate 
COmmon human experience than those of Anselm's reason, or of our 
Human language and thought and knowledge ou^ to be 
characterized by the immediacy of vision and by the conjunction o 
of knower and known; the human sense o/ 
dlrectly related to what is ultimate. Cusanus' solution tries to achieve 
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these ancient goals, though he accepts the new categories of Anselm 
and of Abelard as 'our' categories. 
Perhaps it is useful to speculate a little at this point about what 
Cusanus would say of our present history and of our present selves in 
relation to the dilemma which 1100 A.D. apparently posed for both. 
I believe his general comment would be that both our history and 
our selves are simply phases of the modern secular, anthropocentric 
rationality which developed out of the very tradition of reason he had 
attacked as incomplete in itself. More particularly, I believe he would 
argue that because our history is 'rational' it inevitably excludes what 
is holy or absolute from its perspective, and the method itself cannot 
be grounded in what is holy or absolute. As Cusanus explains the 
scope of reason: 
The human mind, when it uses reason as its means of 
investigation, ejects the infinite from the entire circle 
of its apprehension.41 
Cusanus is far from denying the validity of Anselm's reason in its own 
realm, but when it is made total the consequences for the intellect are 
tragic. In reason the intellect can find neither itself nor the Absolute 
which is its cause. As Cusanus writes of the intellect under these condi­
tions: 
The intellect is an eye, but it cannot see because it is 
not in the light.... And this is interminable torture, 
to have an intellectual being and never to be able to 
use the intellect. 
CU8,aiT wi,U go further and argue that on any level the 
inffniil W UuT ltuknows 11 or not. is moved and affected only by the 
f i n i t e  HiiT excluded from the realm of reason; if the in-
wniiM r,nt t ' n°Tre would any of the beings.43 Hence Cusanus 
thev were * ol!r history cannot reach the Greeks, since 
for them ^ fC ° n° suc^ habitation. The holy and the divine were 
thought L u°r 1Tlost ,°^ mankind, the most serious subjects of thought, speech, and writing. 
trie character3^1153!!115 wol!ld go on to argue that the anthropocen-
reason The anth°Ur 7 1S ?iso a consequence of its limitation to 
Vico the fnnnrf roP°c^ntr'sm is particularly evident in Giambattista 
remember^S "8 ̂  °f the tradition in which 1 «and. You will 
defining the scnne^fMv nCC that power is the decisive factor in 
therefore onlv r h° ftory' things and creatures are made by God; 
y God can know them and man cannot. But 'the world of 
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nations and (the) civil world' are objects of history made by man, and 
therefore man can know them.44 Past human thought and actions re­
main within our power to reenact in thought, and thus to know. 
It is interesting that Cusanus is an early representative of part of 
Vieo's argument, but in the long run the differences are more impor­
tant than the similarities. Cusanus agrees that only God can know the 
creatures: "Hence of all the works of God, there is no precise 
knowledge except with Him who made them." Man has precise 
knowledge only of mathematics, a human creation in the realm of 
reason. But Cusanus quickly limits this knowledge: 
Hence, if we have rightly considered, we have 
nothing certain in our science except our 
mathematics, and the mathematics is an enigma for 
searching out the works of God.45 
But man has no certain knowledge of what we encounter through 
sense, and no two sense experiences are identical; he has no certain 
knowledge of another's intellectual experience, and no two intellects 
are identical.46 
Hence from this standpoint too, Cusanus would not be surprised 
that our history has its troubles with the Greeks. By limiting ourselves 
to an anthropocentric rationality, he would say, we have excluded the 
factors which do the most to make men human and we have surely 
made ourselves anything but fit companions for the Greeks, whose 
assumptions were contrary to such anthropocentrism. ^ 
Finally, where we were worried that we might lose our selves if we 
abandoned Anselmian categories for those of the Greeks, Cusanus 
would say this happened only because we recognized no self but that 
of the realm of reason, and that self ought in any case be. transcended 
in the ascent to a vision of our true selves in the intellect and in the Ab-
s°lute. More important, he would argue that only when we had risen 
above the realm of reason we could see that the common relation ot 
men to the Absolute is precisely what makes possible the extraor 
d'nary 'history' of all the philosophic and theological positions known 
Admittedly, Cusanus shows little interest in history as 
develonment ' hut Via an almost unique positive appreciation 
to him. 
Thus in the De filiatione, he writes: 
rational understandability but in a common 
All those who have theologized and philosophized 
have tried to express only one thing, though in a 
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variety of modes .... Their ways of speaking are 
adverse and incompatible, but they nevertheless all 
•tried to express nothing else than the one itself which 
is located above all contrariety beyond our reach; 
each did this in his own way, the one affirmatively, 
the one negatively, and the one doubtfully .... Thus 
all possible ways of speaking all try to express that 
which is ineffable, and they all fall under this 
theology (of the ineffable) itself.47 
Cusanus accordingly believes that through his new 'mental 
philosophy he can reach out to the Greeks historically, and there is no 
reason why we should not extend the method to other civilizations as 
well. And while in the texts with which we have been working his main 
concern is to show how this can be done as the Greeks try to reach the 
Absolute through the intellect which is 'above' reason, one should 
note that Cusanus holds that all men, including the Greeks, also con-
ront the Absolute at the other end of the scale, in sense which is 
below' reason. 
The sight of the mind and the sight of sense have only 
one and the same object; the sight of the mind sees it 
as it is in itself, while the sight of the sense sees it as it 
is in signs. The one object of both (the mind and of 
sense) is the power itself (posse ipsum), than which 
nothing is more powerful.48 
lms proper visi°n °f our own selves we are able without 
Greeks and S I T '  ' T T  d i f f e r e n t  b W  a l s °  s i r a i l a '  ° f  
other minds mankind, in so far as it is given to minds to know 
* * * 
reoriematfrniof H on A ^ tf'k' 1 tried to outline the history of a 
demands unnn ns v.- u suggested that the history made certain 
hisTorical method Hh reemed impossible in the light of our modern 
search for^wavr»a? r ^."^em selves. In the second part, in 
to 1100 A D and Uf ° 0li,r emmas> I analyzed Cusanus' response 
upon our oSn irs.1"6 °f rSSp°nSe COmmented 
counter an answeH^Ci03" °nly ra'Se the 1uesti°n: do we in fact, en-
help us get nast thp • .sanus' or an analogue to answer which might 
has ponged usV perTam T° ^ history of 1100 A D" 
come other, larger, crises r°m SmaU beginnin8 we might over-
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Cusanus, speaking from the Christian standpoint, argues that 
all human experience of thought and language and things is human 
precisely because it is constantly bracketed by transcendence, whether 
in the descent from intellect through reason to sense, or in the ascent 
from sense through reason to intellect; in the light of this argument he 
criticizes the Anselmian reorientation, and by implication us, for us­
ing a method of reason which explicitly excludes that which makes us 
human. As I think of the common human experience of thought and 
of sense both the argument and the criticism seem to me persuasive, 
even if we choose to detach them from the Christian context. Helen 
Keller, one of the very few people to whom it was given to remember 
the transition to the world of human experience through language, 
was driven to the Old Testament to describe the gift and the grace that 
the transition involved: "I learned a great many words that day, 
words that were to make the world blossom for me, like Aaron's rod, 
with flowers."4' 
With such intimations of ecstatic transition and quite apart from 
our relation to the Greeks, one can only regret that the modern in­
tellectual disciplines, among them history, followed so completely the 
Cartesian, Galilean, and Vichian traditions which in their exclusively 
secular and anthropocentric rationality all led to the exclusion of what 
appears to be most human in man, first in the disciplines and then in 
the selves of those who use the disciplines. It might have been better to 
have taken the alternate route mapped out by Cusanus, and to ave 
assumed with him that what makes the human use of signs in thoug t 
and language differ from that of animals and of machines is in the 
final analysis human awareness of the transcendent which is eyon 
the signs. 
And if this is so, then I wonder whether we should not also reject 
the assumption, made explicit in Descartes, that the sel as t in mg 
substance lies within man's conscious thought, and instead move to 
Cusanus' position, or to an analogue of his position, in w IC our 
selves would be found to be based ultimately in the transcendenc 
which made our thought human, not within the universes of meaning 
and of things. . . f 
If we give up the secular, anthropocentric assumP;1°n^f 
historical method, then history can enter into the categor 
«•> as well as those of Anselm and Abelard^ we give up the 
Cartesian' definition of the self, we can enter both the anaenPan ^ 
Post-Anselmian worlds without loss of our own se v^s- return 
ho both of these things, then my problems are solved and I can retu 
happily to my simple and straightforward hlsto^" - r dmit that 
So there are some possibilities for your consideration. I admit 
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they are still only possibilities, and I also grant that they are not entire­
ly comfortable ones. Despite the attendant gains a loss or transcending 
of an old self is involved, and this is never without danger. But the dif­
ficulties out of which these possibilities emerged are, I submit, real 
ones; they will not go away. And to close on a more cheerful note, the 
road explored by Cusanus is a lovely road. Who knows? Perhaps if we 
have the courage to follow it we shall find, like Cusanus, that we have 
been given "this whole visible world and all that has been written 
(totam scnpturam) and all ministering spirits"50 to help us in our 
quest. 
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Of Messages and Messengers 
Marijan Despalatovic 
Tonight I perforce stand into danger, as the naval language 
describes the condition of a ship which borne by its element ap­
proaches shoals and sands. For what I wish to consider I must seek 
words outside of my "discipline" thus incurring danger of failure and 
the scorn visited upon the pretentious ignorant. There is no other 
course open because I should like to imagine intents other than my 
own and the structures of thought which bear such intents and shape 
their destiny. 
Lest we think that this is an extraordinarily weighty endeavor, this 
desire to be tentative about one's own work, let us remember Kant s 
adjuration: "Do you really desire that knowledge which concerns all 
men shall surpass common understanding and be revealed only y 
Philosophers?" (1933:859) Needless to say the stakes here and now are 
v«ry modest, and if we wish to be tentative about our work we should 
also be tentative about the results of our examination of it. So 1 expect 
'hat I shall not be able to answer queries put to me by those w ose 
Professional fields I have despoiled with so little proper respect. I shall 
amply have to quote Pirandello: "It is so if you think it is so-
Themost difficult point, to my mind, where to begin thinking abo 
the specialised form of thinking we call critique is, naturally, read' g, 
and reading that part which is behind the neuro-physiological 
operations of the process although permanently joined to it in a sym 
blotic, incestuous union. What I read is always conditioned by the ac-
P"Per read on April 6, 1978 
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tivity of reading, and unless I am mindful of the fact I engage in a 
scholastic game. Obviously by reading I do not mean any kind of 
reading; I do not mean reading for comprehension, I do not mean 
skimming, and certainly not speed-reading. I wish to consider the 
reading which is attended by a special and recognisable grace. 
I contend that reading always includes a perspective of total envelop­
ment, and that the reader's pre-reflexive experience of a poem (or a 
painting, a sculpture, a concerto, a play) has all the qualities of a 
special conviction, of belief. The belief concerns the existence of the 
poet's world, the reality of the "world" being the a priori of the poet's 
truth. As Bachelard says somewhere: "Tell me what your world is 
like, and I shall tell you whether or not you are a poet." The reader 
believes that the poet is right, even if he cannot tell why he believes in 
the poet's Tightness. 
Here, of course, is my first difficulty. I must consider belief if I am 
to consider the text in one of its innumerable and elusive permuta­
tions. I must do that bearing in mind that belief does not confer any 
degree of empirical reality upon the text around which it glimmers, 
and that belief is not susceptible to quantifiable, perceptible change 
wrought by the agency of the text. Empirically the text can be a patent 
lie, yet we may be prepared to accord it a degree of reality which we 
would refuse to a person purveying a lie of equal magnitude. Our will­
ingness to believe the text when we no longer find it possible to believe 
a friend or a parent clears a little of the confusion — belief has 
nothing to do with empirical verifiability of statements, or, as Kant 
says: "No objects of empirical knowledge are matters of belief" 
(1800:103). Matters empirical are capable of description (and I use the 
term very broadly), whereas matters of belief defy description. It is 
impossible to describe either the belief or its object; the attempt is at 
best an asymptotical solution which, to many, means no solution at 
all. 
11 BCfiV<R7 MW® °fferS a pre8nant illustration of the predicament 
(1888:97-98). Let two men read the same book, according to Hume 
one as a "romance" and the other as "a true history," and they will 
receive the one text in two distinctly different ways although they will 
have put the very same sense upon the author." The meanings they 
will have found in the text will be identical, but the "testimony" of the 
author will not have the same influence upon them. The believer will 
have a more lively conception of the incidents." The sceptic unahle 
to give "credit to the testimony of the author" will have "a more fakit 
and langui of all (these) particulars." From this follow 
that belief "is something felt by the mind," but it is also "that am of 
the mind which renders realities more present to us than fictions'' 
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(1888:629). But these realities are fictions, one may exclaim in ex­
asperation. Hume offers no consolation. Poets, who are "liars by pro­
fession," endeavor with more or less ingenuity to impart "an air of 
truth to their fictions." The kind of truth that poets strive to construct 
in their artifacts has been discussed elsewhere in this volume. Suffice it 
to remember that, on Hume, ideas do not necessarily have any "man­
ner of influence on the will and passions," but an air of truth and 
reality is an indispensable condition for their reception. In other 
words, Hume, I think, shifts the emphasis from the poem to the mind; 
the poet's most difficult undertaking has to do not with ensuring that 
his fictions command more obedience than facts but with preparing 
the mind of the prospective reader so skillfully that it will "give 
assent" (the phrase is Hume's) to what is presented to it. Hume goes 
even further: "the constant repetition" of poetic ideas makes them 
enter the mind "with facility" and prevail over fancy; the mind can be 
conditioned to consider forms of reality which it would under or­
dinary circumstances reject. The poet, then makes extraordinary con­
ditions for the reception of ordinary notions. I venture to say that 
what poet makes is belief, and that poem is almost a byproduct, 
detritus of the more ambitious purpose. The poem can never be as 
plainly and as efficiently informative about a given circumstance as an 
account, or an article. It is not meant to be informative about the cir­
cumstance, it is not meant to be informative at all, not unless we 
remember that the word informare in Latin means "to give form to, 
shape, fashion." 
Belief, therefore, "consists merely in a certain feeling or sen­
timent," says Hume, "in something that depends not on the will, but 
must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which 
we are not masters" (1888:624). Thus Hume reaches the end of his en­
quiry. I do not know whether more progress has been made since his 
day. Bertrand Russell admitted that belief "is the central problem in 
the analysis of mind" (1921:231) and then yielded the floor. 
. B almost looks as if I have set out to prove that since my first condi­
tion for a critique escapes definition we should give up altogether and 
Joyously immerse ourselves in "interpretation" and other forms of 
Pleasant games. I think not. If the world of the poet's experience does 
not coincide exactly with ours, and it never does, there is yet a signifi-
cant part of that world which does coincide with ours, although the 
coincidence is not of the poet's making and eludes- rigid and 
categorical definitions. I have in mind the expression of the world, its 
contours and shapes, and that expression in linguistic. This suggestion 
owe to Wittgenstein to whom the expression of belief is just a 
sentence: — and the sentence has sense only as a member of a system 
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of language" (1953:42). And here the path to be followed is reason­
ably clear: in relation to a linguistic act our experience is not ontolog-
ically superior, nor is it the only given we have at our disposal. 
The other and more important given is the linguistic act itself in a 
specific form — the language-game as Wittgenstein calls it, 
Sprachspiel. And in a critique we are, or at least we ought to be, more 
interested in the game than in our experience, although in the working 
out of the rules of the game we rely on the rules of experience. We 
should never forget that we think about language in language, and 
that the personal pronoun we apply so simply and casually, the / of 
the modest cogitator, represents a most serious danger. / think about 
the game, and how easy is it for me to assume that the rules / know 
must exist in some form in the object upon which my thought con­
verges. This is one of Wittgenstein's "delusions," namely that "the 
concepts of proposition, language, thought, and world stand in a line 
one behind the other, each equivalent to the other" (1953:93). 
If belief is a matter of language, and we desire to think about 
another matter of language, the poem, then perhaps we should say a 
few words about how we consider the poetic act. 
To consider a poetic act critically is to think about it out of an ab­
solute synchronic level of the poetic system whose concreteness pro­
vides only the matter and impulse for a far-reaching metamorphosis. 
On this level the poetic act in its absoluteness becomes a possibility of 
change to be wrought upon the system out of which it has risen Only 
on the synchronic level of a system of world literature can we ap­
preciate the accuracy of Eliot's statement in "Tradition and In-
represents an opposition to the historical posi­
tion (1932:47-59). The statement is, in fact, anti-historical. The notion 
of literature as a body alive and present in its synchronic multiplicity 
enables us to approach particular poetic systems in the light of a 
movement incepted by Mallarme, a movement which shifts the aues 
tion of literature from the writer to the process of writing from in­
dividual works to a system in which boundaries between works and 
their forms disappear. d"u 
Even before Mall W's concept of The Book whose intended con­
tent is the whole world in the pure quality of verbal presence Gusmve 
Flaubert wishes fervently: "If only I could read all the one hundred 
fifty-eight pages in one glance; if only I could embrace all S ,!™ 
with all their detail in one single thought." (1968:63) This aggress S 
expressed concept of a total act of reading posits the rnniv f 
perfect synchrony: this dream of , con.ple.epSc of wort ex 
presses merely the desire of a writer turned rritie u • 7 
present in all the elements of a work as an active con7™I™Ta£ 
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prehending not sequentiality but synchronous wholeness, not a sum of 
elements but the system of their "activity." 
Poetry, like every conceptual system hierarchical in nature, rests on 
the general system of language. The notion of the poetic system of in­
terest to us is simultaneously a linguistic system and a metasystem 
based on a particular manner of organisation and a unique expressive 
purpose of poetry. Organisational "idiosyncrasies" of a poet reveal 
an essentially distinctive principle of constitution and com­
municativeness of language. All these "idiosyncrasies" are firmly 
founded upon the general level of linguistic concreteness, and each 
one of them in its system reflects and renews this concreteness in a 
slightly different, individual fashion. If we, then, apply de Saussure's 
definition of the linguistic system in general to a particular poetic 
system, a "world," we emphasise the elementary interdependence of 
all parts of the system and its ontological supremacy over its consti­
tuent elements. An approach from the position of the system directs 
the analyst towards the fundamental levels of the work, toward the 
concrete totality of its signifiers, precluding indulgence in clever 
mechanistic "thrusts" and predetermined ideological "enquiries." 
Only if we begin with this totality can we determine the topos of an in­
dividual expression. "It is a grave error," says de Saussure, "to con­
sider an expression as nothing but a connexion, a link between a sound 
and a concept. To define it thus is to believe that one can begin with 
expressions and construct the system as a sum of expressions; on the 
contrary, one must begin with the firm, solid whole, and by analysis 
reach down to its constituents" (1961:164). The level of the system 
Places the analyst above the limitations of induction, above the con­
ceptual caprices of deduction, and leads him directly to the non-
intentional experience of broadest concreteness of the work and its 
signifying totality. In the critique of the system, which is truly a 
systematic critique, there is the whole programme of a critique which 
shifts the act of reading across the linearity of writing into the concen­
tric grasp of the synchronic openness of the work. 
Ultimately the position of the system raises serious doubts about the 
traditional notion of "critical performance." The activity of the krites 
has always been far more selective than evaluative. On occasion the 
latter was merely an excuse for indulgence in the former. Krites' 
8 °bal judgment has always been based on an a priori choice of the 
meaning of the work and a pious hope that the meaning may be read 
mto" the work: the critical act was in the last analysis an attempt to 
^Present the work as a book finally decoded, broken open, its mean-
mgs offered up for reading. The work was objectified, recast into 
meanings determined by the krites: the epoch was at last given its own, 
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definitive "translation" of a literary act. 
The analytic of the system leads us first into the open ambiguity of 
poetic texture, the text itself, where we are compelled to admit that it 
is impossible to separate one fixed, self-contained meaning from the 
contexts of other meanings outside of the system whence they 
originate. Furthermore, the existence of the system precedes the 
essence of meaning, language precedes thought, thus there can be no 
meaning before there is a system because language has no substance, it 
't 0r.m" significant de Saussurian thesis inherent in the demand 
that the analysis begin with the whole is based on the experience of the 
inguistic system as a collection of formal relationships among 
e ements o varying degrees of similarity or, on occasion, complete in­
compatibility. Meanings which these elements acquire are only func­
tions o their relationships with each other. Meaning is relative: 
. . . the language contains only differences," says de Saussure. 
ore?ver" a difference generally assumes the existence of positive 
riiffprtS1°nS etTCen d *s interposed; but language contains only 
Wlthout P°sitive expressions . . . Language contains 
tual and nhnnT Tf? which antedate its system, but only concep-
cpn * , Phonetic differences brought into being by the system. Con-
enSronment^a^m^15 °' 3 ̂  1CSS imp0rtant tha» its signal 
about^"hf^nafS di^.erence: this revolutionary and simple discovery 
of exclusive UrC ° angua8e became possible only when the tyranny 
when as Fonr^n1"8 concePt_essence was brought into question, 
reducible mass m SfyS' tbe lan8ua8e returned" in its mysterious, ir-
silence of our' h 6 anguage lhat speaks of everything we do, of every 
something ^ fefuses t0 yield to desire to "say" 
language assumes1"8' " 11 becomes evident that our activity in 
which contains meamng only in that total, all-embracing reality 
which we may wantToemertransaction with our world int0 
certain global'rrf8"^' name' and' ultimately, to speak, is to analyse 
Babylonfan schk "m8S' create. differences in the same, wreak a 
may be liberated f" m °ne meanin§ so that two different meanings 
thepoetic^lanluageTHltnThiS-Phen°menon » Particularly fruitful in 
unarticulated m 1vW strains toward the discovery of new, as yet 
believer in conqe"e eS T* trans™tations. Gaston Bachelard, a firm 
differentialitv of rf ^ etype.s an.d substantial elements perceived the 
and dynamic imagi^aUW^lm3*10" tHe °rganic Unity °f COnCr£te 
itself in order to ev t t ge 1S.an essence which differentiates 
ample. A litem™ • 1S ' !terary imagination provides the clearest ex-
image destroys indolent perceptual images. Literary 
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imagination de-imagines in order to re-imagine better" (1958:26) 
Pv'?wetke accepted the insubstantiality of language it is"in 
calls k In theWtmd VUld 7^ 'tS non-concePtual essence, as Martinet calls it. In the traditional representation of a linguistic sign fixed in de 
Saussure s fraction: signifier, the numerator and the denominator are 
. signified 
intelSibie0 ThtS-f15 ^ °ne translates a"d renders the other 
world of idel tJ! of language is inseparable from the abstract 
worm ot ideas, the sound is forever wedded to the concept. It is true 
the H 3CC° ing t0 de Saussure, the link between the numerator and 
SS. arbitrary' bUt in the process of conceptual deS 
equa i v o H arb"ranness °f the link makcs the unity, the mystical equality of elements inevitable. 
quSdoTdfeST58 °f thC il?dependence of language brought into 
tativp nf th r canonical straight, linear connection represen-
func,il herCOnCeptUal functioning of the sign. The discovery of 
senarltpH lln matlveness as the essence of a linguistic phenomenon 
alsn hrr. anguage from Its cultural connotations to a degree, but it 
tv nf it?8 ]t, er t0 our activity in language by positing the totali-
l° 'tS SIfifying relationships. "The independence of language," 
lineuisti? f r0t' "which had t0 be fought for step by step in the 
«•„ c° i™lSPnMi.iS„a,n ™media'e n't™ in "><= linguistics of 
Dhennml (1968:53). Language is a communicative 
of tiin u ?' 3S an Informative code "it is a signal, not an expression 
shins ~ r ?968:53)- The signal informs through sets of relation-
othern ?? between various totalities which communicate their 
rln«H dlfference — as a difference in tension, in charge, a circuit 
closed by differential meaning. 
and 6 3re n°W near an explanation of why we can nevertheless think 
proi C°n,c^ptuaHse in language. If a concept is not a little picture 
fro i Cacb articulated word it must obtain its totality and sense 
inte™ 3 ?' possibility. The concept is not a partial projection to be 
a grated with other partial projections; it is a unique sensible design, 
the amework °f signifying behaviour. In short, it is a system in which 
tualh? 8 gesture separate poetic images acquires the concep-
not °| poedc Individuation. The projection, in its potentiality, is 
the f Spada'' 'I Is also temporal: each poetic image always projects 
jts Uture °f lfs system. This is the unique flight of a poetic image in 
catS nVing t0 f°und its universe and invent poetic individuality as a 
CQ egorical demand for a home of an imagination. Conceptuality is, 
sj S6C?ently, ibat outward, global, in a word, systemic condition of a 
(196fht Cb ^?g'ns t0 signify °nly when it has reached it. Francois Wahl 
•329) rightly places conceptuality outside of the sign, in the 
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denominator of a new fraction, thus: 
/ signifier\ n 
sign I — ) 
System = \signified J 
concept 
Concept is an imaginary design of a whole anticipated in elements, a 
proximity of signification apparent as a subconscious situation rather 
an as a conscious framework. However, before we base the concep-
svstS th W°rd. OI? 3 defined system of mean'ng. such as a poetic 
nntln^m6 T already exists in the system of language, in the 
potentiality of meanings and sounds of a whole field of close or op-
« Ialues lr\ relation to which it acquires its own meaning and 
from ; J • enters thlS semantic field in a poetic act. It retreats 
Doetic iran«v i detern"nation of its topos into the system, where its 
noe c Z "T t0 °CCUr- Val^ry described it as the direct 
around a themat^ a create. a P°eiT1 — to move into words — 
bv a varietv r>f 'C W°r 3n imPression, to call forth words caused 
incerition of art-eaS]°?S ° creatc in this manner a palette, before the 
dicative of a vafV come into being combinations in-
liberated" (1961 -35)y ° a ties> and ultimately a general sense is 
thought ?s0not>rThep/70em' however' are concrete in ways in which our 
whether it misfit c°ncreteness of the poem tempts one to wonder biSfhr„d',he8̂ °«„rs,v,°h gei at be!,ief-for 
countered what annp, <- u ° same order- Edmund Leach en-
thropology of religion" Rp a similar predicament working in thean-
get lost in the scholar' mar'<ing that a great many anthropologists 
its "rationality " he nrnn"0"^1156 regarding the content of belief and 
tion: "To ask questions t 3 straightforward methodological solu-
tained in the content nf r t olf. content of belief which are not con-
alike are to be underst,-."^3 nonsense • • • Ritual action and belief 
social order" (1954- 141 °TtfS I0™.5 symbolic statement about the 
tractive. If the noem is ™ a ecasiveness of Leach's approach is at-
contain the parameters ofthe ̂  f°rm °f "tU.al action'thenit must 
We have an obiect thp n elusive, pre-reflexive state we call belief, 
with all the care it merits °fm' a. ^ i°b at hand is to treat the object 
of belief and that the cnntSSUfmmg •t^3t We are 'nterested in the content 
tent of the poem. I am not" 'S gomg t0 ke co-extensive with the con-
belief that attends my reaHin^r 1 3m n0t PrePared to accept that the 
tendant upon the reading f 3 p.oem's identical with the belief at-
representation, it is an inne my ne'g^our- Belief is not a collective 
man, and even he woulH v, "n^3.!6 which can only be claimed by one 
be hard put to describe it. And the object I 
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have in mind is not an ordinary object at all, therefore an objective 
reading is almost a misnomer. If, however, we offer a reasonably sim­
ple definition of objective maybe all is not lost. I propose that we 
understand objective to mean that which is general in signification, an 
articulation of elements and characteristics also known as 
paradigmatic modeling; objective pertains specifically to the defini­
tions of relationships between the poem and the system which contains 
it. 
This form of objectivity is the immanent determinant of the poem, 
even though it seems to threaten its being. At least it keeps at arm's 
length the intoxication of subjective empathy and every identification 
of poetic structure with a private experience of life, or of an event with 
the meaning of history. The structure of the system is real, actual, 
and, most importantly, trans-subjective. 
Under ideal circumstances objective critique would avoid equivoca­
tion; one sign would denote one thing, one situation, one proposition. 
It would be a precise language of structural morphology containing 
signs originating in different systems and pooled in a comprehensive 
semiotics of culture. If this radical unification of language were possi­
ble it is difficult to imagine what the function of critique might be. 
The initial situation of this ideal but undesirable critique would re­
semble a dictionary of a dead language, without grammatical clues, 
without phonetic rules, without a single document in which words 
function as language. It would be a language outside of the dynamics 
of language, reduced to signs which cannot produce significant rela­
tions even when forced into proximal dependencies. 
Signs, however, in their aggregate condition are one thing: when 
they have entered into a system of a larger construct their structure 
and properties change: they begin to signify. So the poem is a sign 
emitted by a larger, infinitely complex system and that is why we willy-
mlly use conceptual dictionaries of other parts of the originating 
matrix — the culture. Such dictionaries are conveniently recognisable 
transmitters (not bearers) of social and ideational epistemes, but they 
also tend to circumscribe and limit the area of discourse to descrip­
tions of the obvious and laborious reconstructions of isolated 
dements. The poem as a sign cannot be described or reconstructed by 
application of a single set of rules: that would mean that we are 
Prepared to reduce all mental operations to one single type, without 
regard to the ambiances that produce imaginative models. Such 
cultural absolutism, as Levy-Bruhl points out (1910:20-21), assumes 
the existence of one "psychological and logical mechanism," and 
k'le it makes possible neat and tidy solutions it reduces, implicitly, 
thePoem to the level of a thing, a tree, a chair. And a poem "about" a 
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tree, or Van Gogh's painting of his chair surely tells us nothing 
"about" specific objects and everything "about" virtual objects of 
imagination. 
The meaning of a poem cannot be identified- with the reflection of 
objective reality: that meaning must be understood as model-making 
activity which is by no means an empirically literal description but a 
heuristic cataloguing of signs capable of producing meanings to which 
we are susceptible, to which we "give assent," as Hume puts it. An at­
tempt to approach and understand the poem as a unique entity of a 
national as well as universal tradition by elaboration of cognitive 
categories represents an insoluble problem. A good example of confu­
sion and strife which inevitably ensue from such manipulations, for 
that is what they are, manipulations, is to be found in the heated 
debates regarding the historical and theoretical application of 
periodisation concepts — realism, classicism, romanticism, etc. It 
seems that Benveniste is not quite right when he asserts that "we can 
say everything, and we can say it as we wish" (1966:63). If we could 
we would need no poet to un-say it, as it were. 
I should like to suggest that we can appropriately identify the poem 
as a sign which establishes a logical connection between the signifier 
and the signified in de Saussurian sense. The signifier comes from the 
enormous riches of values sanctioned by a cultural tradition: the 
signified is a cluster of meanings, i.e. functioning epistemes ar­
ticulated topologically. We advance through concepts which serve as 
bridges not of an emotional, emphatic understanding, but of an essen­
tially and primarily culturological grasp of the poem as an intersection 
of different knowledges, consciousnesses and perceptions, physical 
and spiritual forms, an imaginative intersection of the known and the 
unknown, the sacred and the profane, the significant and the insignifi­
cant. 
The purpose of reading is topological determination of relations 
w IC obtain within structures. This form of conceptualisation has 
nothing in common with mediaeval scholasticism (even in its contem­
porary disguises) which insisted, categorically, that universal con­
cepts, i.e. the concepts of real essence, reside from the beginning in the 
min n t e contrary, we believe, and here is that word again, that 
concepts are models, schematic representations of the structure and 
properties o the object or the circumstance which imagination ap-
6S an C a'ms ^or own. The hypotheses we could not put to 
rprpntu? 3 *p° •I? ^use °f extraliterary influences visited upon the 
anothe/whhin tv, umqueness which differentiates one poem from 
M e same topological system, we can test on a model. 
analogies a *traftly logical activity is based on the study of 
> s a istical classification of sequentiality and combina-
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tions of significant core elements in a poetic structure. For instance, 
E.R. Curtius' European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, 
although in appearance a continuation of the traditional philological 
approach presents a whole series of characteristic thematic and 
stylistic properties which constitute significant determinants of dif­
ferent authorial structures. In V. Propp's Morphology of the Fairy 
Tale application of statistical research shows not only the "nature" of 
the miraculous in the fairy tale but offers clear ways of understanding 
how identical functional distributions and arrangements govern the 
flow and shape of a "literary" narrative. 
Model is a means of concretisation: it and its original are not iden­
tical, they are only similar. Certain dominant features of the original 
must be transposed into the model. If they are not, we reject the pro­
position contained in the original, we turn away from the poem. The 
failure, however, is not necessarily the fault of the maker of the poem 
but of the maker of the model. And, to make matters more difficult, 
the model is tested against belief, which explains why it is possible to 
be awed by a poem yet give not a hang for it, or, conversely, why one 
occasionally "gives assent" to a trite piece of sentimental fluff. By 
and large, however, there is a broad, global, tacit agreement regarding 
certain "greats." 
One is almost prepared to accept the notion that these general and 
inexplicable agreements — why should peasants of a remote village in 
Yugoslavia become so profoundly and shockingly moved by the fate 
of Hamlet, for instance, or why is Shakespeare, the voice of a 
"civilized" urban culture, a "hit" in the bush? — bespeak the 
quality of the mind that is anterior to logical thought, the sort of thing 
Levy-Bruhl must have meant by "pre-logical" mentality, namely the 
capacity of the mind to sustain itself in contradiction, something we 
find difficult to imagine. Is it not possible that Weber s suggestion 
should be pursued as a rewarding clue: some causes can have only one 
type of consequence, he claims (1963:36), but on different leve s 
sociological, poetic, semantic, semiotic? I find Weber's idea attractive 
because it confirms my conviction that poetry as pure su jec rvi y is 
bunk. The poem is an attitude, a proposition regarding certain orders 
and their constituent elements. "A proposition is a model of reality as 
w imagine it," says Wittgenstein (1976:19). And while I probably 
misunderstand most of Wittgenstein the last statement is, think 
almost incapable of misunderstanding. A theory of a thinking whole 
rests on the praxis of reading: the two processes are not to be 
understood as a sum of processes external to each other but as 
spatial and temporal unfolding of certain idea urn ies. 
organism is a melody which sings itself," says Uexkull. The organism 
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does not necessarily know the melody, nor does it know that it is sing­
ing, let alone that it is singing a unique, characteristic melody which 
attests to the existence of systematic behaviour. But such an organism 
is a whole and as such significant, for the consciousness that knows it, 
not merely a thing-in-itself. 
The cluster of attitudes, propositions of the poem is the immanent 
structure of the language of the poem. Its syntax is a relationship be­
tween the poem and the reader. The poem without the reader is empty, 
mind-less; it is like a galvanic element drained of electrolyte. Reading 
starts the poem up, as it were. The mind in the poem is a hidden mind: 
it is hidden because it is not produced in the form of the mind itself; it 
is a mind for the mind that comes to it; it is mind-in-itself but not 
mind-for-itself. Only in reading does it become mind-for-itself. So 
when we say the poem we mean the consciousness of the poem, just as 
when we say life we mean the consciousness of life. The poem, then, is 
the manifestation of an "interior" in the "exterior" — a duplication 
of the process whereby consciousness projects onto the world a new 
world. And that new world in the assent of pre-reflexive belief is 
perceived as an "interiority" when we have perceived certain patterns: 
in other words, on the level of perception, I think, actions dissipated 
onto the world merely inform us of the vital situation of an organism; 
the sudden grasping of patterns is understanding which makes the poem. 
An enquiry into the activity of signs is a concrete submergence in a 
game whose rules are known in part, a play we can describe as a pro­
cess but whose outcome is opaque. Such an enquiry is only a partial 
j* to a^stract a general system of functioning meanings attached 
to fields of signification in the constitution of plot by stylistic devices. 
he structuration of the fields, again, is an attempt to abstract 
everything that evidently lies behind them in thp intprpct nf a com-
century Schaffhausen to the 
locale. present-day Doxa works in the same 
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The phenomenon of literariness becomes more accessible by the ap­
plication of extra-disciplinary procedures, even if this application is 
clumsy, as mine is. At least one is forced to ask questions in a different 
language, thus avoiding the strategy of fitting the question to a pre­
conceived answer. This strategy is based on the assumption that 
literariness, or poiesis, is a transcendental quality of the imagination, 
something like a repeatable immaculate conception. The questioner 
can never be wrong, only inept or inelegant. The logic of consequen-
tiality is always upheld, never questioned. And what is never question­
ed must be considered suspect. Consecutivity as a principle is easily 
discredited, and it is usually discredited that a consequential logic may 
be established. A journey to the significant core of the poem, for ex­
ample, can easily and attractively be "reified" by the core itself. But 
there must be other ways to verify the metaphor. In the process we 
may discover that the core is a decoy. 
When we are "informed" by the poem we are shaped from within 
by a specific activity of the text. Information is not generated by 
meanings deposited in signs, but by the arrangement of signs 
themselves. They are the melody I mentioned earlier. A distinct piece 
of information is generated when a group of signs reveal certain 
choices and preferences in the use of signs, as Shannon says. Conse­
quently, in the area of language information is also shaped by the pro­
cedures of choice. Syntax, after all, comprises only linguistic signs, 
and since Shannon's concept of information appears to be applicable 
to any statistically significant group of signs there is no reason why it 
should not be applied to the poem (vide Propp). The use of language is 
in the final analysis a behaviour, a properly human activity which has 
no intrinsic significance, only referential significance. Behaviour can 
only be understood in reference to aims of life — linguistic behaviour 
is a means of adaption to "unorganized mass," to life. But life^does 
not have the same meaning in animality and humanity, and man s act 
of speaking expresses the fact that he is severing his adhesion to en­
vironment, that he recognizes the act to be co-extensive with his mind 
and that the specific modality of this co-extension is knowledge. For 
bought language is simultaneously a principle of slavery, since it is in­
terposed between thing and thought, and a principle of liberty, since 
the naming of an attitude, or a conviction, constitutes separation ot it 
from the being, an increase in the transparency of the consciousness. 
That in itself is an attitude, a proposition with regard to the world. 
The poem, then, is an example of the systematic use o signs, y 
th« I mean the use which purposefully organizes the behaviour o 
reading. We do not perceive signs separately, in fact we are not 
generally aware of signs as specific pieces which form a shape, any 
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more than we see each single piece in a mosaic, or each stroke of the 
brush in a painting. We see a mosaic, or a painting, before we know 
how it is made, or we do not see them at all. We do not make in­
ferences from a number of distinct elements of a whole. The whole is 
apprehended, and from our apprehension of the whole its constituent 
elements derive their meaning. Natasha's face is radiant, Tolstoy tells 
us, but the radiance is ours. Rather, the radiance is not capable of 
description, we either know what it entails or we remain at a loss as to 
why it is of any particular import. The radiance of Natasha's face is 
only a brush-stroke on the grand canvas of War and Peace, it is a sign 
emanating from the comprehensible system of the novel. Significa­
tion, the most distinct property of the system, is its ontological 
essence. 
This understanding of signification offers a way to deal with the 
consciousness of here and now, when, specifically, such consciousness 
becomes overt in a collapse of the dimensions of the poem into the 
unensions o the reader. In this catastrophe the elimination of suc-
Z'ICOntr ttl0f of memory and intelligence reduces the initial 
when a ,a^ experience to that swift shock we experience 
tain hn "'fi, I W& believe, no, we know without being completely cer 
which dne* ! we have glimpsed or heard a man. This judgemenl 
tact whh reart "f °bject' neve«heless marks a point of con-
separable frnm h absolUJely irreducible in experience, thoroughly in-
realitv of nrece efm8 e sPeak about the feeling we have of present 
function " as the h ° unconditi°nal density, of the "reality 
referential ilTusfon1T 11 is different from reality as a 
, iThinh W"hOW the reali,y «* illusion would 
SAY> -IS M ED AS A REALI,Y-IL IS NO1 K-°™» » 
but if our experience is preSermilied byVlanSh<:S 'he "penence of 
the enormous differenee between the ex~rienSd accounts,fo; 
Is language an indecomposable structure and tkm f account of 
Y e s ,  l a n g u a g e  a s  a  h u m a n  s o c i a l  e v e S  i s  s u c h  a n T " " o f / " " " '  
stitutes the dividing line between ,™al C°?' 
not the content, because it is a secondary chSensnif^ ' 
then! And that which is alone caoable^™,. • Jhestruc,ure-
the consciousness, the most problematic part of myViscVsXTolT 
sciousness is a network of significative intent yL , sslon- Con' 
clear, transparent to itself i e known and 1S sometimes 
than known. Some of our most DrofonnH s?metimes lived rather 
knowledge: they are « ' 
wetght are impressive because they are rooted to Se lifeT/con 
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sciousness. And if the vocabulary of consciousness were limited to the 
juggling of experiential data, we would probably never have climbed 
down from the trees. 
The poem is in the conjoining of the ideal signification and true 
signification. The message represents ideal signification, the recipient 
of the message provides true signification. The ideal signification is 
visible from the outside of the poem, the message, but this visibility 
entails a corresponding visibility from within. I see myself seeing, I am 
more profoundly in being, the poem and the reader are one event: the 
ideal structure of signification and the true structure of recipient 
signification flow so closely that signification constitutes a single 
"form" and the separation between the ideal and the true is suspend­
ed. It is a form of consent, a union. This union has several 
recognizable features: 
1. Reading is an event — by that I mean that it occurs within the 
dimensions of consciousness; 
2. Reading is a linguistic event — by that I mean that language is not 
used instrumentally as an extension of the self in the conquest of 
the world, but that language is a medium in which the world 
stands before us and in us; 
3. Reading is a dialectical event — by that I mean that true con­
sciousness enters into a relationship with the ideal consciousness, 
and that ideal consciousness, standing over and against, 
permeates the true consciousness; 
4. Reading is an objective event — by that I mean not only that it has 
the characteristics of otherness, namely what stands before us in 
the poem, in language, is not the outcome of the reflexive activity 
of the mind. Rather, the mind by entering into a world it has not 
shaped conforms to that world; 
3- Reading is an ontological event — by that I mean that in conform­
ing to the poem the mind dies and is re-born, and dying and birth 
are disclosures of being. 
6' Reading is an historical event — by that I mean that reading en­
tails the collapse of history into the presentness of the event; thus 
whether we know it or not, whether we like it or not, reading is a 
genuine experience of history in the guise of its total absence, 
Reading is an event of the text — by that I mean that the text is at 
least as important as the reader. 
Whenever language works, as Needham says, we are the locus of the 
Phenomenon. Perhaps that is why we are so inept in trying to under 
stand how it works and so endlessly fascinated by its working. 
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